Raffaella A. Del Sarto, European University Institute
‘Nothing enduring can be built on violence.’ – Mahatma Gandhi[2]
‘The practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world.’ ― Hannah Arendt[3]
The starting point of my contribution (co-authored with Helle Malmvig and Eduard Soler i Lecha) to Order and Region Making in the Middle East is two essential questions. First, what is an order? Second, how and why do orders change? As political and social orders are always in flux, thereby featuring elements of both continuity and change, what allows us to define an order as substantially new? Our contribution introduces the analytical distinction between change of order and change within order.[4]
Written well before the events of October 7, 2023 in Israel/Palestine, our chapter shows that the revolutionary forces unleashed by the Arab uprisings could have changed the regional order profoundly. The same can be said about the normalization of relations between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan of 2020: Israel’s potential integration into a regional security architecture could have led to the emergence of a very different Middle East. We also identified the growing distance of many regional actors from their traditional ‘Western’ allies, together with the diversification and ‘liquidity’ of alliances,[5] as significant features of the region after the Arab uprisings. However, the existing order proved far more resilient than anticipated. We therefore concluded that the transformations that resulted from the Arab uprisings qualify as a change within order and not a change of the order.
Are these conclusions still valid after October 7, 2023? Did Hamas’ attacks on Israel that day, Israel’s subsequent war on the Gaza Strip, and the regional escalations which followed signify the emergence of a qualitatively different regional order? While armed conflicts have been characterizing the Middle East for decades, one striking feature since October 7 is the extent and type of violence. Focusing on this aspect, I argue that extreme, sustained, and indiscriminate violence on and after October 7 has been affecting the region’s ordering principles in various ways—and across different levels of analysis.
A note on regional order and change
From a constructivist and English School perspective, regional order entails more than the distribution of material and/or ideational power, the kind of polarity and international permeation, and patterns of alliances. Regional orders are also made up of shared norms and rules that are enacted in common practices and institutions, as well as identities.[6] These elements structure relations between the actors in a regional system, foment expectations, and define the parameters of legitimate behavior. We also assume that there is a hierarchy of ordering elements in any given regional order, with constitutive norms at the top, followed by durable institutions and practices.[7] A change of order occurs when constitutive and deeply entrenched norms and practices mutate substantially. Importantly, transformations at the domestic, regional, or international level may trigger or amplify processes of change across the other levels. Which ordering principles define a region, and which hierarchy exists among these, is an empirical question; these factors vary from region to region.
Central to any regional order is the way in which the actors in the system manage their security relations. These can range from open conflict and war to collective security arrangements and integration, which entail different degrees of actual or threatened violence.[8] Hence, what does a focus on violence tell us about the Middle East regional order after October 7?
Violence since October 7
The period since October 7 has been characterized by specific forms, locations, and degrees of violence. While the Hamas attacks resulted in the death of around 1,200 people in one single day, and over 240 hostages being taken, at the time of writing Israel’s assault on the Gaza Strip, with the stated aim of eliminating Hamas and restoring deterrence, has caused the staggering number of over 52,000 Palestinian fatalities.[9] Over 250 aid workers and over 150 journalists have also been killed there.
The conflict quickly spiralled from the Gaza Strip to Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. For the first time, it led to a direct military confrontation between Iran and Israel in April 2024, and again in October 2024. In Lebanon, Israel’s war on Hizballah in response to their launching of rockets on Israel in solidarity with Hamas has killed at least 3,500 people (a ceasefire went into effect in late November 2024; both sides have been accusing each other of violating it). Israel’s pager attack on Hizballah members of September 2024 left 42 people dead, 12 of them civilians, and injured more than 3,000 people across Lebanon and Syria.[10] This attack was quite sophisticated, but it has been equalled with (state) terrorism.[11] Leaders and senior commanders of Hizballah, Hamas, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have been killed by Israeli strikes or explosions. These include Hamas deputy leader Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut in January 2024, two senior IRGC commanders in the Iranian embassy compound in Damascus in April, Hamas senior figure Ismael Haniyeh in the military-run guesthouse after he attended the inauguration of Iranian President Pezeshkian in July in Tehran, and longtime Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah in September of that year. The Israeli army has also bombed Yemen’s Houthis, which also joined the fray against Israel, as well as various Iran-affiliated groups in Syria and Iraq.
The weakening of the ‘axis of resistance’ (and Russia’s focus on Ukraine) set off a chain reaction in the region: Syrian rebels led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham took over Damascus in early December 2024, leading to the fall of the al-Assad regime. This has prompted Israel to conduct hundreds of airstrikes on Syrian territory, with the declared aim of destroying Assad’s military facilities.[12] In violation of the 1974 Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement, Israeli ground forces also advanced into and beyond the demilitarized zone on the Golan Heights, purportedly to provide security to Israeli citizens, and appear set on a long-term occupation of parts of southern Syria.
The impact of the military campaigns on civilians has been catastrophic. Infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip has been destroyed while most residents have been forced to flee. This reflected the initial Israeli objective to push the Palestinian population southwards and create a buffer zone in the north.[13] The rest of the Gaza Strip lies in ruins, too. According to UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk, the ‘scale of the Israeli military’s destruction of homes, hospitals, schools and places of worship [is] deeply shocking’.[14] In November 2024, Israeli airstrikes and the subsequent ground invasion had already caused the forceful displacement of 1.9m people out of 2.2m, that is, 90% of Gaza Palestinians.[15]
After Israel let a weeks-long ceasefire with Hamas collapse in March 2025, Israeli attacks on Gaza resumed, forcing some 420,000 Gazans to flee yet again. The Israeli government also cut off all humanitarian aid and electricity to Gaza. As of May 2025, the blockade on food, water, fuel, and medication has persisted for two months, with the UN warning of an imminent hunger crisis.[16] In the West Bank, more than 800 Palestinians were killed by Israeli soldiers or settlers, and over 1,000 people were forced to leave their homes, between October 7, 2023 and the start of a massive Israeli campaign against Palestinian militants in January this year.[17] Since then, an additional 40,000 West Bank Palestinians have been displaced from their homes, the largest displacement of civilians in that territory since the 1967 war. The Israeli army has also destroyed buildings and power lines, as well as the water and sanitation systems in four refugee camps in the West Bank.[18] In Lebanon, around 1.3m people were forcefully displaced. 100,000 housing units were destroyed, with the World Bank estimating the damage to physical infrastructure at around 3.4 billion US-Dollars in November 2024.[19] In Israel, over 60,000 residents had to evacuate the northern border area because of Hizballah’s rocket attacks; another 60,000 residents along the Gaza border left their homes after the destruction wrought by Hamas on October 7. At the time of writing, 58 hostages are still held in Gaza, with 35 of them declared dead.
Extent and type of violence
Since October 7, the magnitude and the type of violence, and especially the combination of these two features, is unparalleled. The death toll and the extent of destruction since October 7 by far exceed any period of violence in Israel/Palestine, including all previous Israel-Hamas wars, which claimed a total of around 6,000 victims. And this does not include the exorbitant high number of maimed and injured people, the malnutrition, starvation, and outbreak of diseases in the Gaza Strip, all of which will drive up the number of fatalities substantially. Also, by comparison, in the 2006 Israel-Hizballah war, around 1,100 people were killed in Lebanon and about 170 on the Israeli side.[20]
But this is not only about numbers. What is equally disturbing is the seemingly wilful ignoring of the distinction between civilians and combatants. While this is a not an entirely new phenomenon, it has reached an unprecedented level. In such a densely populated area as the Gaza Strip, massive Israeli air strikes and ground invasions cannot but cause a high number of civilian deaths—irrespective of whether Hamas uses civilians as human shields, as the Israeli government claims.[21] An additional explanation for the extraordinary high number of civilian fatalities is that the Israeli army reportedly relaxed the rules of civilian protection in its campaigns.[22] And indeed, 70% of those killed in the Gaza Strip are women and children.[23] Similarly, violence committed by Israeli soldiers and settlers against West Bank Palestinians mainly affects the civilian population, with violence patently also used for territorial and/or demographic engineering.
Neither did Hamas and other groups distinguish between soldiers and civilians when they staged their attacks on southern Israel on October 7. These were not a quick incursion: for example, in Kibbutz Be’eri, where over 80 people were killed, the killing spree lasted for hours. There is also evidence of sexual violence,[24] although Hamas denies this. Neither did Hizballah’s rockets and drones distinguish between civilians and soldiers in Israel.
The decision of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to issue arrest warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu, his former defense minister Yoav Gallant, and senior Hamas commander Mohammed Deif,[25] because there are ‘reasonable grounds’ the three men bear responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity, supports this observation. In other words, since October 7, indiscriminate violence has become ubiquitous, with the extremely high numbers of civilian death and suffering being tolerated—if not intended—by the perpetrators.
Equally important, irrespective of strategic justifications, this type of violence is directed towards specific ethnic or religious groups: Jewish Israelis in the case of Hamas, and Palestinians in the case of Israeli assaults on Gaza and the West Bank. Similarly, Israel’s objective of weakening Hizballah has mainly targeted (Arab and non-Arab) Shi’a in Lebanon and the wider region. While members of other ethnic and religious groups are ‘accidentally’ killed as well,[26] sectarian securitization,[27] which had retreated in recent years in the Middle East, is back.
An additional aspect is the type of actors that are perpetrating and supporting this kind of violence. All evoke a fundamentalist interpretation of religion (see Blanc’s essay in this collection). This seems obvious for Hamas and Hizballah (and the Iranian regime), but it also applies to the politically most influential components of the Israeli government. Indeed, the far-right religious parties on which Netanyahu’s coalition depends are eager to continue the war on Gaza. Not only do they want to annex the West Bank according to their messianic worldview. They dream of resettling the Gaza Strip, too.[28]
Importantly, violent Israeli settlers can count on the support of these extremist parties, with far-right National Security minister Itamar Ben-Gvir bragging in May 2024 about having issued 100,000 gun licences to Jewish Israelis (including settlers) since October 7.[29] While settler violence in the West Bank has been enjoying impunity for years, but even more so under the current Israeli government, violent settlers act like state-sponsored militias that aim at terrorizing and expelling Palestinians from the West Bank. This consideration blurs the traditional distinction between states and armed non-state actors—a distinction that is already difficult to make for Hamas and Hizballah—in the case of Israel, too.
Finally, looking at the perpetrators and supporters of violence in the current conflict, one cannot but notice the gender aspect. Indeed, among the leadership of Hamas, Hizballah, Israel, and Iran, women are conspicuously absent.
Violence and regional order
In which way do the magnitude and the type of violence that we have been witnessing since October 7 challenge or even alter the ordering principles of the region?
Constitutive norms
At first sight, key constitutive norms of the region, namely sovereignty and territorial integrity – norms that also regulate international relations at large – are still setting the parameters of legitimate and predictable behaviour. Indeed, a forceful Israeli response to the violation of these principles by Hamas (incursion into Israeli territory) and Hizballah (launching of rockets) was to be expected. The assassination of political and military leaders — designated ‘terrorists’— within the territory of other sovereign states, which has become a normal practice for Israel’s leadership, has tested these principles. And yet, Iran’s military response to the killing of Haniyeh on its territory also confirms the enduring validity of the norms of territoriality and sovereignty. However, the unprecedented type and the extent of violence after October 7, most prominent in Israel’s military campaigns and its seeming indifference to the killing and forceful displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians, show that these norms are under attack—literally.
The challenge to the region’s constitutive norms has also had repercussions at the international level. The question of whether the principle of legitimate self-defence justifies Israel’s violent response in Gaza and the wider region,[30] as the Israeli government claims, or whether the Israeli army is committing war crimes, pits the government in Jerusalem and the US administration (plus many European governments) against the majority opinion in international law. The latter is defended by the UN, the ICC, and many governments in the Global South. Extreme polarization around the question of whether Israel is a victim or a perpetrator of genocide has also affected public opinion worldwide, as evidenced by ‘pro-Palestinian’ and ‘pro-Israeli’[31] protests and clashes around the world, together with the militarised response to demonstrations on US campuses. With Israel currently losing the public opinion battle, discursive if not physical violence has been exported abroad.
What is at stake here is the legitimacy of UN institutions and international law, which, however imperfect, have been structuring international relations since World War II. The Israeli government’s designation of UN Secretary-General António Guterres persona non grata,[32] its banning of UNRWA from Israeli-controlled territory, and its calls to not comply with the ICC’s arrest warrants are cases in point. But even more so, the tacit—and not-so-tacit—support of these positions by the US administration as well as by some Western governments, together with Washington’s repeated vetoing of UN Security Council resolutions calling for a ceasefire in Gaza, poses a serious threat to the rules-based international order.
Fault lines, actors, power
The second aspect of how the violence has affected the region’s ordering principles regards the configuration of fault lines in the region, together with the power of the main conflicting parties. As a toxic mix of overreaction, provocation, miscalculation, and deterrence transformed the Hamas attacks into a regional war between Israel and the ‘axis of resistance’, Israel’s response succeeded in weakening the military and organizational capabilities of Hamas, Hizballah, and even Iran.[33] Moreover, Iran’s normative power was damaged as it refrained from defending its allies, most notably Hizballah, and later the al-Assad regime. In other words, the violence deployed by the Israeli army, however deplorable, did alter the balance of power in the region—for now in Israel’s favour. The Israeli government also succeeded in dragging Iran into the conflict, much in accordance with Israel’s—and particularly Netanyahu’s—long-standing obsession.[34]
The decision of Arab states to not intervene militarily despite the massive violence in Gaza also confirms that the ‘old’ Arab-Israeli conflict no longer exists. This fault-line had structured regional relations for decades. While once more confirming the erosion of the norm of Arab solidarity, the extreme violence and destruction in Gaza have however fuelled feelings of solidarity with the Palestinians among Arab populations. This bears evidence to the ever-growing gap between the people and their rulers.[35] And while the question of Palestine (or the political use of it) still lies at its origin, this fault line has mutated into a conflict between Israel and several semi-state actors (Hamas, Hizballah, the Houthis) plus Iran. Reflecting my previous observation on the perpetrators of indiscriminate violence, we could also say that it transmuted into a conflict between (predominantly male) actors whose political agenda is led or dominated by religious fundamentalism.
At the international level, the unwillingness of the Biden administration to reign in and pressure the Israeli government showed that ‘tail-wagging-the dog’ dynamics—an important feature of the region post-Arab uprisings—had reached a new high. This is even more so as Netanyahu was trying to drag the US into an armed conflict with Iran. Combined with Washington’s massive military and diplomatic support of Israel,[36] which renders it complicit in Israel’s violations of international law, the US’ standing in the region took a further hit.
Israel/Palestine: End of negotiations and dialogue
Finally, the massive and genocidal violence employed by the Israeli army since October 7—as well as by Hamas on that day—has sounded the death knell to any peaceful and mutually acceptable resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Each side is focused on its own situation and trauma, with Israeli media for instance rarely showing footage of the massive destruction and inhuman conditions in Gaza. Even a dialogue among traditional pro-peace activists in Israel/Palestine has become extremely difficult. By also considering Israel’s relative power at the regional and international level, together with its right-wing shift and expansionist appetite, going back to a negotiated framework to establish an independent—and meaningful—Palestinian state seems unthinkable at present. The existing one-state-reality in Israel/Palestine,[37] which only foments (further) violence, seems to be here to stay.
Conclusions
A focus on the scale and type of violence shows how much the Middle East regional order has changed since October 7, 2023. Excessive and indiscriminate violence perpetrated by political actors that are steeped in, or condone, religious fundamentalism has been challenging the constitutive principles of the region—as much as the international order with its laws of war. Particularly Israel’s extremely violent reaction to the Hamas attacks has also transformed the material and ideational power of the principal actors in the current conflict. And it has confirmed the ever-diminishing relevance of solidarity with the Palestinians among Arab regimes—but not populations. While decimating the prospects of dialogue and a shared future for Israelis and Palestinians, including at the civil society level, massive and indiscriminate violence committed by all sides since October 7 has also further polarized and radicalized public opinion worldwide. Concurrently, Washington’s material and diplomatic support of Israel, its incapacity or unwillingness to reign in the violence, and the (tacit) backing of these positions by other Western governments, erode the validity of the international system’s foundational laws and rules.
A reading of the Middle East regional order through the lens of violence thus confirms that October 7 and its aftermath have affected key principles, normative underpinnings, and the power relations of the regional order across different levels of analysis. While some of the current dynamics of violence are not entirely new to the region, their unprecedented pace and magnitude have shaken the order that preceded October 7, 2024. Whether this will precipitate a radical change of the regional order—as opposed to significant changes within that order—remains to be seen. Yet, considering the repercussions of the weakening of the ‘axis of resistance’, the challenging transition in Syria after Assad, and Trump’s unpredictable policies on the region, the extent and type of violence after October 7, 2023 may well exceed a threshold, thereby prefiguring the beginning of a different Middle East.
[1] This paper was first presented at a workshop on ‘Regional Order in the Middle East after October 7, 2023’ that took place at the European University Institute on 12 December 2024. The author would like to thank all the participants for their insightful comments. Special thanks to Marc Lynch and Daniel Lubin for their feedback.
[2] Mahatma Gandhi (and Judith M. Brown, ed.), The Essential Writings, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008; p. 97.
[3] Hannah Arendt, On Violence, Orlando, Fl.: Harcourt Publishing, 1970; p. 80.
[4] Raffaella A. Del Sarto, Helle Malmvig, and Eduard Soler i Lecha, ‘Lost in Change: A Framework for Understanding Change in the Middle East Regional Order’, in Marc Lynch and Simon Mabon, eds., Order and Region Making in the Middle East, Manchester: Manchester University Press, forthcoming.
[5] Raffaella A. Del Sarto and Eduard Soler i Lecha, ‘Regionalism and Alliances in the Middle East, 2011-2021: From a “Flash in the Pan” of Regional Cooperation to Liquid Alliances’, Geopolitics 29(4), 2024, pp. 1447-1473.
[6] See for example Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012; Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
[7] Del Sarto, Malmvig, and Soler i Lecha, ‘Lost in Change’, op. cit.
[8] Buzan and Wæver, op. cit.; see also Patrick M. Morgan and David A. Lake, eds., Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.
[9] Most international observers, the UN included, consider these figures reliable. A recent study finds that mortality may even have been under-reported, by over 40%. Zeina Jamaluddine, et al., ‘Traumatic injury mortality in the Gaza Strip from Oct 7, 2023, to June 30, 2024: a capture–recapture analysis’, The Lancet, published online 9 January, 2025.
[10] Suspecting that Israel had succeeded in hacking into the cell phone network, Nasrallah had instructed members to use pagers instead of cellular phones.
[11] ‘Former CIA director: Israel pager attack “a form of terrorism”’, The Jerusalem Post, 23 September 2024.
[12] Ephrat Livni, ‘Israel Conducts Raids in Syria Amid Accusations of Cease-Fire Violations’, New York Times, 5 January 2025.
[13] Haaretz [editorial], ‘Is Israel Really Implementing a Plan of Siege and Starvation in Gaza?’, Haaretz, 22 October 2024.
[14] United Nations, ‘Most of Gaza’s 40,000 dead are women and children, says UN rights chief’, 15 August 2024.
[15] Human Rights Watch, ‘“Hopeless, Starving, and Besieged”: Israel’s Forced Displacement of Palestinians in Gaza’, November 2024.
[16] United Nations, ‘Gazans face hunger crisis as aid blockade nears two months’, 28 April 2025; Erika Solomon and Rawan Sheikh Ahmad, ‘As Gaza Siege Grinds On, Gazan Children Go Hungry and Patients Die’, New York Times, 4 May 2025.
[17] B’Tselem, ’Forcible transfer of isolated Palestinian communities and families in Area C under cover of Gaza fighting’, 30 October 2024.
[18] Fatima AbdulKarim and Patrick Kingsley, ‘Palestinian Displacement in the West Bank Is Highest Since 1967, Experts Say’, New York Times, 17 February 2025.
[19] The World Bank, Lebanon: Interim Damage and Loss Assessment (DaLA), November, Washington: The World Bank, 2024, pp. 5-6.
[20] Human Rights Watch, ‘Why They Died: Civilian Casualties in Lebanon during the 2006 War’, September 2007, p. 4. The report erroneously states that about 12 Israeli soldiers were killed in the war; the correct number is 120.
[21] Incidentally, the Israeli army has reportedly been using Palestinians as human shields. See Natan Odenheimer, Bilal Shbair, and Patrick Kingsley, ‘How Israel’s Army Uses Palestinians as Human Shields in Gaza’, New York Times, 14 October 2024.
[22] Samuel Granados, Patrick Kingsley, and Natan Odenheimer, ‘How Israel Weakened Civilian Protections When Bombing Hamas Fighters’, New York Times, 26 December 2024.
[23] United Nations, ‘Most of Gaza’s 40,000 dead’, op.cit.
[24] United Nations, ‘Mission Report: Official Visit of the Office of the SRSG-SVC to Israel and the Occupied West Bank, 29 January – 14 February 2024’, 4 March 2024.
[25] Deif was reportedly killed in an Israeli airstrike in the summer of 2024.
[26] For example, in July 2024 a rocket launched by Hizballah killed 12 Druze children on a football field in Majdal Shams in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.
[27] See for Helle Malmvig, ‘Power, Identity and Securitization in the Middle East: Regional Order after the Arab Uprisings’, Mediterranean Politics 19(1), 2014, pp. 145-148; Raffaella A. Del Sarto, ‘Sectarian Securitization in the Middle East and the Case of Israel’, International Affairs 97(3), 2021, pp. 759-778; Simon Mabon, Houses Built on Sand: Violence, Sectarianism and Revolution in the Middle East, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2022.
[28] Marcella Simoni, ‘”Torniamo Subito:” Il disimpegno dalla Striscia di Gaza e l’aspirazione al ritorno dei coloni israeliani’, in Arturo Marzano and Marcella Simoni, eds., Il labirinto di Gaza: Storie, politiche, rappresentazioni (1987-2023), Brescia: Morcelliana, 2024, pp. 135-172.
[29] Rachel Fink, ‘Israel’s Far-right National Security Minister Celebrates Handing Out 100k Gun Permits Since Oct. 7’, Haaretz, 19 March 2024.
[30] According to UN Charter VII, Article 51. The principle of legitimate self-defence applies if Gaza is considered a sovereign state or political entity ruled by Hamas (as Israel does). It does not apply if Gaza is considered occupied territory (as the majority opinion in international law maintains), meaning that Israel cannot claim to defend itself legitimately against a people it occupies.
[31] A discussion of what exactly ‘pro-Palestinian’ and ‘pro-Israeli’ mean is warranted, but this would be for another paper.
[32] Guterres dared saying that there is a context to the Hamas attacks (which he unequivocally condemned).
[33] Israel’s attacks reportedly damaged Iran’s air defence system. Farnaz Fassihi and Ronen Bergman, ‘Israel Struck Air Defenses Around Critical Iranian Energy Sites, Officials Say’, New York Times, 26 October 2024.
[34] Raffaella A. Del Sarto, Israel under Siege 2017: The Politics of Insecurity and the Rise of the Israeli Neo-Revisionist Right, Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2017; pp. 62-64, 113, 178-179.
[35] Morten Valbjørn, André Bank, and May Darwich, ‘Forward to the Past? Regional Repercussions of the Gaza War’, Middle East Policy 31(3): 3-17, 2024; see also Raffaella A. Del Sarto, ‘A Region in Transition: The Fluid Nature of Middle East Politics’, in The Middle East’s Fragile Reset: Actors, Battlegrounds, and (Dis)Order, ed. Galip Dalay and Tarik M. Yousef, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, 2023, pp. 8-15.
[36] In October 2024, the US had spent a record of at least US-$ 17.9 billion on military aid to Israel since October 7, 2023. Linda J. Bilmes et al., United States Spending on Israel’s Military Operations and Related U.S. Operations in the Region, October 7, 2023 – September 30, 2024, Brown University, Watson Institute for International & Public Affairs, October 2024.
[37] Ian Lustick, Paradigm Lost: From Two-State Solution to One-State Reality, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019; Michael Barnett et al., eds., The One State Reality: What is Israel/Palestine?, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2023.