Eduard Soler i Lecha, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Regionalism and regional order: looking for the right questions
The study of regionalism in the Middle East and North Africa region, and particularly among Arab countries has mainly focused on identifying the reasons explaining its limited success. Is this a region without regionalism, as suggested by Paul Aarts (1999)? Why is political and economic integration among Arab states so weak despite the existence of a strong common cultural and linguistic bond and the broader phenomena of globalization that has translated into a regionalist dynamic elsewhere? (Salloukh and Brynen, 2004). Is it appropriate or analytically meaningful to apply ‘Western’ standards to the analysis of regionalism in the MENA? (Acharya, 2011; Fawcett, 2020). Can the region’s integration shortcomings be explained by a sustained tension between the Pan-Arab ideals and the interests of Arab States aiming at securing their political autonomy? (Tripp, 1995; Barnett and Solingen, 2007; Awad, 2022). Or, instead of focusing on the shortcomings of top-down regionalism, should our attention be redirected to the understanding of bottom-up regionalization processes? (Harders & Legrenzi, 2008; Ferabolli, 2014). Under which conditions do formal organizations such as the League of the Arab States (LAS) or the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) become the arenas where regional powers expose and confront their differences? (del Sarto & Soler i Lecha, 2024).
This essay examines the relationship between regionalism and regional order. Regionalism, conventionally defined as the formation of interstate organizations within specific regions, has had a limited influence on shaping regional dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa region. Instead, dynamics of regional fragmentation, conflict-driven inter-state relations and extra-regional interference explain many of the challenges and shortcomings faced by such organizations. Consequently, when examining the relationship between regionalism and regional order, the focus should be on how changes of regional order or within a specific order (del Sarto, Malmvig, Soler i Lecha, 2025) have shaped the conditions under which regionalism either advances or declines.
Building on the English School’s definition of international order, regional order can be understood as the set of ordering principles within an international society, applied specifically to a regional context. This regional order comprises not only a specific distribution of power but also formal and informal institutions, shared norms, rules, practices, common assumptions, and durable expectations. Within this framework, regionalism—or its absence—constitutes an integral element of the regional order in the form of secondary institutions. It is crucial to highlight that orders may either be cooperative—creating opportunities for regionalism to flourish—or conflict-driven, where the prospects for regionalism are significantly constrained.
Three key moments challenged this regional order. The Arab countries, as part of the broader Middle East region, experienced an intensification of domestic and regional upheavals in 2011. Initially, the predominant view was that the Arab uprisings could herald a profound and irreversible transformation of the region, which could have eventually led to the emergence of a new regional order with greater regional cooperation and a more visible role for regional organizations. With the descent of Syria, Libya, and Yemen into interstate wars and the resilience or restauration of authoritarianism, those expectations faded away. In 2017, the coordinated boycott of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain revealed the vulnerability of even a seemingly effective regional organization like the Gulf Cooperation Council. Finally, in 2023, the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel and its subsequent brutal retaliation in Gaza, followed by the regionalization of the conflict. The involvement of Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iran, the Israeli military operations in Lebanon, and the weakening of the axis of resistance in the form of the sudden collapse of the Al-Asad regime in Syria in December 2024 represents a new stress test for Arab regionalism.
The analysis of these three episodes provides an empirical basis for comparative studies on Arab regionalism but also for the regionalism in contested regional orders. We already know that regionalism has not become more prominent or relevant, despite a brief, illusory resurgence in the early months of 2011 (del Sarto & Soler i Lecha, 2018). Thus, our focus should shift toward understanding how regionalism absorbs these challenges without collapsing entirely. In other words, is this dysfunctional regionalism merely another symptom of an old order clinging to survival? What are the elements that sustain this resilience? Can regionalism mitigate and buffer challenges to the regional order?
2011: A flash in a pan
The Arab Uprisings of 2011 presented a rare opportunity for regional organizations to assume a more assertive role. With mass protests sweeping through the region and the overthrow of authoritarian leaders in Tunisia and Egypt, uncertainty prompted calls for collective action. Organizations like the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) took a more central role in shaping regional dynamics, creating momentum for organizations that had long been trying to upgrade regional cooperation and modernize those institutions.
The LAS’s response to the uprisings highlighted both its potential and its limitations. It took unprecedented steps, such as supporting an international intervention in Libya and imposing sanctions on Syria. These actions marked a departure from its traditional non-interventionist stance, and analysts considered that it reflected “a change in both its initial conception and its general behavior” (Korany, 2013: 93–94) and argued that “the Arab League can be reformed to enhance its role in the development of the new Arab world” (Muasher, 2012) thus opening a significant window of opportunity for regional cooperation and cooperative security mechanisms that previously had been closed (Malmvig 2013: 30, Beck 2015). Despite bold proposals, such as the creation of a joint Arab military force, internal divisions among member states hindered the organization’s ability to address regional challenges effectively and relegated the organization to its pre-2011 role.
The GCC also emerged as an active player during the uprisings, leveraging its relatively cohesive structure and resources. In Bahrain, the GCC deployed its Peninsula Shield Force to suppress protests, while in Yemen, it mediated President Saleh’s resignation. These initiatives were primarily driven by the Gulf monarchies’ desire to counter regional instability and curb Iranian influence. However, proposals by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to upgrade the GCC into a “Gulf Union” faced a growing resistance from smaller member states like Oman, Kuwait and Qatar, which feared Saudi dominance.
In the end, the Arab uprisings’ potential to strengthen institutionalized regional cooperation proved ephemeral. This setback echoes Fawaz Gerges’ (2014) description of the Arab uprisings as “a frustrated attempt to build a new, pluralistic, and post-authoritarian order”—one in which regional organizations might have explored new avenues to upgrade their cooperation or even envision regional integration. None of this happened. Authoritarianism rearmed itself, regimes resorted to repression and co-optation to resist the wave of change. New challenges to the regional system of states emerged, including the proclamation of a new Caliphate by the Islamic State and the establishment of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, popularly known as Rojava. However, the old state-centric, conflict-driven, and authoritarian order proved more resilient than initially thought. As a result, regional organizations ultimately embodied this return to the status quo ante.
2017: The risk of a permanent rupture
In June 2017 a new crisis tested the limits of the institutional architecture of the Arab region. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt – which named themselves the Arab Quartet – severed diplomatic ties with Qatar, accusing it of supporting terrorism and meddling in other Arab states’ affairs. This Arab Quartet imposed a blockade, disrupting travel and trade within the Gulf. The rift stemmed from Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood, its close ties with Turkey (which included the upgrade of Turkey’s existing military base in Qatar), and its amicable relationship with Iran regarding the exploitation of gas fields. The blockade strained Gulf unity, an organization that had previously been seen as a rare exception of successful regional cooperation (Legrenzi, 2015).
Qatar refused to meet the Quartet’s 13 conditions, which included shutting down Al-Jazeera and the Turkish military base. Supported by Turkey and Iran, Doha weathered the blockade, exposing deep divisions within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The crisis raised doubts about the GCC’s effectiveness, as it struggled to mitigate inter-state rivalries or address divergent threat perceptions among its members. This marked the most severe crises in GCC history.
Its effects were also visible but less impactful on the LAS, partly because its members had already normalized the existence of major divisions within the organization. However, it is worth noting that this crisis coincided and to some extent culminated a process marked by the proliferation of alternative, less formalized frameworks for regional cooperation among ideologically aligned countries with the Arab region and beyond. Back in 2015 Saudi Arabia led the creation of a coalition of nine countries to intervene militarily in Yemen in March 2015, which overlapped and arguably neutralized the aforementioned proposal of Egypt and the Arab League to create an Arab Joint Military force. In December 2015 Saudi-led efforts also included the establishment of the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC), created in December 2015. The formation of the ‘Arab Quartet’ against the backdrop of the GCC crisis represented a new attempt to explore alternative, less formalized and more ideologically driven patterns of regional cooperation.
In January 2021, GCC leaders reconciled during the Al-‘Ula summit in Saudi Arabia, reopening borders and airspace. Those alternative frameworks that had emerged since 2015 became less visible and the increased competition between Saudis and Emiratis considerably limited the GCC’s effectiveness. Once more, already existing formal institutions such as the GCC and the League had proven their resilience.
Gulf countries also played a major role in the process that led to the reintegration of Assad’s Syria into the Arab League. While some countries, notably the UAE, had already normalized relations with the Syrian regime, Bashar al-Assad’s participation in the Jeddah summit in May 2023, following a vote within the League to reinstate Syria’s membership after a 12-year suspension, appeared to signify the Arab leaders’ willingness to consolidate a return to the status quo ante—as if the Arab uprisings were merely a temporary interruption. The only change that some, but not all, Arab leaders were ready to embrace was the normalization of Israel within the regional order. However, the October 7 attacks put those plans on hold.
October 7 and the Fall of Assad: New Stress Tests
Palestine has returned to the center of the regional agenda, thus reverting the trend of the previous two decades in which this issue was deliberately sidelined. Since 2011, and arguably even earlier, Palestine’s prominence on the Arab security agenda had waned. The absence of a viable peace process and the emergence of other conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Sudan shifted Arab leaders’ focus to issues they perceived as more decisive. For instance, Turkey’s and Iran’s interventions in conflicts such as Syria (for both of them), Libya (for the former), and Yemen (for the latter) unsettled many Arab leaders more than Israel’s policies did. Under President Trump, the United States also bypassed the Palestinians in its approach to the conflict, advocating for normalization agreements between Israel and friendly Arab nations in a mood that was also intended to counter Iran’s regional role. The UAE and Bahrain spearheaded this “Abrahamic” initiative in 2020, followed shortly by Morocco, which received U.S. recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara in return.
This dynamic fostered an illusion of peace prospects in the region, a policy actively continued by the Biden administration. Negotiations to include Saudi Arabia in this new Abrahamic Bloc, gained momentum, with the Crown Prince confirming discussions shortly before Hamas’ attack on Israel on 7 October 2023. The India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) announced in September 2023 during the G20 summit in New Delhi pointed towards the same direction as this initiative indirectly integrated Saudi Arabia into this Abrahamic Bloc. By connecting India, the Gulf, and Israel through infrastructure projects, IMEC further positioned Saudi Arabia within a new regional and global geopolitical alignment.
These developments posed significant challenges to the longstanding Arab norm of solidarity with Palestine while bolstering multilateral engagement between Israel, the U.S., and states that had normalized relations. Forums like the Negev Forum, attended by Israeli, U.S., and several Arab foreign affairs ministers, exemplified these evolving ties and even hinted at the possibility of institutionalization as yet another regional format for political dialogue. However, the second summit, set to take place in Dakhla (Western Sahara, under Moroccan administration) was postponed without a definite timeline. The unprecedented escalation following the Hamas attack halted this process indefinitely.
The renewed centrality of Palestine since October 7 is a major test for the Arab League, which traditionally has regarded Palestine as a unifying cause among Arab nations. The memories of its worst crisis—Egypt’s suspension and the temporary transfer of the headquarters from Cairo to Tunis in 1979 following the Egypt-Israel peace deal—indicate how Palestine can easily become a driver of division. After the Hamas attacks and the subsequent Israeli retaliation in Gaza, differences in tone among Arab ministries were apparent. Countries in the Abrahamic bloc urged de-escalation, hostage releases, and condemned attacks on civilians, irrespective of their nationality. Conversely, countries that had not normalized relations with Israel, such as Algeria, Iraq, and Syria, used harsher rhetoric to explicitly condemn Israeli actions. Kuwait and Qatar adopted a similarly critical stance, albeit with less inflammatory rhetoric. Jordan, a country aligned with the US and that had normalized relations with Israel in 1994, was exceptionally harsh in its condemnation of the war crimes committed by Israel. Interestingly, the restrained attitudes and contradictions of the most influential Arab countries allowed a non-Arab government, South Africa, to lead international denunciations of Israel’s actions in Gaza.
The first regional meeting addressing the Israeli retaliation in Gaza was a joint summit of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Saudi Arabia, attended by the late Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, exemplifying a rapprochement between the two regional powers. At this meeting, some leaders reportedly proposed threatening to disrupt oil supplies to Israel and its allies and severing the economic and diplomatic ties that some Arab League nations maintain with Israel (Le Monde, 2023). Instead, leaders decided to form a joint Arab-Islamic ministerial contact group, comprising representatives from Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia) and non-Arab nations (Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey). This group has led regional efforts to articulate a unified regional voice, marking an interesting shift by transcending the Arab region’s boundaries. The group has also engaged in political dialogue with other actors, such as during the ministerial meeting held in Madrid in September 2024, attended by representatives from Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Ireland, and Josep Borrell, then High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
Palestine has also become the main topic of the LAS meetings since October 2023. The summit of the League of Arab States summit in Bahrain in May 2024 was the first occasion in which Arab countries tackled the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and the risk of regional destabilization at the highest level. Leaders reaffirmed support for Palestine as a core Arab issue essential to regional peace and stability. They reiterated their support for the Arab-Islamic Joint Ministerial Committee in addressing the Gaza crisis, ending the humanitarian catastrophe, and advocating for Palestinian statehood and freedom. They called on Israel to halt its Gaza operations, lift the blockade, open crossings for humanitarian aid, and opposed any displacement of Palestinians (The National, 2024). The summit also reaffirmed the support for the two-state solution, which the League had espoused since adopting the Arab Peace Plan at the Beirut summit in 2002.
This position was reiterated in subsequent meetings of the Arab League, which, while acknowledging new developments, continued to have minimal impact on the ground. Notably, at the emergency meeting of Arab leaders held in Egypt in March 2025, participants agreed to support Egypt’s reconstruction plan for Gaza—a stance reaffirmed at another summit in Baghdad in May 2025. The “Arab plan” is widely viewed as a response to Trump’s unilateral proposals for Gaza, encapsulated in the notion of transforming the territory into a “Riviera of the Middle East.” Although this initiative represents the League’s lowest common denominator, it has not translated into the organization playing a prominent or influential role in the conflict.
In comparison, the GCC, as a regional bloc and institution, has been less directly affected by the October attacks and Israeli retaliation. Nonetheless, GCC countries remain concerned about potential regional spillovers, particularly the risk of an escalated Israel-Iran confrontation with unpredictable consequences. GCC leaders appear united in their desire to prevent this conflict from compromising the parallel normalization processes initiated with both Israel and Iran (Haghirian, 2024). This consensus among Gulf leaders, even if limited to shared concerns, has enhanced the GCC’s image as a relevant international partner. For instance, the long-awaited first EU-GCC summit took place in October 2024. Alongside discussions on connectivity, energy, and trade, leaders issued a joint statement expressing shared positions on Ukraine and the Middle East conflict.
In December 2024, a new seismic episode shocked the regional order: the fall of the al-Assad regime following the rapid advances of HTS and other rebel groups, and the escape of the President to Moscow. This was a major issue for the League of Arab States, as Assad’s Syria had reintegrated the organization a year earlier. One of the first signs of adaptation to the new political equation was the visit of the Assistant Secretary-General of the League of Arab States (LAS), Hossam Zaki, to Damascus in January 2025, during which he recalled the League’s call to lift the sanctions against Syria (Ahram Online, 2025). The invitation extended to Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa to participate in the emergency Arab League summit in Cairo on March 4, 2025, marked a significant boost for the regional legitimation of the new leadership and political reality in Damascus. However, the political debate in Iraq prior to the Baghdad summit of the League in May 2025, and the fact that al-Sharaa chose not to participate in it, confirmed that divisions still exist within the Arab region on how to deal with the new Syria.
Although Syria is not a member of the organization, it has been a relevant topic for the GCC—particularly for its member states, which had displayed divergent policies before and after the fall of Assad. The UAE had played a visible role in the push to establish relations with Assad’s Syria; Saudi Arabia, more cautiously and lately, supported the international normalization of the regime; and Qatar remained far more reluctant, maintaining open channels with the insurgents.
Thus, when Assad’s regime collapsed, Qatar was portrayed as a “winner,” and the country’s Emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, became the first head of state to visit Damascus post-Assad, meeting the newly appointed transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa on January 30, 2025. Although not enthusiastically, Saudi Arabia also accepted the new reality and even hosted the first meeting between the Syrian leader and Donald Trump. Riyadh’s main concern appears to be avoiding another focus of destabilization in the region. While the UAE’s leadership is ideologically at odds with al-Sharaa, it is worth noting that, according to some sources, it is also mediating secret talks between Israel and Syria (Azhari and Al-Khalidi, 2025).
All this highlights the critical influence Arab Gulf countries can exert on the domestic and international consolidation of the new Syrian regime, and how central Syria is for the regional order. Some authors have even compared the fall of Assad to a 1989 moment (Khatib, 2024) and refer to a “new Levantine order” (Barnes-Dacey, Geranmayeh and Lovatt, 2025). What remains to be seen is whether this new Syria will become a platform for cooperation—such as through joint campaigns for sanctions relief and reconstruction—or yet another arena for geopolitical competition.
Conclusions
Key questions raised at the outset of this article—such as whether regionalism can actively mitigate challenges to the regional order, to what extent dysfunctional regionalism reflects an old order clinging to survival, and which elements sustain the resilience of that order and its institutions—find relevant answers in the events of 2023 and 2024, as well as in earlier crises such as the 2011 Arab Uprisings and the 2017 GCC crisis.
First, all these developments reaffirm the limitations of regional organizations like the Arab League and the GCC, whose responses are often constrained by inter-state rivalries and divergent priorities. For instance, the Arab League’s strong rhetoric on Palestine contrasts sharply with its lack of consequential actions as a unified bloc since October 7.
Second, despite the apparent stagnation of formal regional cooperation, there are noteworthy developments that merit closer attention. Among them are the creation of a joint Arab-Islamic contact group and the roles that both the GCC and the LAS can play in supporting the transition in Syria.
Third, alongside these efforts, the normalization of diplomatic relations with Israel by some League members and attempts to establish permanent frameworks for dialogue with it indicate both a profound erosion of the foundational institutions of the old Arab regional order and the extent to which Palestine—once a unifying cause—has become a driver of fragmentation.
Fourth, in this conflict-driven and fractured region, the resilience of these organizations remains notable. Both the Arab League and the GCC have weathered severe disruptions, maintaining platforms for dialogue even as internal divisions deepened. Understanding the sources of this resilience may offer more analytical insight than focusing solely on their failures or the gap between regional aspirations and outcomes. Such an inquiry can shed light on how the existing regional order has endured and adapted amid the wide array of shocks and transformations that have shaped the Middle East and North Africa over the past two decades.
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