Threatening Refugees: Refugee Rentierism and Arms Deals in Jordan, 1967–77

Lillian Frost, Virginia Tech



The large waves of Syrian refugees fleeing violence since 2012 have directed scholarly attention to the rents that neighboring states can extract from donors in exchange for receiving and “hosting” refugees (Tsourapas 2019). However, as Lynch and Tsourapas note in the introduction to this volume (2024), refugee rentierism is not solely a recent phenomenon, nor has it only been linked to keeping refugees out of Europe. Jordan, for example, has long leveraged its large Palestinian refugee population to extract aid from British, American, Arab Gulf, and Libyan governments in exchange for containing and controlling these refugees in Jordan. Despite this history of refugee rentierism, little scholarly attention has been devoted to its historical variations. How, then, have refugee host states secured and maintained refugee-related rents?

This paper addresses these questions by analyzing Jordan’s refugee rentierism from 1967 to 1977. It starts with a discussion of data collection and case selection, before moving on to the argument and its implications. Overall, I find that Jordan secured and maintained refugee-related rents by successfully convincing donors that refugees could become major security threats, thereby connecting refugee and military assistance. In addition, the donors supplying such military assistance could help propagate refugee-related arms deals because of their commercial benefits. By emphasizing the threats refugees posed, Jordan’s refugee rentierism in the case explored here is similar to the recent “blackmailing” strategies that states, such as Türkiye (Almasri 2024), applied to European donors as the Syrian refugee crisis escalated (Tsourapas 2019). Thus, many of the dimensions of Jordan’s historic refugee rentierism remain present in state strategies today, including in Jordan, as elaborated in other pieces in this volume (Arar 2024; Lupieri 2024; Parker-Magyar 2024; and Dhingra 2024).


Data and Case Selection

The analysis uses British archival files on Jordan’s internal politics to trace the dynamics surrounding Jordan’s access to foreign aid after the 1967 Arab–Israeli War. These files, which amount to thousands of documents, describe conversations among British, American, Jordanian, and other Arab state officials regarding aid and the justification for its continued issuance. Without publicly available archival files on this topic in Jordan and other Arab donor states, the British files are a valuable resource. Specifically, I reviewed every folder on aid, assistance, relief, refugees, the armed forces, police trainings, and the sale and export of military equipment from the UK to Jordan, as well as relevant folders on King Hussein’s trips to the UK, US, and Arab donor states between 1967 and 1977. I also draw from US archival files collected in 2016 on Jordan’s politics and refugees, though the US government had only released files, at that time, through 1973. The use of UK and US files inevitably privileges British and American perspectives on the refugee rentier dynamics. Regardless, these files help enhance our much-needed understanding of the historic context surrounding refugee rentierism.

As perhaps the oldest refugee rentier state, Jordan is a critical case to understand. Moreover, as a “developing” state that neighbors refugee-sending countries, its basic context is similar to the states that host the majority of refugees. Specifically, in 2022, low- and middle-income states hosted 76% of all refugees, and neighboring states hosted 70% (UNHCR 2023, 2). In addition, as Figure 1 shows, “developing” states have long hosted the vast majority of refugees, ranging roughly between 85% from 2013 to 2021 and 70% in the late 1990s and early 2000s (UNHCR n.d.).


Figure 1: Share of Refugees Hosted in Developing Countries, 1990–2022 (UNHCR n.d.)


Moreover, Jordan’s refugee rent-seeking after the 1967 Arab–Israeli War is particularly fruitful for developing explanations relevant to contemporary host states. One reason for this is that it represents the first period of major refugee reception without the heavy governing influence of British colonial officials. Although Jordan did receive substantial amounts of foreign aid following the 1948 Arab–Israeli War along with the 531,000 refugees the War brought within Jordan’s borders,[i] the British provided much of this aid as a continuation of the budgetary and military support they had been providing since Jordan’s independence from them—which Jordan gained nominally in 1946 but effectively in 1956. Thus, Jordan did not have to use the refugee population to convince the British to provide large sums of aid because this assistance likely would have continued even without the refugees, due to Britain’s state-building and geopolitical aims in Jordan at the time. In addition, the foreign aid that Jordan received in the decade following the 1967 War historically constituted some of the largest percentages of Jordan’s central government budget expenditures, as shown in Figure 2 below (Peters and Moore 2009, 269).


Figure 2: Foreign Aid as a Percentage of Jordanian Central Government Budget Expenditures, 1964–2005

Source: Central Bank of Jordan Yearly Statistical Series 2006; cited in Peters and Moore 2009, Fig. 1, page 269


Furthermore, the foreign aid following the 1967 War came from a variety of sources, producing numerous instances of refugee-related rent-seeking. Figure 3 below highlights available figures for the total amount of aid per year per major donor.[ii] Jordan received much of this funding from Arab states due in part to the large number of Palestinian refugees it hosted on its now truncated territory (because Jordan lost the West Bank in the 1967 War). By February 1968, there were 110,000 “old” refugees from the West Bank (who were registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and had been resident on the West Bank since the 1948 War), 131,000 “new” refugees from the West Bank (who were displaced from their regular residences for the first time), and 20,000 refugees from Gaza (most of whom were registered with UNRWA and had been resident in Gaza since the 1948 War).[iii]


Figure 3: External Financial Assistance to Jordan, 1967–1969 (in Millions of Jordanian Dinars)[iv]

While UNRWA’s aid went directly to assisting refugees, the other aid is better characterized as supporting Jordan’s hosting of refugees through budget support, emergency grants, technical assistance, and development loans and grants.[v] Thus, only a small portion of this aid focused on caring for refugees, and the rest was connected to enabling Jordan to contain and control them. Jordan played a key role for Arab states in keeping Palestinians, en masse, out of other Arab states—or at least deportable if in those states for work or study—while keeping them close to Palestine to maintain pressure for their right of return. At the same time, Jordan helped Western donors, and indirectly Israel, by preventing Palestinian refugees from trying to return to Israeli-occupied areas (attempts that would result in Israeli forces either killing or arresting Palestinians) and from attacking Israeli forces (attacks that often resulted in counter-attacks on Jordanian territory). Although Jordan could not fully prevent either action, it did limit them, similar to Jordan’s efforts today to control and contain Syrian (and other) refugees from going to Europe or supporting regional terrorist groups.



I argue that host states can secure and sustain refugee rent by connecting refugees to security threats that deeply concern wealthy donors. In the case explored here, the security threat was that the refugees could overthrow the Jordanian regime and its valuable presence to donors as a pro-Western, “moderate” force in the region. However, in other cases, such as Türkiye more recently, the threat could concern refugees’ potential to cross into Europe or other donor states. When a refugee host state takes Jordan’s approach and convincingly frames refugees as threats to its regime, that state can increase and extend refugee rents by connecting military assistance to the “burden” and “risk” of hosting refugees. In addition, the development of commercial benefits for donors to supplying military aid can amplify donor willingness to sustain refugee-related rents. A key manifestation of this security-refugee-aid nexus is the provision of arms deals to refugee host states.

These arguments support issue-linkage and supply–demand explanations of rentierism. With issue-linkage, refugee rentierism can expand when host states effectively link refugee assistance to donors’ international security concerns, similar to the emergence of refugee rents that link refugee assistance to diplomatic concerns (Tsourapas 2019). For example, refugee host states can connect refugee maintenance and control to imperatives to strengthen the state’s security apparatus, producing refugee rents in the form of arms deals.

With supply–demand dynamics, refugee rentierism highlights that the “supply” of large external rents alone does not itself create a rentier state. Instead, the host state’s “demand” for such rents sustains the process of extracting revenue from foreign actors to maintain refugee populations. In addition, the host state shapes the distribution and use of those rents (Peters and Moore 2009). For instance, host states can divert budgetary assistance to fund military salaries or purchases. Likewise, they can solicit rents in the form of arms deals. In either case, host states can use refugee-related rents to maintain the support of key constituencies. As such, they can engage these new institutional venues to distribute old forms of patronage (Marshall 2012). Moreover, when commercial benefits accrue to donors from providing these rents, they can overlook, or even play an active role in maintaining, such patronage dynamics (Jones 2012). Thus, both donors and recipients can pursue their financial interests through refugee politics.

Overall, these arguments highlight the links between foreign aid, arms purchases, and refugee-hosting that can enable refugee rentierism to endure and expand. The remainder of this paper will unpack these arguments by focusing on Jordan’s refugee rent-seeking between 1967 and 1977. Specifically, it highlights that Jordan linked Palestinian refugees to security threats relevant to major donors, who viewed arms deals as key to “securing” Jordan. It then describes how these arms deals benefited donors commercially. The final section reflects on the implications of these arguments, including the blurring of developmental, economic, refugee, and military aid, which can make it difficult to halt military assistance. Altogether, the security-refugee-aid nexus observed in Jordan may be most applicable to host states that donors deem geo-strategically important.


Linking Palestinian Refugees to Security Threats

Jordanian leaders often connected Palestinian refugees to threats between 1967 and 1977. The first threat concerned the potential for Israeli forces to attack Palestinian refugee communities in Jordan’s East Bank, based on refugee efforts to return to the West Bank as well as pro-Palestinian militants’ (i.e., fedayeen) attacks on Israeli forces. Jordan needed stronger military and policing capabilities to prevent cross-border violence as well as to disincentivize Israel from reigniting the War and taking more of Jordan’s land. The Vice President of the Jordan Development Board expressed this need to foreign donors in a report circulated during July 1967, in which he requested that foreign aid “shift from development to military budget” because the “aggressive acts carried out recently point to the necessity of maintaining a larger budget for military preparedness.”[vi]

Second, Jordanian officials characterized the socio-economic character of the 1967 refugees as a potential threat to the Jordanian regime, particularly without a peace settlement. Just after the War, Jordan’s “Internal Security” reported concerns with the refugees “coming from the Jericho and Nablus refugee camps,” who are “short of blankets and food” and where “morale is low and tempers run high.”[vii] In the same Jordan Development Board report referenced above, the Vice President explains that these refugees “belong to the last productive part of the population since a large number of them are UNRWA in-camp refugees.”[viii] Further, during a meeting with US President Johnson in November 1967, King Hussein focused on making “a very strong appeal for additional help for the new refugees” and asked about “arms and all military supplies for Jordan,” conveying a link between Jordan’s defense and refugee needs.[ix]

Third, as months passed without Arab–Israeli peace negotiations, Jordanian leaders started to describe the refugees as fedayeen, who could challenge the ceasefire and threaten King Hussein’s regime. In May 1968, King Hussein lamented that the internal situation in Jordan was “difficult” because “attempts at a peaceful settlement were not getting anywhere, the resistance movements growing, and there was pressure to accept Soviet offers of arms…There were many groups of Fedayeen and, given the thousands of refugees, it was very difficult to find out about them and control their activities.”[x] The Jordanian Ambassador to the UK, in criticizing Israeli attacks on refugees in the East Bank, asked British officials “who were the Fedayeen but Jordanian civilians who had lost their homes and been made refugees twice in the past twenty years?”[xi]

As tensions grew between the fedayeen and the Jordanian state, the 1967 refugees—now essentially equivalent to the fedayeen—became direct threats to the Jordanian regime. The culmination of these tensions in the September 1970 War between the Jordanian army and fedayeen, backed by Syrian tanks, made these direct threats very real. By November 1970, British Colonel McLean reported that King Hussein intended “to change the role of the armed forces to meet an attack from anywhere—meaning Syria and Iraq—and not just from Israel,” while recognizing that “the problem of the Palastinians [sic] still remains.”[xii] Even after Jordan defeated and expelled the Palestine Liberation Organization, which represented the fedayeen, senior police officers reported in August 1971 that “the main threat to the internal security of Jordan is that posed by the Fedayeen,” which is “a by-product of the dispute with Israel,” and “as there is no solution to the dispute in sight[,] the threat will be long term and the fedayeen/refugee problem a likely vehicle too for political attempts from outside to embarrass the Jordan government.”[xiii]

As the next section demonstrates, Jordan’s framing of the 1967 refugees as impoverished, angry, and subject to “radicalization” and militancy struck a chord with the national concerns of the US, the UK, and the Arab Gulf states, who feared the spread of communism and Arab radicalism as well as renewed fighting with Israel. In turn, this enabled Jordan to secure more assistance to support the military—the backbone of the Hashemite regime—and control its Palestinian refugees.


Arms Deals and Financing to “Secure” Jordan

American and British officials reacted to the threats that Palestinian refugees, as fedayeen, posed to King Hussein’s survival—and Israel’s security—by diverting more military aid to Jordan. During the November 1967 Anglo-American talks on aid to Jordan, officials agreed that “restoring Jordan’s military strength was obviously of importance in re-establishing her stability” and “that King Hussein was the key to a settlement: he had a reasonable chance of succeeding, provided he retained the loyalty of the army.”[xiv] The leader of the US delegation also affirmed that “arms were a more important factor in Jordan’s future than economic or at any rate financial aid.”[xv]

King Hussein also linked his fate and ability to manage the Palestinian refugees with receiving greater support for Jordan’s military and police forces. On March 7, 1968, he “admitted that sympathies with the Fedayeen were widespread,” and that he could not always restrain army units commanded by junior officers because he had:

“been out of touch with these people and had, in fact, avoided them for some time because he had nothing by way of new equipment to offer them. The American arms package changed that and he intended…to visit as many units as he could and personally make clear…where their duty lay.”[xvi]

Essentially, King Hussein argued that he could not reduce support for the fedayeen, and thereby control threatening refugees, without military assistance. In May 1968, the US supplied a three-year $100 million arms package, and US officials reported in January 1969: “US rationale is that our arms supply to Jordan represents essential political support for Hussein,” in the context of a “deteriorating” security situation, with cycles of fedayeen raids and Israeli reprisals, as well as the “irritant” of 600,000 UNRWA refugees.[xvii] In May 1970, the US Secretary of State asked President Nixon to approve a new arms package for Jordan, explaining that “it continues to be in our national interest that Hussein remain pro-West. We need him for a peace settlement, to help arrest the trend toward radicalization in the area, and to limit the level of hostilities in the Jordan area.”[xviii] A key part of “limiting” hostilities concerned Jordan’s ability to control Palestinian refugees, particularly the fedayeen among them.

While the Americans provided direct assistance to Jordan’s armed forces, the less-resourced British were brokers with other states in this process. For example, in spring 1969, the British helped Jordan contract rifles from the Germans to compete with the “kalashnikovs of the fedayeen,” despite German bans on selling arms to “areas of tension.”[xix] These negotiations involved both urging “the Germans to bend their own policies” by sending the rifles to the UK,[xx] despite knowing they would end up in Jordan, as well as helping King Hussein secure the funding for these rifles from Arab Gulf states.[xxi] Likewise, the British were heavily involved in negotiating the US sale of a missile air defense system to Jordan using Saudi funds in 1976.[xxii] Although these cases did not involve the sale of British arms, others between 1967 and 1977 did, which helped maintain British interest in facilitating Jordan’s arms deals.


Commercial Benefits of Making Jordan “Secure”

Arms deals proliferated as donors accepted Jordan’s portrayal as a “moderate” but vulnerable state, which, if adequately resourced, could contain Palestinian refugees and their potential for violence. These were key concerns for the US and UK, given Jordan’s proximity to Israel, and for the Arab Gulf, considering Jordan’s proximity to their own borders. Moreover, the British and Americans viewed these deals as an opportunity to support their commercial interests and clout in the region, while Arab states considered them an opportunity to negotiate their own arms deals with Western suppliers and to demonstrate their support of the Arab–Palestinian cause.[xxiii] The financial assistance offered by Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Libyan—and, to a certain extent, Qatari, Bahraini, and Emirati—donors enabled Jordanian leaders to purchase US and British weapons, often in cash.

Shortly after the August 1967 Arab League Summit in Khartoum, during which Arab leaders pledged to support “confrontation” states, like Jordan, with large aid packages, the British started discussing economic opportunities. In November 1967, the British Embassy in Amman observed:

“There are of course commercial advantages in having a continued stake in Jordan’s economic development. The ‘untied’ Arab aid should offer even greater opportunities for British goods and services especially if Her Majesty’s Government’s technical assistance to Jordan were increased. This would […] facilitate British participation in the increased economic and commercial opportunities created by the Arab aid.”

In 1968, British expectations came to fruition. For the first time, the British helped finance the sale of British Tigercats (short-range surface-to-air missile systems) to Jordan with Saudi assistance.[xxiv] Embassy officials acknowledged that “the value of the order […] would be about 2.1 million pounds, and […] an export order of this size to Shortt Brothers, Belfast, would […] be a good reason for agreeing to this sale.”[xxv] In August 1968, they also highlighted “our interest in future arms transactions” and the importance of offering the Saudis agreeable terms to avoid a “grievance which will prejudice our hopes of further arms sales here.”[xxvi] Likewise, British financial officials emphasized the commercial nature of this deal.[xxvii] In the same month, King Hussein even wrote to the British Prime Minister, as the deal grew to include ammunition and tanks as well: “We feel that this deal, plus many others which we hope to raise funds for from our Arab sister states, might depend on a satisfactory agreement regarding the items mentioned above.”[xxviii] Soon after, the British Embassy in Amman suggested another commercial opportunity:

“As far as the supply of new equipment is concerned, notably armoured scout cars, there could be commercial opportunities for us in the strengthening of the two Bedouin [police] detachments. We have heard that the Head of Public Security is toying with the idea of asking the King to let him take over from the Jordanian army used equipment […] when and if the latter receives new equipment. It may be that ideas of this kind could increase the total Jordanian demand, both police and army, for armoured and scout cars, and that King Hussein will be prepared to allocate new funds given to him by other Arab countries following the Arab League conference of Foreign Ministers for this purpose […] A vehicle which would meet their need very adequately in this respect would be the ‘Shorland’ manufactured by Short Brothers and Harland.”[xxix]

Reflecting on these deals in September 1970, officials wrote that, in Jordan, “British investment is small but our position as major exporters and arms suppliers earned us a useful 30–40 million pounds in 1968.”[xxx]

By 1972, there were also opportunities for Jordan to use US funds to purchase UK arms and equipment. In September, British conversations with US official Korn highlighted that the US wanted to keep this confidential: Korn “had to tell me frankly that the State Department would find itself in a very invidious position with Congress if it became widely known that other countries were selling large amounts of military equipment to the Jordanians on credit,” and “by their generous budgetary assistance to Jordan the US was really subsidising the Jordanian budget […] where Jordan was in effect drawing on her American subsidy to make interest payments on credits for military equipment supplied by other countries.” In October, British Foreign Office officials lobbied the financial offices to provide an “advance package deal” to expedite restocking Jordanian supplies using British credit but ultimately American funds, observing:

“If we are unable to help the Jordanians to buy British spares and equipment now, we shall undoubtedly lose our present share of the military supplies market for the foreseeable future, particularly in view of the massive injection of American aid into Jordan […] [this] would not be a state of affairs we would willingly let come to pass.”[xxxi]

A British military report from February 1973 summarized that “the Americans provide the money and the British seem to provide goodwill,” though it also lamented that “when we cannot offer military supplies on the easy credit terms which other countries are prepared to do we risk not being able to sell the quantities of arms which we would otherwise do.”[xxxii] Moreover, in 1977, the UK identified one of its key interests as maintaining a market share in Jordanian development.[xxxiii] Overall, commercial interests motivated British officials to act as brokers soliciting more money for Jordan, particularly “untied” money, from the US and Arab Gulf states.



Refugee host states, like Jordan, can amplify and sustain foreign assistance after receiving a large wave of refugees by emphasizing the security threats that the refugees could pose. In doing so, donors can view refugee and military assistance as serving the same goal of containing and controlling the refugees within the host state. Donors supplying military assistance can also propagate refugee-related arms deals because they are commercially beneficial. These dynamics highlight how host states can tie refugees to other justifications for aid, such as security needs. Thus, refugees serve as a key component—though not the only one—in obtaining more assistance.

However, one consequence of refugee-related arms deals is the blurring of aid that supports development, the economy, the military, and refugees. A British official summarized this issue:

“I must however be allowed to make the fairly obvious point that defence expenditure which has accounted for some 40% of all Government expenditure plays a formidable role in the economy as a whole; I recall that when H.M.G. were maintaining the Arab Legion at a cost of 12m. [pounds] per annum, it was calculated that one in every five Jordanians was a direct pensioner of H.M.G […] Sir Richard Beaumont’s draft considers that the defence forces ‘will have to be revised and reduced’; but any reductions are bound to swell the number of unemployed and lead to an added strain in the civil budget and/or a revolution…[and it’s] unrealistic to exclude the defence budget from consideration because this has been to a very large extent the mechanism whereby purchasing power was injected into the economy, which in its turn made possible the very rapid rate of economic growth which had occurred.”[xxxiv]

Likewise, another British report adds that “approximately one-third of the population of Jordan is dependent on the Government’s military expenditure and that the latter consequently reflects a large element of social relief in a country suffering from much unemployment or under-employment.”[xxxv] Thus, this analysis suggests that decisions to link security, refugees, and aid can have long-term, difficult-to-reverse consequences.

Overall, this exploratory study highlights links between foreign aid, arms purchases, and refugee-hosting that can enable refugee rentierism to expand and endure. Although the analysis focused on a historical period, it highlights dynamics that may exist in Jordan, and perhaps other host states, today. For example, the conflation of humanitarianism and security is evident in Jordan’s Azraq Syrian refugee camp (Gatter 2023). We can also see the securitization of Syrian refugees in other sectors, such as health care (Lupieri 2024), education (Parker-Magyar 2024), employment, housing, and other public services (Dhingra 2024). Thus, the portrayal of refugees as threats to host states need not be limited to physical, violent threats to be effective in obtaining or sustaining refugee-related aid. The security-refugee-aid nexus highlights rich avenues for future research exploring the different threats to which host states can link refugees in current and historic cases, as well as the implications of these dynamics.



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[i] Memorandum of Conversation to Department of State, November 30, 1949, 1945–49 Central Decimal File, File 767n.90i/11-3049, The US National Archives College Park.

[ii] Annual Report on the Jordanian Armed Forces 1976, by Colonel R. B. Robertson, Defense Attache, February 1977, Foreign Commonwealth Office (hereafter referred to as FCO) Folder 93/1079, Document # 5, File # NFJ062/3, Page 4, The National Archives of the UK at Kew (hereafter referred to as TNA).

[iii] Telegram from American Embassy in Amman to the Secretary of State/Department of State, February 2, 1968, 1967–69 Subject Numeric File, File REF 3 UNRWA, The US National Archives College Park. For more details on these populations and their rights in Jordan, see Frost 2020 and Frost 2022.

[iv] Ibid. These figures do not include foreign military grants or credits. The file references the exchange rate as 1 Jordanian dinar to 1.16 British pounds and to $2.80.

[v] Country Policy Paper: Jordan, by Middle East and Mediterranean Department of the UK Ministry of Overseas Development, July 1970, FCO Folder 17/1071, Document # 102, File # NEJ6/1, TNA.

[vi] Jordan Development Board’s “Economic and Statistical Background to Jordan’s Economic Development Program and the Implications of the Recent Events,” by Dr. N. Dajani, Acting Vice President, July 4, 1967, FCO Folder 17/259, File # EJ6/30, Page 8, TNA.

[vii] “Refugees,” Sent by Mr. Adams, Amman, to Ministry of Defense and Foreign Office, Telegram Number 639, June 12, 1967, FCO Folder 17/297, File # EJ19/4, Document # 6, TNA.

[viii] Jordan Development Board’s “Economic and Statistical Background to Jordan’s Economic Development Program and the Implications of the Recent Events,” by Dr. N. Dajani, Acting Vice President, July 4, 1967, FCO Folder 17/259, File # EJ6/30, Page 9, TNA.

[ix] “King Hussein’s Visit to the United States,” Sent by A.B. Urwick, British Embassy Washington D.C., to A.R. Moore, Foreign Office, London, November 14, 1967, FCO Folder 17/306, File # EJ22/12, Document # 26, TNA.

[x] “Record of Conversation between the Foreign Secretary and His Majesty, King Hussein of Jordan, Held at the Foreign Office on Monday, 6 May, 1968 at 12 Noon,” Drafted by D.J.D. Maitland, May 7, 1968, FCO Folder 17/247, File # EJ3/20, Document # 4, Page 3, TNA.

[xi] “Record of Conversation between the Minister of State and the Jordanian Ambassador on 20 March,” Drafted by FCO, March 21, 1969, FCO Folder 17/811, File # NEJ3/548/1, Document # 1, Page 2, TNA.

[xii] “The Present Situation in Jordan,” Report sent by Colonel Neil Mclean, to Alec Douglas-Home, November 3, 1970, FCO Folder 17/1067, File # NEJ3/548/1, Document # 16, TNA.

[xiii] “A First Report on the Jordan Police,” By Sir Richard Catling, June 1971, FCO Folder 17/1430, File # NEJ14/1, Document # 32, Page 2, TNA.

[xiv] “Anglo/American Talks on Aid to Jordan, Summary 16/17 November 1967,” Sent by A.J.A. Douglas, Ministry of Overseas Development, January 1968, FCO Folder 17/260, File # EJ6/36, Document # 50, TNA.

[xv] “Anglo-American Talks on Aid to Jordan, November, 1967, Brief for U.K. Delegation,” Sent by C.R.A. Rae, Ministry of Overseas Development, November 14, 1967, FCO Folder 17/260, File # EJ6/36, Document # 43, TNA.

[xvi] “Jordan/Israel/Jarring,” by Mr. Adams, Amman, to Foreign Office, March 7, 1968, FCO Folder 17/247, File # EJ3/20, Document # 3, Page 2, TNA.

[xvii] Memorandum on “Talking Points – JORDAN” from NEA/ARN Talcott W. Seelye to NEA Mr. Parker T. Hart, January 8, 1969, 1967–69 Subject Numeric File, File POL JORDAN, The US National Archives College Park.

[xviii]  Memorandum for the President, “Visit of Zaid Rifai and Jordan Arms,” from Secretary of State to the President, May 5, 1970, 1970–73 Subject Numeric File, File POL 7 JORDAN, The US National Archives College Park.

[xix] Letter from Philip-Adams, British Embassy, Amman, to G.G. Arthur, FCO, May 9, 1969, FCO Folder 17/830, File # NEJ26/1, Document # 38, TNA.

[xx] Ibid.

[xxi] “Conversation with General Khammash, Chief of Staff of the Jordan Army, 26 March, 1969,” drafted by J.P. Tripp for Mr. Arthur, March 26, 1969, FCO Folder 17/827, File # NEJ22/4, Document # 3, TNA.

[xxii] “Missiles for Jordan,” drafted by JC Moberly for Near East and North Africa Department Departmental Series, October 25, 1976, FCO Folder 93/868, File # NFJ087/548/2, Document # 252, Pages 1–2, TNA.

[xxiii] A similar dynamic also occurred in British arms deals with Israel in this period (Smith 2014).

[xxiv] “Tiger Cat for Jordan,” Sent by Mr. Moore to Mr. Burrows, September 1968, FCO Folder 17/267, File # EJ10/8, TNA.

[xxv] Ibid.

[xxvi] “Jordan/Saudi Deal,” Sent by O.J. Porter, Ministry of Defense, to M.F. Daly, Foreign Office, August 19, 1968, FCO Folder 17/267, File # EJ10/8, Document # 85, TNA.

[xxvii] “Credit Terms for Arms Sales,” Letter from K.W. Cotterill, Export Credits Guarantee Department, to D.J. McCarthy, Foreign Office, September 11, 1968, FCO Folder 17/815, File # NEJ10/1, Document # 4, TNA. Telegram 653 from Stewart to Jedda, Repeated to Amman, November 7, 1968, FCO Folder 17/815, File # NEJ10/1, TNA.

[xxviii] Letter from King Hussein to James Harold Wilson, Prime Minister, August 5, 1968, FCO Folder 17/830, File # NEJ26/1, TNA.

[xxix] “Assistance for the Jordan Police,” Sent by D.G. Crawford, British Embassy, Amman, to R.M. Evans, Foreign Office, October 4, 1968, FCO Folder 17/289, File # EJ14/2, Document # 24, Pages 2–3, TNA.

[xxx] “Country Assessment Sheet, Jordan,” September 1, 1970, FCO Folder 17/1067, File # NEJ3/548/1, TNA.

[xxxi] “Jordanian Military Requirements,” Sent by AJM Craig, Foreign Office, to Mr. Parsons, October 11, 1972, FCO Folder 17/1699, File # NEJ10/17, Document # 49, TNA.

[xxxii] “Jordanian Armed Forces 1972,” drafted by MLH Hope, Near East and North Africa Department, for Mr. Pike, February 1, 1973, FCO Folder 93/87, File # NFJ10/8, Document # 2, TNA. “Annual and Valedictory Report on the Royal Jordanian Air Force,” drafted by JMA Parker, Group Captain, Air Attache, for HG Balfour Paul, British Embassy, Amman, January 1, 1973, FCO Folder 93/87, File # NFJ10/8, Document # 2, Page 15, TNA.

[xxxiii] “Country Assessment Sheet: Jordan,” Near East and North Africa Department, December 1977, FCO Folder 93/1075, File # NFJ014/5, Document # 9, TNA.

[xxxiv] Letter from C.R.A. Rae, Ministry of Overseas Development to H.J.O.R. Tunnell, Foreign Office, August 11, 1967, FCO Folder 17/259, File # EJ6/30, Document # 18, TNA.

[xxxv] “The Jordan Armed Forces 1972,” Sent by British Embassy, Amman, to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, January 13, 1973, FCO Folder 93/87, File # NFJ10/8, Document # 1, TNA.