Yassmine Tlass, University of Kent
Introduction
The collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024 presents both a historic opportunity and a profound challenge for reimagining state institutions in Syria—none more urgently than the security sector. For decades, security provision in Syria was synonymous with repression, centralization, and institutional opacity, rooted in the dominance of overlapping intelligence services and regime-loyal militias. During the conflict, Syria saw territorial fragmentation, with different armed factions backed by different foreign powers (e.g. the opposition-held northern territories were controlled by different armed groups including HTS and the Kurdish Forces). This also means local populations had different security, social and to an extent legal dynamics depending on the group that had control over them.
Today, as Syria transitions away from authoritarianism, the instinct to centralize control over security forces may appear as a necessary step toward state-building. The state is not the majority provider of justice and security. HTS has repeatedly failed to show a unified response to major crises lately, suggesting a fragmented central state, fragile and bound to fail. Yet this paper argues that such an approach risks reproducing the very dynamics that contributed to state fragility under Assad. Instead, it proposes that decentralization – when channelled through inclusive, locally grounded mechanisms – can be an asset rather than an obstacle to Security Sector Reform.
How can post-Assad Syria rebuild its security landscape to promote legitimacy and accountability? In divided, post-conflict societies like Syria, local security initiatives often enjoy greater legitimacy, responsiveness, and accountability than top-down structures imposed by a fragile transitional authority (Baker, 2009; Luckham & Kirk, 2013). Accordingly, this paper argues that Syria’s SSR trajectory should embrace a controlled decentralization model, whereby local security councils, civilian oversight bodies, and hybrid policing arrangements are not viewed as threats to national coherence, but as stepping stones toward sustainable trust-building and institutional reform.
This paper is divided into two parts. First, it engages scholarship on local ownership, hybrid security governance, and plural policing. Second, it maps emergent community-led security practices since late 2024 in Suweida, Raqqa, and Aleppo. These three cases were chosen because they represent three distinct modalities of decentralized security governance in post-Assad Syria. Aleppo illustrates forms of supervised co-production between local Kurdish structures and residual state institutions; Raqqa highlights institutionalised subsidiarity through bargains between tribal authorities and security forces; and Suweida exemplifies communal self-administration rooted in customary authority.
Literature: Legitimizing bottom-up capacities in SSR
There is a consensus in the literature that the SSR paradigm has been largely state-centred, with policy and practice tending to prioritize state-building rather than addressing the real needs of local populations for service delivery and security provision. When interventions engage only state-authorised actors in settings of security pluralism, they tend to channel benefits only to those covered by state protection, inadvertently privileging some groups while leaving the most vulnerable and marginalized underserved (Price & Warren, 2017). From this perspective, effective reform depends less on who should be providing security and justice than on who actually does so in practice – revealing a persistent tension between governance and effectiveness (Baker & Scheye, 2007).
Recent literature therefore advances a more inclusive, flexible and context-specific approach, framed as locally owned while recognizing the importance of differentiating between (new) regime ownership and national ownership (Goodhand and Sedra, 2007). In this vein, Donais and others argue that reconciling national and local ownership is achieved through a pragmatic process that co-produce security across multiple actors — rather than by privileging one scale of authority over another (Donais, 2009). This shift suggests a turn to hybrid security governance, and multi-layered strategies that recognize and regulate the different providers of security and justice: the state, civil society, commercial, and informal actors (Baker & Scheye, 2007; Luckham & Kirk, 2013). Second generation SSR thus engages non-state actors while prioritizing accountability and public legitimacy, acknowledging the non-linearity of postconflict transitions (Ansorg & Gordon, 2019; Jackson & Bakrania, 2018; Sedra, 2018). Indeed, supporting non-state systems, or “bottom-up adaptive capacities” may be the best means of realising short-term, sustainable gains, as they are more resilient than state systems, having endured throughout conflicts and fragile environments (Juncos, 2018b).
The normative and policy literature therefore increasingly advances a principle of decentralization for SSR, so that justice and accountability migrate closer to the arenas where security is actually produced, while acknowledging the crucial role and public legitimacy of civil society (Sedra, 2018). Conceptually, this arrangement tackles the governance-effectiveness tension by widening ownership beyond a central state and enabling adaptive responses in non-linear transitions (Jackson & Bakrania, 2018).
Empirical evidence: the cases of Aleppo, Raqqa and Suweida
Since the Assad regime collapsed, Syria has been in a volatile state. The US and western countries want to give it a chance, moving to lift the sanctions and encourage foreign investment opportunities. But the reality is darker. The interim government has repeatedly failed to show unity and control over its own factions. Given the complexities and non-linearity of post conflict dynamics, the solution for SSR lies in a more decentralized model, to avoid a repeat of the devastating incidents of the Sahel[1], and find a solution to the ongoing crisis in Suweida[2] (Maggie Michael, 2025; Reuters, 2025).
By examining early initiatives from Aleppo, Raqqa and Suweida, this paper maps three distinct modalities of decentralized security governance: 1) supervised co-production with state agencies, 2) subsidiarity through formalized bargains between the state and organized local bodies (e.g. councils of elders, tribal sheikhs, religious leaders) and 3) communal self-administration. Each of these models relocates parts of the security function closer to the local population while attempting to preserve the legal link to national authority. Together, these models illuminate what decentralization buys – consent, responsiveness, situational knowledge and perhaps the most important, accountability. Yet, these gains are not without risks: decentralization may inadvertently encourage secessionist tendencies, empower local warlords, or leave communities vulnerable to coercion and external patronage in the absence of strong institutional oversight. What one must consider, then, is how to balance the benefits – enhanced legitimacy, inclusion and local accountability – against the dangers of competing sovereignties and territorial disintegration.
Joint checkpoints and communal agency: Aleppo’s hybrid security practices
In Aleppo, neighbourhoods such as Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh have long had Kurdish majorities. Because of this concentration, when the conflict fragmented Syria, Kurdish political and security structures (known as the Asayish) were able to establish a strong presence in these quarters. Their authority drew not only on militia capacity but also on deep community roots, meaning that residents tended to view Kurdish forces as more familiar and protective than outside actors. Yet rather than entirely supplanting the state, they entered joint structures—such as shared checkpoints with the Interior Ministry— formalised in a 14-point arrangement (ANF News, 2025; Levant 24, 2025).
These joint actions included documented volunteer night patrols or auxiliaries extending from Damascus to Aleppo and Homs, with residents guarding districts “with support from authorities” (Al Mounes, 2025). In Manbij, a little further north of Aleppo, the civil administration reportedly established volunteer neighbourhood committees from quarters and villages to protect property amidst theft/looting spikes (Focus Aleppo, 2025). The joint checkpoint model blends local force knowledge with public-law mandate, aligning with co-production theory[3] (Baker & Scheye, 2007; Price & Warren, 2017).
These joint actions show how decentralisation in security governance is less a binary alternative to centralisation than a layered process in which multiple logics of authority coexist. In Bosnia, for instance, community policing initiatives evolved from experimental projects into a nationally codified framework that standardised citizen participation while preserving municipal discretion (Juncos, 2018a; Padurariu, 2014). Like Bosnia, Aleppo demonstrates how municipal–state interfaces can be formalised through checkpoints. The lesson is not simply that decentralisation “worked”, but that coherence was produced through interfaces between local priority-setting and central oversight. Similarly, in African contexts of hybrid security governance, durable arrangements have often rested on the recognition and regulation of plurality rather than on attempts to eliminate it (Bagayoko et al., 2016; Baker & Scheye, 2007).
Recent events, however, have highlighted the fragility of such a model. During the 6th of October 2025 local elections, violent clashes erupted between Asayish and regime aligned militias in these areas, leaving several civilians dead and disrupting polling stations. It became evident that such arrangements depend less on their institutional design than on the broader political compact that sustains them. What had functioned as a pragmatic model of co-production was quickly undone when electoral competition re-politicised and revived latent power disputes (Al-Arabiya, 2025; Times of Israel, 2025). This volatility stems from the fact that the current government remains institutionally unstable and politically unconsolidated, with a deficient and/or contested legitimacy. As a result, authority within these hybrid arrangements is still negotiated rather than codified, relying on informal bargains. In the absence of clear hierarchies or a legally defined division of competences, power remains contingent—subject to local shifts in allegiance, changes in military and governmental balance, or the instrumentalization of groups by regional powers.
Local legitimacy through institutionalised subsidiarity in Raqqa
Raqqa’s post-2024 security landscape has been shaped by its tribal composition and history of contestation between ISIS, Kurdish-led forces, and Arab local councils. Authority here has long been fragmented: tribes and notables retained significant influence in dispute settlement and access to resources, even under ISIS control (Hawar News Agency, 2025a). This meant that, after the regime collapse, any durable security arrangement had to acknowledge these local actors.
Against this backdrop, the iterative coordination between the Internal Security Forces (ISF/Asayish) and tribal notables from January to August 2025 reflects not simply ad hoc cooperation but the institutionalization of subsidiarity—the principle that problems should be resolved at the lowest competent level. Through joint roles in dispute resolution, road reopening, and anti-narcotics campaigns, the notables lent social legitimacy while the ISF provided coercive capacity (Hawar News Agency, 2025b). This corporatist compact effectively converted tribal authority into governable consent for everyday security tasks.
The immediate gain was legitimacy at the point of service delivery, reducing enforcement costs and curbing cycles of revenge through ritualised reconciliation. Indeed, studies suggest that legitimacy emerges less from coercive capacity than from visible responsiveness and routinised security engagement —through public forums, reconciliation channels, feedback loops— with local populations (Arriola et al., 2021; Wisler & Onwudiwe, 2008).
The National Guard Forces: can customary authority be the solution to the ongoing crisis in Suweida?
Suweida’s security trajectory after the Assad collapse is inseparable from its Druze communal structures. For decades, the province was only loosely integrated into Damascus’s security architecture; local notables and the Men of Dignity movement carved out space for communal autonomy. This history, coupled with longstanding grievances about neglect and marginalisation, meant that when clashes with Bedouin tribes and broader instability intensified in mid-2025, trust in central institutions was minimal and communal authority filled the gap.
In response, notables established a Temporary Executive Office in August 2025 with authority over security, services, and property protection, later complemented by the announcement of a consolidated “National Guard Forces” under Druze leadership (SyriacPress, 2025). These measures sought to convert communal legitimacy into public-service functions, offering immediate crisis management, dispute mediation, and protection against corruption. They exemplify a form of hybrid governance (Bagayoko et al., 2016), where customary authority supplies cohesion while emergent structures attempt to provide functional services. This model demonstrates both the promise and peril of decentralized SSR. On one hand, the Druze leadership’s rooted legitimacy gave the initiative unparalleled capacity to stabilize during violence, mediating disputes and managing arms. On the other hand, the risk of parochial capture is acute: without external oversight, licensing, and interoperable standards, a “National Guard” can easily harden sectarian boundaries and entrench patronage networks (Schroeder et al., 2017). The priority, therefore, is for such forces to be institutionalized within a national SSR framework—time-bounded, regulated, and coordinated with state agencies, rather than operating beside or in competition with them.
Patterns of Hybrid Governance in security contexts
Across the three cases, three mechanisms recur.
First, joint structures, such as checkpoints, local committees, or temporary councils, mediate between local authority and state institutions, making everyday security coordination easier (Baker & Scheye, 2007; Donais, 2018).
Second, customary mediation embedded in public procedure, including local reconciliations and justice tracks, absorbs social conflict that formal policing and judiciaries cannot process at scale, reducing revenge dynamics (Bagayoko et al., 2016; Luckham & Kirk, 2013).
Third, performance-based legitimacy – when people see visible protection of property, de-escalation, and service continuity—proves to be more convincing than centralized claims to authority in contexts of fractured trust (Ansorg & Gordon, 2019; Sedra, 2018).
| Case | Initiative | Key Mechanism | Strengths | Risks |
| Aleppo | Hybrid co-production with the state (joint checkpoints, volunteer patrols) | Shared security provision between Kurdish Asayish & Interior Ministry | Local familiarity, situational knowledge, trust | Vigilantism, impersonation, weak accountability |
| Raqqa | Institutionalised subsidiarity with tribal notables | Tribal–ISF bargains in dispute resolution & anti-narcotics | Social legitimacy, reduced revenge cycles | Elite capture, Islamist infiltration, opaque representation |
| Suweida | Communal self-administration (National Guard Forces under Druze leadership) | Customary authority + Temporary councils | Legitimacy, crisis response, dispute mediation | Sectarian entrenchment, foreign patronage, lack of oversight |
Limitations
Decentralized models also face clear dangers. Without licensing, proper training and complaint channels, volunteer patrols can slide into vigilantism (Gordon, 2014). Tribal or religious leadership can drift toward elite capture, patronage network, or ideological infiltration (Hassan, 2021). Foreign powers may also exploit local autonomy to advance their agendas, as seen in Suweida when appeals for Israeli protection sparked regional escalation (Schroeder et al., 2017).
Beyond these localized dynamics, Syria has also become a proxy arena for a new Turkish–Israeli rivalry, now that Iran is weakened. Ankara’s expansionism through reconstruction and border security collides with Israel’s pre-emptive deterrence strategy in the south. A controlled, decentralized security model could help absorb these pressures by dispersing authority, lowering the strategic value of central capture, and anchoring stability in locally legitimate structures.
But balancing legitimacy and accountability remains the greatest challenge. Customary authorities may be trusted, but without formal oversight, they risk replicating the same exclusionary patterns they were meant to replace (Sedra, 2018; Tiscornia, 2024).
Conclusion: Reconsidering a decentralized trajectory for SSR
This paper asked how security arrangements in post-Assad Syria can contribute to legitimate and accountable Security Sector Reform. The cases of Aleppo, Raqqa, and Suweida demonstrate that decentralization is not simply an alternative but an already-embedded reality in Syria.
Years of conflict and territorial fragmentation have dispersed authority and localized legitimacy, such that attempts at coercive re-centralization would likely reproduce distrust and instability, as we have seen in the Sahel region, Suweida and the Northeast of Syria. At the same time, decentralization on its own is insufficient: without mechanisms of oversight and institutional interfaces linking local authority to state frameworks, local governance risks sliding into fragmentation, or foreign patronage. Legitimacy in Syria is now dispersed and locally rooted. The task of SSR, then, is not to erase this plurality but to ask how a state might be rebuilt upon it.
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[1] Where nearly 1500 Alawites died in a massacre in the beginning of March 2025, dozens went missing, and there were 40 distinct sites of revenge killings, rampages and looting (Reuters, 2025).
[2] The crisis in Suweida Governorate has escalated into calls for full independence by Hikmat al‑Hijri, a Druze sheikh, amid a siege affecting food, medicine and movement for civilians and over 600 abductees, with the Syrian Government blamed (Enab Baladi, 2025).
[3] The intentional, rule-bound collaboration through which state security institutions and community actors jointly diagnose problems, set priorities, and deliver everyday safety and dispute-resolution— with the state providing legal authority and rights safeguards, and communities supplying local knowledge, access, and social oversight (Baker & Scheye, 2007; Price & Warren, 2017)