Courtney Freer, Emory University
Kuwaiti foreign policy was for decades constrained by the presence of the Gulf’s most vocal and powerful legislature.[1] Since May 2024, however, that legislature has been dissolved, leaving foreign and domestic policy decisions in the hands of the unelected members of cabinet and the amir. I have written elsewhere about how Kuwaiti domestic politics influenced the state’s foreign policy, particularly when it came to engagement with Islamists and with Iran.[2] The landscape today is markedly different. In 2026, Kuwait not only faces changes within the domestic sphere, as it stripped over 50,000 Kuwaitis of their citizenship in 2025 and introduced new amendments to the citizenship law,[3] but also contends with shifting regional and global dynamics since the start of the US-Iran war on February 28.
In this context, particularly since the start of the US-Iran war on February 28, Kuwait’s traditional foreign policy may be under threat. The state has long behaved as a typical small, vulnerable actor in the region (see Peter Moore, this collection). Since independence, Kuwaiti foreign policy has been largely focused on maintaining ties with its Arab neighbors. Indeed, one of the first acts the independent Kuwaiti state took was establishment of the Kuwait Fund for Economic Development.[4] Kuwait also played a foundational role in the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981, largely to shield Arab Gulf states from export of Iran’s revolution. Within that body, Kuwait has been instrumental in mediating rifts that have emerged among member states, most recently helping to mediate the blockade of Qatar in January 2021, though never mediating at the global level of Oman (see Tyler Parker, this collection). After the death of Amir Shaykh Sabah in 2020, who had previously served as foreign minister (1963-2003), some commentators questioned whether the mediation focus on Kuwaiti foreign policy would change. Neither Shaykh Nawaf (r. 2020-2023) or Mishaal (r. 2023-present) has seriously altered the trajectory of Kuwaiti foreign policy, however. In part, this is because of the realities of being a small, weak state dependent on external support for survival. But what makes Kuwait’s adaptations and continuities distinct is the institution of parliament, which seems to have more seriously constrained Kuwait’s foreign policy options, which have in turn tended to be more conservative and less activist than the policies put forward my neighboring small states like Qatar and the UAE.
Unlike its Gulf neighbors, Kuwait has a profound and painful recent history of invasion and occupation. The memory of the 1990-91 Gulf War has tended to push Kuwait to craft a foreign policy that will enable it to maintain key alliances and avoid being targeted. As Ulrichsen explains, “The invasion also revealed ‘how little oil rent could be converted into military security,’ although the speed with which the multinational coalition mobilized to liberate Kuwait illustrated the significance of maintaining strong and durable international partnerships.”[5] The Kuwait state therefore has, since 1991, balanced a security relationship with the United States alongside a focus on the provision of humanitarian aid to Palestine, maintaining ties with Iran, and refusing to normalize with Israel.
The US-Israeli war on Iran has highlighted yet again that oil wealth does not guarantee security, and that a policy of neutrality did not protect it from Iranian retaliation. What is more, the US military presence, always understood as a vital security asset, has potentially become a liability, as Kuwait and its US-aligned neighbors faced repeated Iranian attacks. In such a context, Badr al-Saif and Sanim Vakil have posited that hedging of the type that Kuwait managed in the past may become increasingly difficult: “Hedging has helped contain tensions and avoid escalation, but as a strategy it is a reactive approach limited to crisis management rather than shaping outcomes.”[6] The war has highlighted that hedging is insufficient to protect Kuwait against Iranian attacks and that American security guarantees are limited, as Kuwait-based US forces,[7] oil infrastructure, and civilian sites continue to come under Iranian fire and the closure of the Straits of Hormuz threatens its most vital economic lifeline.
The total focus of a weak state such as Kuwait on external protection is often met with the indifference of its stronger patron. Trump himself has never visited Kuwait as president, despite his two high-profile trips to the Gulf. On the American side, the 2026 National Defense Strategy only mentions Arab Gulf states collectively and insofar as it emphasizes the administration’s focus on “deepening cooperation,” “enabling integration between Israel and our Arabian Gulf partners and building on President Trump’s historic initiative, the Abraham Accords,” adding that “in the Gulf, US partners are increasingly willing and able to do more to defend themselves against Iran and its proxies, including by acquiring and fielding a variety of US military systems.”[8] The latter statement has proven true to some extent in the recent war, although the war has also arguably turned the American security umbrella into a liability rather than an asset. In contrast, the document portrays Israel as “a model ally” due to the fact that “it was able and willing to defend itself after the barbaric attacks of October 7th.”[9]
Kuwait found itself on the list of 75 countries – and the only Gulf country – that the State Department recently released, issuing a ban on immigrant visas.[10] The Trump Administration has also not managed to appoint a new ambassador to Kuwait, as the president’s choice for ambassador, Amer Ghalib, failed, following bipartisan criticisms of his antisemitism.[11] This incident reveals the level of priority that Kuwait holds for the Trump Administration, though it is worth noting that interim ambassadors are also in place in Qatar and the UAE, indicating general deprioritization of and understaffing in the Gulf.[12] Below I detail three micro case studies that may represent areas of change regarding Kuwait’s hedging position.
Kuwait’s Stance against Normalization with Israel
The Trump Administration aims to require more of its allies when it comes to making them responsible for their own defense and encouraging them with normalize with Israel. Kuwait has long been steadfast in its refusal to normalize with Israel, notwithstanding its neighbors’ shifting positions, largely standing by a ministry spokesperson’s statement in 2020 that Kuwait “will be the last to normalize relations.”[13] While some states like Qatar and Saudi Arabia have insisted that recognition of a Palestinian state along lines proposed in the Arab Peace Initiative must precede normalization, Kuwaiti authorities have not set out any conditions for normalization. This is best explained by the role of Parliament, which gave Kuwaiti public opinion much more political weight than in most of its Gulf neighbors.
When it was still in session, Kuwait’s National Assembly backed the state’s stance towards Israel, with the body passing legislation strengthening the cultural and economic boycott of the Israeli state.[14] In 2019, 39 of 50 elected members of parliament (MPs) signed a statement expressing their refusal to normalize with Israel.[15] And as recently as January 2025, Kuwait’s Public Prosecution imprisoned commentator Fajr Al Saeed due to her calls to normalize with Israel, which it claims violate Kuwait’s Unified Law for Boycotting Israel (Law No. 21 of 1964).[16] Such a hardline stance on Israel appears to follow public opinion: as of March 2024, Arab Barometer found that 84 percent of those surveyed reported boycotting Israeli-linked companies, 62 percent contributed to support Gazans, and 40 percent shared support for Palestinians online.[17]
With the parliament suspended and with a ceasefire (notionally) in place in Gaza, Kuwaiti policy could feasibly change. If the Iranian regime survives the ongoing war, it is plausible (yet in my view unlikely) that Kuwait could turn to Israel to shore up its security, Part of the reason this seems unlikely is the apparent lack of interest on the American side. Indeed, Jared Kushner in 2020 opined that Kuwaitis “are out there taking a very radical view of the conflict in favor of the Palestinians. Obviously, it hasn’t been very constructive.”[18]
At present, it seems unlikely that Kuwait will alter its stance on Israel, particularly given that the US Government does not appear invested in trying to change this. Further, public opinion matters, at least to some extent, even under authoritarianism, and there is no incentive at this time for Kuwait to normalize with Israel. As Hamad Albloshi highlights, “Kuwait might be the only member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that has had no direct or indirect contact with Israel.”[19] This is largely due to the historical presence of Palestinian nationalist groups and links with Arab nationalism within the state.[20]
Kuwait’s Stance on Islamists
The Trump Administration’s designation of the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Lebanese branches of the Muslim Brotherhood as foreign terrorist organizations in January 2026[21] confirms the administration’s refusal to engage with Islamists – something that may concern Kuwait, one of the only Gulf states that has not banned the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. When it comes to positioning on Islamists, Kuwait’s policies may be shifting. The December 2025 stripping of citizenship of Tareq al-Suwaidan, a figure who has been associated with the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, may indicate such a change. The decision was made “based on the recommendation of the first deputy prime minister of interior, and with approval of the Cabinet.”[22]
Similarly, in February 2026, on the heels of the Kuwaiti Defense Minister’s visit to Abu Dhabi,[23] Kuwaiti authorities halted funding to eight Lebanese hospitals on grounds that they have links to terrorist groups. Kuwaiti authorities claim that this move was made in compliance with UN Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII, which focus on fighting terrorism.[24] The Lebanese Health Ministry noted its “great surprise” at the measure, which it dubbed “inconsistent” with the crisis facing the Lebanese state, as the private hospitals are “an essential part of the Lebanese health system.”[25] The hospitals, which are primarily in southern Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, and in southern Lebanon are likely linked to Hizballah. [26] Last summer, Kuwait’s Foreign Ministry also placed sanctions on Al Qard Al Hassan Association, which is thought to have links with Hizballah. [27] The Lebanese Government has pushed back on this measure, signaling greater tension in the bilateral relationship.
Such moves may indicate closer alignment with the UAE, a state that has staunchly opposed any Islamist influence in the region for over a decade. The two states appear to be getting closer, despite holding different stances on normalization with Israel. In January, Kuwait and the UAE held a high-profile weeklong celebration in the UAE to mark their long-standing ties under the tagline “UAE and Kuwait: Brothers Forever.”[28] During the Emirati-Kuwaiti Media Forum, Emirati diplomatic advisor Anwar Gargash obliquely referenced his country’s recent tensions with Saudi Arabia, citing an “unprecedented media campaign” based on “fabrication, lies, falsification, and exaggeration.”[29] In contrast, he praised “Kuwaiti restraint.”[30] Notably, the UAE was the only state to congratulate Kuwait publicly on the dissolution of parliament, with a readout of a telephone call between President Muhammad bin Zayed and Amir Shaykh Mishaal released one day after the dissolution. In it, the Emirati president “affirmed that the UAE stands with Kuwait with respect of all measures and decisions it has taken to maintain its stability. Sheikh Mohammad bin Zayed has assured His Highness the Amir that he views the stability of Kuwait and the UAE as intertwined due to the solid brotherly relations.”[31] Now that Kuwait no longer needs to contend with parliament on issues of foreign policy or validate Islamists’ place within the domestic political sphere, it may pursue a different strategy with Islamism that is more aligned with that of the UAE. Despite the recent rift between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, it is worth noting that adopting stances to combat Islamist influence is a shared interest.
Kuwait and Iran
Kuwait-Iran bilateral ties before the 2026 war were cordial though not necessarily strong. The relationship has been marked by periodic flashpoints – first after the 1979 revolution: Kuwait recognized the state under Khomeini’s leadership, but relations worsened after the start of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, during which Kuwait and much of the Arab Gulf supported Iraq.[32] More recently, in 2008, a mourning procession for Hizballah leader Imad Mughniyyeh in Kuwait led the state to summon around 1,500 Kuwaiti Shias for questioning and “demonstrated to Kuwaiti Shias the precarity of their position if they were seen to be colluding with transnational Shii movements.”[33] Another flashpoint emerged in 2015, when a cache of weapons was discovered in northern Kuwait, the so-called Abdali Cell. This incident led to the arrest of 25 Kuwaiti Shias and one Iranian for intentions to engage in “hostile acts” against Kuwait;[34] Kuwait also in 2017 expelled Iranian diplomats in the country, as the Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry claimed that the Supreme Court found that “Iranian sides helped and supported the cell members.”[35]
Shortly after the discovery of the Abdali Cell, then-Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sheikh Sabah al-Khaled Al Sabah made an official visit to Tehran with a letter from then Amir Shaykh Sabah to President Rouhani as a means of founding the “basis for dialogue” between the GCC and Iran – again showcasing Kuwait’s tendency towards mediation.[36] Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarid proclaimed Iran’s willingness to engage with the GCC, and Rouhani visited Kuwait and Oman in February 2017.[37] In August 2022, Kuwait appointed a new ambassador to Tehran – the first since 2016.[38]
Kuwaiti concerns about Iran have since 1979 focused on its ability to influence domestic politics, particularly Kuwait’s politically active Shii minority population, and the ongoing war is no different.[39] Kuwait, along with its neighbors, has announced the arrest of Iran-linked cells, with around 45 people arrested reportedly due to links with Hizballah.[40] The war could contribute to further securitization of Kuwait’s Shii population and extension of authoritarian practices more generally. It will also undoubtedly complicate Kuwait’s ability to continue its hedging approach towards Iran, particularly if the regime survives.
Where Now?
The Kuwaiti Government now has the freedom to implement foreign (and domestic) policies without parliamentary input or oversight and may start taking advantage of this fact. These policies, however, will likely focus on shoring up regional security and potentially moving away from its hedging position, particularly regarding Islamists and Iran. On the whole, Kuwaiti foreign policy is likely to remain focused on mitigating threats from the region to Kuwaiti stability – again, namely those linked to Islamism and to Iran. Further, and relatedly, authoritarian retrenchment throughout the region seems likely, as dozens have already been arrested in the region on grounds of harming national security through social media posts about the war.[41]
Another major issue is whether Kuwait’s ties with the United States could change post-war. Questions have emerged throughout the Gulf about the level of involvement of these states in the war, given that many host US airbases. In the Kuwaiti case, while the state has denied that its territory has been used to launch attacks against Iran, videos of US missiles and missile launchers have suggested otherwise, at least in recent weeks.[42] Kuwaiti officials have opined that such accusations, which portray Iranian strikes as “retaliatory,” serve to justify continued Iranian attacks;[43] they may also lead to demands for a re-set in US-Kuwait relations and have already fueled tensions with some Iran-backed groups in Iraq.[44]
Kuwait presents in many ways the case of an archetypal weak state, one that has sought to remain out of the international spotlight, one whose parliament has constrained major foreign policy changes, and one that has relied on the US security umbrella since 1991. Given that none of these policies has insulated Kuwait from effects of the US/Israel-Iran war, however, Kuwait may take a new approach. So far, this response appears to involve strengthening regional ties through the GCC, particularly when it comes to fighting Iranian efforts at “infiltration” into those states, with a recent statement from the GCC Secretary-General claiming that “the security of the GCC states is indivisible.”[45] Internal schisms within the body, particularly between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, may make such regional realignment untenable and may force Kuwait to end its policy of hedging and choose sides within the Gulf and within the region more broadly.
[1] Courtney Freer, The Resilience of Parliamentary Politics in Kuwait: Rentierism, Ideology and Mobilization (Oxford University Press, 2024).
[2] Courtney Freer “Domestic Political Pressures and the Formulation of Foreign Policy,” Journal of Arabian Studies (2026): https://doi.org/10.1080/21534764.2025.2612160.
[3] “Amendments Introduced to the Kuwaiti Citizenship Law,” KPMG, April 23, 2026, https://kpmg.com/xx/en/our-insights/gms-flash-alert/2026/flash-alert-2026-111.html.
[4] Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Kuwait as a Mediator in Regional Affairs: The Gulf Crises of 2014 and 2017,” The International Spectator, vol. 56, no. 4 (2021): 121.
[5] Ibid., 122.
[6] Bader Al-Saif and Sanam Vakil, “Iran and the Gulf: Why Hedging Is No Longer Enough,” War on the Rocks, February 20, 2026, https://warontherocks.com/2026/02/iran-and-the-gulf-why-hedging-is-no-longer-enough/.
[7] “Iran struck US forces relocated on Kuwait’s Bubiyan island, military spokesperson says,” Reuters, April 6, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-struck-us-forces-relocated-kuwaits-bubiyan-island-military-spokesperson-2026-04-06/.
[8] “2026 National Defense Strategy: Restoring Peace through Strength for a New Golden Age of America,” Department of War, January 23, 2026, https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Yasmine El-Sabawi, “How did Kuwait end up on the US immigrant visa ban?” Middle East Eye, January 23, 2026, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/how-did-kuwait-end-us-immigrant-visa-ban.
[11] Laura Kelly. “Bipartisan senators criticize Trump’s nominee for Kuwait over accusations of antisemitism,” The Hill, October 23, 2025, https://thehill.com/policy/international/5570214-amer-ghalib-nomination-kuwait-confirmation-hearing/.
[12] Joey Cappelletti, “Trump’s failed bid to elevate an Arab American ally shows cracks in his political coalition,” AP News, February 1, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/trump-michigan-gaza-amer-ghalib-arab-americans-703621a99b5fdb89b84c34f3b8070bf1.
[13] “Kuwait says it’ll be ‘last to normalize’ with Israel, will stand by Palestinians,” The Times of Israel, August 16, 2020, https://www.timesofisrael.com/kuwaiti-officials-reject-israel-normalization-reaffirm-support-for-palestinians/.
[14] “Kuwait parliament passes bill banning dealings with Israel,” The New Arab, May 29, 2021, https://www.newarab.com/news/kuwait-jail-fine-anyone-who-deals-israel.
[15] Tyler B. Parker, “Why Kuwait Rejects Normalization With Israel,” Fair Observer, August 18. 2020, https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/tyler-parker-kuwait-news-israel-relations-uae-gulf-arab-news-international-media-news-79163/.
[16] “Kuwaiti media figure Fajr Al Saeed detained over calls for normalisation with Israel,” Gulf News, January 11, 2025, https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/kuwait/kuwaiti-media-figure-fajr-al-saeed-detained-over-calls-for-normalisation-with-israel-1.500014191.
[17] Michael Robbins and Amaney A. Jamal, “Foreign Affairs: Arab Public Opinion Constrains Normalization with Israel,” Arab Barometer, June 23, 2025, https://www.arabbarometer.org/media-news/press-release-foreign-affairs-article-how-arab-public-opinion-constrains-normalization-with-israel/.
[18] “Kushner: Kuwait’s support for Palestinians not ‘very constructive,’” Middle East Monitor, August 19, 2020, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200819-kushner-kuwaits-support-for-palestinians-not-very-constructive/.
[19] Hamad H. Albloshi, “The War Between Iran and Israel: A Reflection from Kuwait,” Middle East Institute Singapore, June 18, 2025, https://mei.nus.edu.sg/think_in/the-war-between-iran-and-israel-a-reflection-from-kuwait/.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] “Kuwait revokes citizenship of influential Islamic preacher Tariq al-Suwaidan,” The New Arab, December 7, 2025, https://www.newarab.com/news/kuwait-revokes-citizenship-influential-lslamic-preacher.
[23] “President Sheikh Mohamed receives Kuwait’s Minister of Defence in Abu Dhabi,” The National, January 28, 2026, https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/uae/2026/01/28/president-sheikh-mohamed-receives-kuwaits-minister-of-defence-in-abu-dhabi/.
[24] “Kuwait Adds 8 Lebanese Hispitals to Sanctions List Over Terrorism Links,” Arab Times Online, February 8, 2026, https://www.arabtimesonline.com/news/kuwait-adds-8-lebanese-hospitals-to-sanctions-list-over-terrorism-links/.
[25] Jamie Prentis, “Shock in Lebanon as Kuwait hits eight hospitals with sanctions,” The National, February 9, 2026, https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/02/09/shock-in-lebanon-as-kuwait-hits-eight-hospitals-with-sanctions/.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] “‘Brothers Forever’: UAE announces week-long nationwide festival celebrating decades of ties with Kuwait,” The Times of India, January 26, 2026, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/middle-east/brothers-forever-uae-announces-week-long-nationwide-festival-celebrating-decades-of-ties-with-kuwait/articleshow/127527670.cms.
[29] Alhurra and Sakina Abdallah, “The UAE Woos Kuwait…In Confrontation with Saudi Arabia?” Alhurra, February 3, 2026, https://alhurra.com/en/12112.
[30] Ibid.
[31] “Kuwait Amir receives call from UAE President affirming solid support,” Al Diwan Al Amiri, State of Kuwait, May 11, 2024, https://www.da.gov.kw/en/news/834-11_05_2024/
[32] Albloshi.
[33] Courtney Freer, The Resilience of Parliamentary Politics in Kuwait: Rentierism, Ideology, and Mobilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2024), 186.
[34] Sylvia Westall, “Terror case opens up Kuwait’s sectarian divisions,” Reuters, June 2, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/us-politics/terror-case-opens-up-kuwaits-sectarian-divisions-idUSKCN0YO0VG/.
[35] “Kuwait expels Iranian diplomats over spy cell,” DW, July 20, 2017, https://www.dw.com/en/kuwait-expels-iranian-diplomats-over-spy-terror-cell/a-39774802.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid.
[38] “Kuwait sends ambassador to Tehran after more than 6 years,” Tehran Times, August 14, 2022, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/475655/Kuwait-sends-ambassador-to-Tehran-after-more-than-6-years.
[39] Ulrichsen, 123.
[40] Ghazi al-Harthi, “Gulf States Pursue IRGC, Hezbollah Cells Amid Ongoing Attacks,” Asharq Alawsat, April 2,2026, https://english.aawsat.com/gulf/5258222-gulf-states-pursue-irgc-hezbollah-cells-amid-ongoing-attacks.
[41] Mary Whitfill Roeloffs, “How Posting Iran War Info Can Get You Arrested – In UAE, Israel And More,” Forbes, March 12, 2026, https://www.forbes.com/sites/maryroeloffs/2026/03/12/how-posting-iran-war-info-can-get-you-arrested-in-uae-israel-and-more/.
[42] Ershad Alijani and Djamel Belayachi, “Videos show US missiles being launched from Kuwait into Iran,
France 24, April 4, 2026, https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20260404-us-missiles-kuwait-iran-himars-launches-gmlrs-france24-investigation.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Sinan Mahmoud, “Iraq investigates attack on Kuwait’s consulate in Basra,” The National, April 8, 2026, https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/04/08/rocket-attack-in-basra-raises-tension-between-iraq-and-kuwait/.
[45] “GCC vow united response to regional threats after Kuwait infiltration case,” Arab News, May 14, 2026, https://www.arabnews.jp/en/middle-east/article_170091/.