Kelly Stedem, Bucknell University
In November 2024, Israel launched a devastating surprise attack on Hizbullah which killed many of its top leaders. Many commentators argued that this attack represented an existential threat to the organization. But Hizbullah mounted an unexpectedly vigorous response to Israel’s 2026 invasion of south Lebanon, showing great resilience as well as continued ability to project military power at home and against Israel. Hizbullah has endured by maintaining internal strength thanks to its continued provision of clientelistic goods and—despite everything—the belief among many Southern Lebanese that it is a strong and capable militia. While the decision to enter the 2026 war with Iran undermined some of this support, many Shia from the South have little political, economic, or even security alternatives to Hizbullah. Dismantling Hizbullah may in principle begin with disarmament and the Lebanese state holding a monopoly on weapons in the South, but the state will also need to address the key reasons that so many Southern Shia have remained steadfast in their support of the organization.
Targeting Hizbullah
Since 2024, Hizbullah has experienced its most intense physical and financial setbacks since it was established in the early 1980s. Hizbullah began exchanging tit-for-tat missile strikes with Israel in support of Hamas following the October 7th attacks. The violence dramatically escalated on September 18, 2024, when Israel detonated bombs hidden in thousands of pager distributed to Hizbullah members. The explosions wounded over 3,000 people and killed 12, including two children.[1] Days later, Israel detonated bombs placed inside walkie talkies, injuring another 600 and killing 25.[2]
Israel then targeted Hizbullah’s key political and military leadership throughout this campaign. Longtime Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah was assassinated on September 27, 2024 when Israel dropped multiple “bunker buster” bombs on Dahiyeh.[3] Leader of the elite Radwan Forces Ibrahim Akil and Deputy Head of the Central Council Nabil Kaouk were also killed during the war. After the presumed incumbent Secretary General Hashem Safieddine was assassinated in early October 2024, Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem was appointed Secretary General.
The combination of the pager attacks and the assassination of Nasrallah, who had not been seen in person for decades and instead delivered his speeches via video from what were believed to be secure locations, made clear that Israel had breached Hizbullah’s network. According to interviewees, Hizbullah has adapted their communications.[4] Allegedly, the organization has reverted to passing written messages through multiple people to coordinate activities.[5] Many members leave their phones at home to avoid any tracking.
Israel then invaded south Lebanon. The war had a massive human toll; 4,047 Lebanese were killed and an additional 16,638 were injured.[6] According to the Arab Opinion Index, 76% of respondents from areas targeted by Israel—primarily the South and Southern suburbs of Beirut—were forced to flee.[7] The destruction of civilian infrastructure was also immense. According to Sawt Lubnan, 50,000 units were completely destroyed including 25,000 units South of the Litani River.[8] An additional 317,000 units were partially destroyed. Hizbullah allegedly compensated 30,000 of the destroyed units, including paying $8000 for furniture, and $6000 for renting a house in Beirut or $4000 for renting a house in the South yearly (more than 50% of those who submitted bills have not been paid).
A ceasefire went into effect on November 27, 2024, requiring Israel to remove forces from South Lebanon and Hizbullah to move fighters north of the Litani River.[9] The Lebanese government was tasked with preventing attacks against Israel and dismantling Hizbullah’s infrastructure South of the Litani River. The LAF deployed to the region, with clear indications that disarmament of Hizbullah in those areas as an ultimate goal. Hizbullah leader Naim Qassem had refused to disarm north of the Litani River.[10] Despite the ceasefire, Israel continued a near daily bombing campaign and an occupation of at least 5 locations across the border.[11] In the last 3 months of 2025 alone, Lebanon accused Israel of over 2,000 ceasefire violations.[12] For many Southern Lebanese, the war did not really end. Even residents of Beirut, roughly 75 kilometers from the Litani River, were subjected to the loud, lawn mower like sounds of an Israeli drone on a near weekly basis.[13]
The 2026 US-Israeli war against Iran reignited the conflict. Although there was a widespread belief among many, including Shia in South Lebanon, that Hizbullah would not enter the war, Hizbullah launched missiles on March 2 from the Naqoura area towards Northern Israel following the assassination of Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.[14] This sparked an intense bombing campaign and ground invasion by Israel. Within days of the start of the March 2026 war, Israel ordered the evacuation of all areas south of the Litani River as well as large portions of Dahiyeh, displacing hundreds of thousands. Hizbullah has continued to fire rockets against Israeli targets.
Simultaneously, the US and its allies have intensified their economic campaign against Hizbullah. Al-Qard al-Hassan, an organization that provides loans to Lebanese citizens but is viewed as Hizbullah’s key financial arm, has been the target of US sanctions since 2007, but recently saw its assets frozen in Saudi Arabia in October 2021.[15] Al-Qard al-Hassan branches were also targeted by Israeli bombs in early March 2026. Kuwait also sanctioned Hizbullah-affiliated hospitals in February 2026,[16] some of whom were also evacuated in March 2026.[17]
These actions represent dual attacks against Hizbullah. Israel has physically targeted the organization, hitting key personnel, infrastructure, and weapons, while the US and its allies have also gone after the financial institutions that allow the organization to function. For many, these campaigns were viewed as effective strategies that were ebbing away at the organization’s capacity to function. Yet, my research found that the belief that the organization had been significantly weakened was not parroted by either its supporters or its critics in the South.
Hizbullah’s Enduring Support
In my previous research, I explored the reason for Hizbullah’s robust and enduring support among Lebanon’s Southern Shia community. I have argued that the organization’s dual pillars are its moniker as the Resistance towards Israel and its clientelistic exchanges. These two factors have helped it build a deep social embeddedness within the community.[18] Although the 2024 war and subsequent violence threatened the existence of those factors, they did not unravel them. Instead, interviewees in January-February 2026 indicated that Southern Shia both still believed in the organization’s military prowess and the ability of the organization to provide economic support.
Southerners, like many other Lebanese, have existed for decades in a tense reality where future violence and war are considered a given. Israel occupied the region from 1982 until 2000; a key factor that led to the emergence of Hizbullah in the first place. The 2006 war between Hizbullah and Israel also led to significant destruction. Even among Hizbullah critics who blame the organization for inviting violence, there is animosity towards Israel and fear for the future due to the very real violence and loss. The idea that Hizbullah has acted as a bulwark against Israeli aggression has thus remained a persuasive argument for Southerners. Despite the destruction of the 2024 war, many still argued that Hizbullah is an effective fighting force, particularly as compared to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), which is seen as less well equipped and trained than the militia and unwilling to defend against Israeli attacks. Recent reports suggest that Hizbullah still has an estimated 30,000 fighters, 25,000 rockets, and 1,000 drones.[19] Interviewees from the South similarly expressed their belief that notable weapons caches remain ready for use.
While Hizbullah’s finances appear to remain strong, cracks have been emerging since well before 2024.[20] Healthcare provision remains, but has dramatically slowed. Individuals, including former fighters, are allegedly waiting over a month for insurance approval for care that used to be provided in mere days.[21] Hizbullah used to cover the majority of healthcare costs, asking those with approved cards to pay as little as 10% of costs. That has also shifted since the 2024 war, with the cost share burden increasing. Finally, salaries of employees have been cut approximately in half. These changes indicate a tightening of the purse strings, or perhaps shifts in fiscal priorities. Many argued, for example, that Hizbullah remains financially strong, but were reorganizing finances to ensure that it had significant money to spend on the, now postponed, 2026 elections.
Importantly, few alternatives exist in Southern Lebanon to compete with Hizbullah’s services. State services are either non-existent, considered of poor quality (for example, state schools), or have been politicized. Harakat Amal, the party of longtime parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri, offers services to their supporters primarily through co-opted state institutions. For example, the Nabih Berri Governmental University Hospital of Nabatiyeh is a state-run hospital that prioritizes Harakat Amal supporters and members. It is not easy to simply change political affiliations, as many of these clientelistic machines operate on establish reputations or familial connections. Further, despite being allies, there is a deep resentment between the two political parties. It’s highly unlikely that majorities of Hizbullah supporters would merely “jump ship” for Harakat Amal. This means that Southern Shia are still incentivized to support the organization in order to receive these clientelistic perks.
Hizbullah has long been aware of the crucial role that domestic support plays in their durability. That is why the organization couples its offerings with repression against internal dissent to prevent the emergence of any real competitors. During the 2018 elections, for example, journalist Ali al-Amine was allegedly beaten by Hizbullah members after hanging posters for his political candidacy as part of an independent Shia party list.[22] Most infamously, civil society activist and political commentator Lokman Slim was assassinated on February 4, 2021.[23] The assassination came just days after Slim appeared on Al-Hadath TV accusing Hizbullah of playing a part in importing the ammonium nitrate that ignited the 2020 Beirut Port Explosion.[24] Similarly, on March 21, 2026, Hizbullah critic Sheikh Abbas Hoteit claimed that Hizbullah had tried to assassinate him.[25] While extreme examples, they indicate the degree to which Hizbullah represses criticism from within the Shia community.
The importance of maintaining this domestic support is why the decision to enter the war in March 2026 comes as such a shock; it threatens the internal cohesion and support for Hizbullah by Lebanon’s Southern Shia. The choice to support Hamas in 2024 was controversial, but the genocide in Gaza and destruction in Lebanon reinforced the narrative for many that Israel is an existential threat. Yet, as described above, that war had severe consequences for the organization and for Southern Lebanon. It was a widespread belief among Lebanese, including Shia in the South and Bekaa, that Hizbullah would not get involved in the US-Israeli war against Iran because its own supporters could not afford another round of war so soon after 2024—physically, monetarily, or emotionally. For many of those same supporters, the decision to enter the war is seen as a betrayal of the Lebanese and their needs on behalf of the already dead Ayatollah Khamenei.
Similarly, Hizbullah has experienced pushback from domestic political allies, including longtime political ally Harakat Amal. Amal MPs did not object to the government’s decision to ban all Hizbullah military and security activity, while Amal leader and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri remained silent on the issue.[26] Berri has continued his silence on key political issues, except offering support for Lebanese PM Nawaf Salam following criticisms by Hizbullah and its supporters (and accusations that Salam himself is a Zionist). This silence is a clear political gamble on Berri’s part to secure Harakat Amal’s future, but it is also notably not an offer of strong support for Hizbullah during this crisis. For those on the opposite end of the political spectrum, the decision to enter the war marks the end of any possible political future for Hizbullah. For many of these critics, Hizbullah’s actions weaken the already strained Lebanese state. But, as suggested above, this view is not shared by the majority of its constituents in the South, which is the more important determinant of its continued survival and influence.
A New Future?
So where do Lebanon and Hizbullah go from here? There are numerous regional factors that will likely affect the outcome of the current war. In some ways, the future of South Lebanon is partially in the hands of Israel. Israel’s defense minister, Israel Katz, has said that the country intends to reoccupy South Lebanon up to the Litani River.[27] Meanwhile, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has called for the full annexation of that territory.[28] Some reports also suggest that Israel seeks to ethnically cleanse South Lebanon of Shia.[29] Similarly, the future of the Iranian regime will also impact the organization’s finances and military capabilities.
There are, however, equally important domestic factors to consider. There is an inherent tension between what Southern Shia will want and need, and what the rest of Lebanon will demand. Many Southern Shia have been looking for support to rebuild since the destruction of 2024. Yet, the Lebanese government’s refusal to grant building permits has reinforced the narrative that the state is unwilling to help.[30] The needs of the South have now dramatically increased and will likely continue to rise as Israel has adopted the “Gaza model,” which will include widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure. For many Lebanese outside the region, however, the problems of the South are a direct result of their own actions, actions which have harmed the result of the country physically, economically, and even diplomatically as other states struggle to avoid interacting with an internationally designated terrorist group that is part-and-parcel of the state.[31]
Moreover, these sectarian tensions are exacerbated with the displacement of approximately 1 million people from the South. [32] While the government has opened shelters, thousands of people are currently living in the streets. On a trip to Bourj Hammoud in early March 2026, a predominately Armenian neighborhood known for selling jewelry, many jewelers were closed or had pulled their merchandise for fears of theft following the displacement. Furthermore, many landlords within Beirut and beyond are wary of renting to Shia (or, as I heard from several interviewees, any woman wearing a black headscarf) out of concerns that they could be Hizbullah or Iranian, and thus invite targeted strikes. This fear was further heightened by targeted strikes on a hotel in the downtown Raouche area[33] and next to the public beach, Ramlet al Baydeh.[34] While there are numerous community efforts to offer free meals and support to the displaced, the war is simultaneously stoking fear and distrust. It’s not clear where these fears will lead, or if they will further strengthen political opposition to Hizbullah.
And what of Hizbullah’s weapons? For decades, many have argued that Lebanon must fulfill the goals of the civil war ending Taif Accords by disarming Hizbullah, the last officially armed militia from the conflict. This is a key step in achieving security and stability, and developing the capacity of the Lebanese state itself. The US and its allies, as well as the Lebanese state, have been looking to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to step up security measures. In September 2025, the US announced $14.2 million in aid for the LAF as part of a strategy to disarm Hizbullah.[35] Then again in early October 2025, the US approved $190 million in aid for the LAF, with an additional $40 million for the Internal Security Forces (ISF).[36] However, the US remains critical of the Lebanese government and the LAF. During his January 2026 trip to the US, Lebanese Army Chief Rodolph Haykel angered Washington after stating Hizbullah was not a terrorist organization “in the context of Lebanon.”[37] This, for some, reinforced the fear that the LAF has been infiltrated by Hizbullah and thus cannot be trusted.
The reality is that the Lebanese State holding a monopoly on weapons via the LAF is the first and most crucial step towards achieving security across Lebanon. Without it, diplomatic negotiations between Lebanon and others will likely stall. Similarly, Lebanese citizens across the geographic and sectarian divides need to see an army capable of controlling its own territory. They expect an army that can prevent the exact kind of escalation from the Lebanese side that wrought the March 2026 war in the first place.
Yet, the LAF faces severe domestic constraints in how it can achieve this goal. It is the most well-respected government institution and thus well placed to take a leading role.[38] Like all Lebanese institutions, however, it’s subject to a quota system to ensure parity among Christians and Muslims. According to my previous research, however, recruitment of Christians is extremely difficult and maintaining the quota is already difficult. While some reform plans advocate the end of sectarian recruitment integration of Hizbullah fighters into the LAF as a possibility of disarmament,[39] the reality is that this will likely result in a Muslim (potentially Shia) dominated organization. This will inherently undermine the image of the LAF as a true, multi-sectarian representation of the Lebanese people. On the other hand, the LAF has to be careful about how it engages against Hizbullah if it wants to avoid feeding into accusations of being either anti-Shia or pro-Israel. For example, calls for the LAF to cooperate in conjunction with the IDF are non-starters even for Hizbullah critics from the South. As for Hizbullah, it is unlikely to voluntarily surrender its weapons as long as it feels that either Israeli attacks or internal civil war is possible—which is to say, for the foreseeable future.
However, the state monopoly on weapons is not enough to achieving durable solutions in the South, which are a critical step towards achieving stability within Lebanon more broadly. Southern Lebanese will require even more support, even if they are allowed to return to those evacuated regions. Without addressing these needs, the decline in support for Hizbullah, or a similar successor organization, among Southern Shia could be temporary. Dismantling Hizbullah and strengthening the capacity of the Lebanese state will never succeed without addressing the real needs of Southern Shia.
[1] Deeb, Sarah El. August 6, 2025. “Survivors of Israel’s Pager Attack on Hezbollah Last Year Struggle to Recover.” PBS News. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/survivors-of-israels-pager-attack-on-hezbollah-last-year-struggle-to-recover.
[2] Ibid.
[3] “New Details Revealed on Israel’s Assassination of Nasrallah.” September 22, 2025. Al-Awsat. https://english.aawsat.com/node/5188849.
[4] Hizbullah allegedly switched to using pagers after targeted attacks against fighters in Syria indicated that phones—particularly Whataspp—was not a secure system for communications.
[5] Interview. Beirut, Lebanon. 1 March 2026.
[6] Ministry of Public Health. 4 December 2024. “Updated Toll of Israeli Aggression: 4,047 Martyrs and 16,639 Injured.”
[7] Arab Center Washington DC. “Arab Opinion Index 2025.” Pg. 15
[8] Sawt Beirut International January 6, 2025. “Ma Bein Harb 2006 and Harb 2024… Arqam Sadaqa li Aadad al-Mubani al-Modamara wa Taklafa Imaraha.”
[9] The region South of the Litani River was occupied by Israel between 1982-200. The river thus marks the division to Lebanon’s deep south.
[10] Agency, National News. December 13, 2025. “Sheikh Qassem: Hezbollah will never be disarmed, surrender spells the end of Lebanon – [Al Manar English].” National News Agency. https://frontend.nna-leb.gov.lb/en/news/148559/sheikh-qassem-hezbollah-will-never-be-disarmed-sur.
[11] OHCHR. UN Experts Warn against Continued Violations of Ceasefire in Lebanon and Urge Protection of Civilians.” October 17, 2025. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/10/un-experts-warn-against-continued-violations-ceasefire-lebanon-and-urge.
[12] Staff, Al Jazeera. January 26, 2026. “Lebanon Files UN Complaint against Israel’s Daily Ceasefire Violations.” Al Jazeera.. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/26/lebanon-files-un-complaint-against-israels-daily-ceasefire-violations.
[13] Ward, Euan, and Diego Ibarra Sanchez. February 14, 2026. “Life in Beirut Beneath the Drones.” The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/14/world/middleeast/beirut-drones-sound-israel-airstrikes.html.
[14] In the aftermath of the missiles, there were numerous rumors that the attack was carried out by an unauthorized faction within Hizbullah. However, the organization claimed credit for the attacks.
[15] Reuters. October 27, 2021. “Saudi Arabia Designates Hezbollah’s Financial Arm as ‘Terrorists.’” Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/27/saudi-arabia-hezbollah-lebanon-al-qard-al-hassan-terrorists.
[16] L’Orient Today. February 8, 2026. “Kuwait Sanctions 8 Lebanese Hospitals over Alleged Terrorism Links.” https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1494288/kuwait-sanctions-8-lebanese-hospitals-over-alleged-terrorism-links.html.
[17] MTV Lebanon. March 5, 2026. “Some Hospitals Have Been Evacuated in Dahiyeh after the Israeli Threats.” https://www.mtv.com.lb/en/news/Local/1661006/some-hospitals-have-been-evacuated-in-dahiyeh-after-the-israeli-threats.
[18] “What State? Political Parties and Non-State Security Provision in Lebanon.” Comparative Politics. Volume 58, Number 1, October 2025, pp. 51-74(24). https://doi.org/10.5129/001041525X17489537724915
[19] Jadah, Malek. March 7, 2026. “What military capabilities does Hezbollah still have?” L’Orient Today. https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1497855/what-military-capabilities-does-hezbollah-still-have.html
[20] Extra perks, like furnishing houses for newly married fighters, had been cut years prior to the 2024 war.
[21] Interview. Beirut, Lebanon. February 27, 2026.
[22] Arab News. April 24, 2018. “Tensions Flare up before Lebanon Legislative Election.” https://www.arabnews.com/node/1290556/amp.
[23] The author worked for Lokman Slim between 2011-2014.
[24] Assaf, Claude. February 4, 2026. “Lokman Slim Assassination: Five Years on, Renewed Hope for the Family.” L’Orient Today. https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1493788/lokman-slim-assassination-five-years-on-renewed-hope-for-the-family.html.
[25] See: https://www.instagram.com/reel/DWJMAOyjSly/
[26] Chamseddine, Adam. March 3, 2026. “Exclusive: Inside Hezbollah’s Decision to Attack Israel and Berri’s ‘break’ with the Party.” Middle East Eye. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/inside-hezbollah-decision-attack-israel-and-berri-break-party.
[27] “Israel Says It Will Keep Control over Part of Southern Lebanon after War with Hezbollah Ends.” March 31, 2026. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yx8knpr5no.
[28] Uriel-Beeri, Tamar, Maya Gebeily, and Maya Gebeily. “Israeli Minister Calls for Annexation of Southern Lebanon.” Reuters. March 23, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-minister-calls-annexation-southern-lebanon-2026-03-23/.
[29] Goldbaum, Christina, and David Guttenfelder. 2026. “Israel’s Message to a Broad Swath of Lebanon: Shiites Must Go.” World. The New York Times. April 1, 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/01/world/middleeast/lebanon-shiite-israel-evacuation.html.
[30] Iman Ali. February 11, 2026. “Repair Amid Ongoing Ruination—Rebuilding Dahiyeh Once More.” Middle East Research and Information Project. https://www.merip.org/2026/02/repair-amid-ongoing-ruination-rebuilding-dahiyeh-once-more/.
[31] “European Union Adds Military Wing of Hezbollah to List of Terrorist Organizations.” July 22, 2013. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/world/middleeast/european-union-adds-hezbollah-wing-to-terror-list.html.
[32] OHCHR. “UN Experts Warn against Continued Violations of Ceasefire in Lebanon and Urge Protection of Civilians.” March 13, 2026. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/10/un-experts-warn-against-continued-violations-ceasefire-lebanon-and-urge.
[33] “War Expands to Central Beirut as Israeli Strike Kills Iranians in Luxury Hotel.” BBC. March 10, 2026. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c2k8y7vy78no.
[34] Staff, Al Jazeera. “Israeli ‘Double-Tap Strike’ Hits Displaced on Beirut Seafront, Kills Eight.” Al Jazeera. March 12, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/12/israeli-double-tap-strike-hits-displaced-on-beirut-seafront-kills-eight.
[35] L’Orient Today. September 11, 2025. “Pentagon Announces $14.2 Million Aid Package to Lebanese Army for Hezbollah Disarmament.” https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1476925/pentagon-announces-142-million-aid-package-to-lebanese-army-for-hezbollah-disarmament.html.
[36] Zengerle, Patricia, Maya Gebeily, Patricia Zengerle, and Maya Gebeily. October 3, 2025. “US Sends $230 Million to Lebanon as It Moves to Disarm Hezbollah, Sources Say.” Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-sends-230-million-lebanon-it-moves-disarm-hezbollah-sources-say-2025-10-02/.
[37] L’Orient Today. February 6, 2026. “Haykal’s Firm Stance on Hezbollah Stated to US Senator Graham Hailed by All Sides.” https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1494092/graham-says-lebanese-army-not-a-reliable-partner-after-haykals-remarks-on-hezbollah-.html.
[38] See Arab Barometer, https://www.arabbarometer.org/survey-data/data-analysis-tool/
[39] See https://thebadil.com/policy/no-peace-without-process-changing-course-on-hezbollahs-arms/