On Academic Integrity and Historic Responsibility: Shrinking Spaces for Critical Debate in Germany after October 7

Jannis Julien Grimm, Freie Universität Berlin

 

There is no doubt that October 7 and its aftermath represent a critical juncture that has altered the horizon of the thinkable and possible. This brutal episode has introduced a sense of liminality into a structural context that was already being described as untenable, reshaping the conditions of possibility for future interactions in this conflict. References to October 7 as a point of no return for the Arab-Israeli conflict and for the (already precarious) rules-based order capture this consequential nature of the present moment.[1] Actualizing divergent historically mediated traumata, the October 7 massacre and Israel’s brutal retaliation have radically anchored those living and witnessing them in the ‘now’ while ‘the past and the future became less present’.[2] Prior imaginations of a potential peaceful future and everything that was invested into making them real seem to have lost much of their meaning. Instead, the future is now open again. In this sense, October 7 has paradoxically both opened and closed spaces of imagination and debate. While freezing the dominant debates in the post-Oslo era on institutionalized pathways towards a two-state solution, it has reignited new ones on the meaning and implications of a people’s rights to exist and to resist.

This ambivalent effect has become particularly visible at academic institutions – and hardly anywhere more so than in Germany: On the one hand, the siege on Gaza and genocide accusations against Israel by the state of South Africa and various scholars of genocide[3] have put the need for regional and historical conflict expertise as guidance for German foreign policy decisions into sharp relief. On the other hand, selective empathy, symptoms of moral panic, and a violent discourse marked by the disciplining of critical voices and a wrangling over terminology to describe the suffering inflicted on civilians have hindered scholars in their ability to provide much needed context and analytical depth to a highly emotionalized and polarizing public debate.

At German universities, where discussions about the normative and practical implications of unprecedented violent escalation ought to take place, the spaces for critical debates had been shrinking even before October 7. The Middle East and North Africa as a region may have experienced a surge of academic attention in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. But scholarship on the conflict in Palestine and Israel has steadily decreased, as discussing Israeli violations of international law has become a discursive minefield that few dare to enter. Since the vicious campaign against Muriel Asseburg, one of Germany’s most distinguished Middle East experts in early 2023,[4] many researchers have refrained from speaking publicly about Israel/Palestine. The demarcation of limits for acceptable critique of the siege on Gaza, including by influential public intellectuals,[5] have only reinforced this trend.

This has exposed the few who still do even more. As I write this article, I too find myself weighing words carefully. That is not to say that no critical discussions are taking place at academic institutions anymore. They are, as they always have. But many scholars have retreated to counterhegemonic and subaltern spaces outside of the limelight to argue without fear of repercussion. Both associations and private individuals have collected a worrying number of incident where researchers and academic faculty were limited to freely share and discuss their research and ideas related to Palestine and Israel.[6] The documented repercussions range from retaliatory discharge to the suspension of funding, to the cancellation of events and deplatforming of critical voices. Most prominently, the Max Planck Society terminated its contract with renowned anthropologist Ghassan Hage over a controversial poem he had posted on social media. Other examples include from the cancellation of movie screenings in solidarity with Palestinians, the postponing of events with thematic or geographic reference to the Middle East, and the disinvitation of speakers for their political stances. Tensions between pro-Palestinian and pro-Israeli student bodies have also intensified. This has caused the suppression of student events in solidarity with Gaza on campus, setting a dangerous precedent for the securitization of protest at academic institutions. After the brutal attack on a Jewish and Pro-Israeli student activist, the Berlin senate is now planning to reauthorize universities to impose penalties up to the exmatriculation of students under certain provisions – a prerogative previously abolished in a 2021 Higher Education reform. Proposed in a fast-track procedure, the draft law has been criticized for potentially providing a gateway to policing students’ political participation. Given its vague formulation, critics fear that the law might provide a pretext to penalize all sorts of contentious activities, from the disruption of events, to protest on campus, to controversial posters and public statements.[7]

Cultural institutions, traditional hosts of academic events, and media outlets, have also supported deplatforming – if only to avoid becoming part of a turf war, for which they possess neither the stamina nor expertise. In their efforts to avoid debates on Gaza, however, many of them overshoot the mark: In the past months, it has become difficult to find venues for events that have something to do with the Middle East (including on issues totally unrelated to Palestine or Israel). Likewise, it has never been harder for conflict scholars, courted by media when it came to writing about Ukraine or Syria, to publish their expertise on an ongoing war. Gatekeeping has complicated an honest discussion of Germany’s direct involvement in Israeli war efforts – and potentially war crimes – through its diplomatic support and weapons deliveries. But it has also precluded secondary analyses of the damage done to Germany’s credibility by its unconditional stance with Israel and its opposition to a ceasefire.[8]

New discursive frontiers

This sharply curtailed public sphere has caused a concentration of German debates on Gaza on questions of legitimacy and discussions of international norms and provisions for legitimate warfare, while marginalizing or ostracizing those who dare to note that these guiding principles are clearly not guiding warfare in Gaza. Azmi Bishara has aptly captured this disjuncture between abstract debates and empirical realities in his critique of Jürgen Habermas’ controversial intervention into public discourses on Gaza. Instead of criticizing the brutal war that is actually being waged, commentators have overwhelmingly argued about a hypothetical war in Gaza, which is in full compliance with international humanitarian law. Drawing its legitimacy from a principled right to self-defense, this ideal version of Israel’s war in Gaza can be determined as proportionate and just, regardless of its actual impacts, and independent of the civilian death toll, the scale and scope of aerial bombardment, and the number of reports of war crimes committed by Israeli soldiers. Similar principled justifications, detached from brutal realities of this war, are also at the basis of efforts to deny or relativize the war crimes committed by Hamas operatives in the Kibbutzim and at the Nova Festival. Among German academics, however, such attempts have remained marginal, at best.

In these discourses, October 7 has functioned as what Laclau has referred to as an “empty” or “floating” signifier,[9] a symbolic container that is filled with a variety of contingent meanings by contending actors. These mutually exclusive ascriptions have become symbolic markers of antagonism in a variety of debates, including on the hierarchization of victimhood and human life, on the threshold of genocide, and on the normative boundaries of legitimate warfare and resistance: Was October 7 an act of resistance or antisemitic terrorism? Is the Israeli siege on Gaza a justified war of self-defense or “a textbook case of genocide”[10]? Free Palestine from Israel occupation or from Hamas?

How these questions are answered is more than a matter of personal opinion. It has immediate and tangible consequences by inspiring different solidarities, delineating political camps, and constituting the limits of acceptable responses, including at academic institution. Laclau describes this as the emergence of an “internal frontier”[11] which conditions what aspects of the social reality unfolding in Gaza are perceived and addressed, and which ones are neglected. October 7 may have created a need for differentiated debate. But amid this dichotomization of public discourse, there has been little room for addressing these questions with the necessary analytical depth.

Scholars of Middle East politics in particular have felt a heavy pressure to position themselves publicly. This pressure has only intensified with the calls by prominent politicians and intellectuals to unequivocally stand with the Israel in its war against Hamas. Many academic institutions have internally communicated unease with one-sided declarations of solidarity. Publicly, however, they heeded these calls to avoid being singled out in a public discourse that has put the refusal to take sides on a level with tacit opposition against Israel. In doing so, they not only solidified a problematic binary depiction of the conflict in Gaza, which reduces its empirical and moral complexity. They also undermined the essential role of universities as spaces of knowledge exchange and dialogue among diverse perspectives, in defiance of partisan logics.

From prejudgement towards explanation

Working against oppression constitutes a moral imperative for researchers, but fundamentally scholarship is not about taking sides. The closure of discursive spaces and the public rush to judgement highlight the risks when scholars turn advocates. Academic interventions cannot stop at value judgement. It should question such simplifications of social reality and situate the unfolding events in Gaza in larger conflict trajectories and logics of violence. Contextualization and comparison – to the Troubles in Northern Ireland, to the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, etc. – does not deny the uniqueness of the current moment. It merely shows that not all the dynamics at play are extraordinary: Conflict scholars have shown time and again how many armed actors use shocking violence and terror tactics as central elements of an asymmetric war of attrition against an superior force.[12] They have identified the targeting of hospitals as a particularly worrying signal of civilian victimization in a variety of conflicts.[13] They have demonstrated the devastating effects of parental harm on victimized communities.[14] And they have illustrated how conflict parties aiming to dominate the public narrative come to treat warfare as a performance for their respective audiences, to the detriment of civilian populations.[15] Through this thematic expertise, social scientists are uniquely situated to explain why critical junctures are interpreted in so vastly different ways, and to highlight the structural conditions in which the images of bulldozers toppling the walls and fences around Gaza on October 7 were instinctively met with elation by people in Gaza and by Arab populations, while they horrified audiences in the Global North.

Such differences can partly be explained by proximity, which has exposed Arab populations to a much greater extent of psychological stress[16] – a social effect that mirrors the higher emotional impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on Germany and Eastern European states in February 2022. But they also result from disparate perceptions of the status quo ante October 7: While described by many commentators as a frozen conflict that had entered the stage of conflict management, for Palestinians this label did not describe the reality of life under occupation and continued threat of settler violence. Likewise, how the “Peace to Prosperity” initiative and the gradual Arab-Israeli normalization process were marketed as effective steps towards peace, hardly resonated with Arab publics, where 81% doubt the seriousness of the United States’ commitment to the establishment of a Palestinian state.[17] These divergences crucially set the stage and provided the resonance structure for the Hamas attack on October 7. They also continue to shape the responsivity of conflict parties to international interventions into the ongoing war, and to proposals for the day after which all fall short of providing a pathway to a Palestinian state – a precondition for sustainable peace.

As stated by Wendy Pearlman, the tendency “to divorce politics from its social context feeds misunderstanding and misguided policies.”[18] Whether we like them or not, reasoned assessments of available options and constraints drive and condition armed conflict – and explanation cannot be equated with justification, as too often happens in our toxic discourse.[19] Their understanding is essential for an informed debate about policies that could end the slaughter in Gaza without perpetuating violence potentials in the future. Understanding without justifying, however, has become increasingly harder with the polarization of public discourse. At German universities, there has been little room for discussing the multiple realities through which October 7 and its aftermath are experienced. Interviews I conducted in the frame of my research on the transformative impact of October 7 highlight how Jewish Israelis in the diaspora were reminded of antisemitic pogroms in Eastern Europe by the murder and abduction of entire families, and by the participation of civilians in these atrocities. These tales of violence are deeply engrained in Israel’s collective memory.[20]For Palestinians, in turn, the death and destruction brought by Israeli bombardments and evacuation orders recalled prior IDF campaigns on Gaza as well as the horrors the Nakba – a historic analogy that has only become more tangible with the forced displacement of a staggering 85 per cent of Gaza’s population. But pointing out the necessity to acknowledge both of these realities has subjected scholars to allegations of “academic antisemitism” and of trivializing the massacres of October 7.[21]

Talking about Gaza, talking about ourselves

In some ways, the debate in Germany is not even about Israelis and Palestinians. It has centered on the implications of Germany’s “Staatsräson”. Formulated as a core pillar of German state doctrine by Angela Merkel at the Knesset in 2008, the term describes the recognition that Germany, in light of the Shoah, bears a collective responsibility to protect and safeguard Jewish life and thus affirms its commitment to fight antisemitism domestically and abroad. In arguments premised on this doctrine, the people who are starving and dying in Gaza are merely a sidenote, as the situation in the Middle East is reduced to the state of Israel and those threatening it. In other words: “The only actor in Gaza is Hamas. And if Hamas is not the only actor, then the alternative actor must be Israel. In either narrative, the Palestinian people disappear.”[22]

The collective ignorance of the catastrophe unfolding in Gaza resulting from this self-referential debate is perfectly exemplified by the outrage over declarations of solidarity with Palestine at the 2024 Berlinale festival. While most Germans reject the Israeli war on Gaza as disproportionate,[23] commentators not only attacked filmmakers as antisemites for using words like “apartheid” and “genocide” in their speeches. They also scolded their audience for applauding and not speaking up. “You were there. And you did not object,” one prominent publicist wrote in his critique of the Berlinale audience,[24] failing to see how these words effectively captured how Germany’s official stance on Gaza has been perceived globally.

Notably, critics are not denying Germany’s historic responsibility. What they challenge is the German government’s exclusive authority to define the boundaries of this responsibility, and the fact that it has made the state of Israel its principal referent, thus neglecting the multiplicity of Jewish voices. They furthermore criticize that the sedimentation of this specific understanding of state reason has served to externalize responsibility for modern forms of antisemitism. As Klaus Holz has recently argued, “we prove our anti-antisemitism by focusing on Israel-related antisemitism. [..] From this follows that being pro-Israeli is eo ipso anti-anti-Semitic.”[25] This premise may be theoretically questionable and factually incorrect. But it undergirds several resolutions to set binding limits for the critique of Israel, such as the Bundestag’s BDS resolution and the adoption of the controversial IHRA definition by the ministers of education and cultural affairs of all German states.

Finally, critics posit that the focus of German memory culture on the extermination of Europe’s Jews prevents the recognition of other atrocities – past or present – caused, facilitated, or tolerated by Germany. This critique of memory culture as the culprit of Germany’s moral blindness when it comes to the Middle East resonates with a controversy about the uniqueness of the Holocaust that has polarized the German academy for years, and has been termed as “Historikerstreit 2.0”.[26] While the first Historikerstreit concerned the comparability of the Holocaust and Stalinist terror in the late 1980s, its relation to non-European and colonial history has been at the center of this second iteration. When the German announcement to intervene at the International Court of Justice on behalf of Israel actualized this debate, this turf war became the terrain that those contextualizing and historicizing the war on Gaza found themselves in.

A solipsistic sense of moral superiority

Some observers have pathologized the vicious attacks against these authors as symptoms of a “national guiltwashing” in which compunction merely functions as a pretense to cover up authoritarian policies in the present.[27] These narratives are not fully convincing though. They misrepresent the fragile relation of Germans to their past as mere strategic calculus, and neglect the genuine, albeit selective, sense of responsibility that is deeply engrained in German society. Furthermore, they inadvertently echo revisionist calls to end “guilt culture” by which Germany’s radical right has sought to trivialize Nazi crimes and relativize Germany’s responsibility for its past. This explains why the “guilt” argument has been met with overwhelming rejection including from the antiimperialist German left.

A more convincing argument, by contrast, may be that of Frank Trentmann, who has argued in his history of “The Germans, 1942-2022” that Germans have always had a “stunning capacity for self-deception” that shaped how they were able to repress and disregard their role in the fascist destruction of Europa.[28] The pride of having overcome a dark past, which developed out of the successful postwar reconstruction and the institutionalization of a much-lauded memory culture, may have prevented broader reflection on the questions what lessons we want to derive from our past. It may also prevent Germans from seeing that it is currently not incorporating the role of moral paragon that it has grown used to over the past decades. Yet, exploring this question has proven a tightrope walk for academics in Germany. When drawing on analytical vocabulary that has been employed to describe National Socialist crimes, scholars have to fear accusations of relativizing those very crimes. Like prior cataclysmic events, in time, this critical juncture will produce an analytical language that can aptly capture the essence of the present moment. Until then, the use of historically shaped terminology is not only natural but necessary to make sense of a reality that is hard to grasp. This is particularly the case when concepts – from colonialism to genocidal intent, to apartheid – have a solid foundation in political theory, peace and conflict studies, and international law.

Threats to the academic integrity

In a recent essay, Samuli Schielke has noted, “We are biased in war, we are more moved by the suffering of some people than others. That is difficult to change. But a minimum level of decency demands that we do not forbid others to feel sad and angry about the killing of so many people.”[29] Likewise, as scholars we are situated in different intellectual histories. We find analytical lenses and concepts more or less convincing, and more or less transferrable from one specific historical context to another. But whether concepts, such as settler colonialism, genocide, and apartheid, but also antisemitism or terrorism, are productive lenses to study October 7 and the siege on Gaza must remain the subject of argumentation. Doubt and dispute, rather than prejudgment and premature affirmation or condemnation are at the heart of social sciences.

At the very least, academic communities must thus resist those who are denouncing the mere analytical use of specific concepts as a marker of ideology or political identity. Rather than “exighophobia, the fear of socio-historical explanation,”[30] what is needed is argument in good faith about the value of these perspectives. Ultimately, the question whether the Israeli everyday structural violence of Israel’s occupation[31] amount to the crime of apartheid and whether Hamas’ atrocities or Israeli policy in Gaza qualify as genocidal will likely be answered by international courts that were founded precisely to make that assessment. Until then, it should be possible to analyze parallels where they impose themselves and highlight divergences where historical categories do not fit. Controversial concepts, which have already exposed sharp divisions in the field of violence and genocide Studies,[32] may remain the object of contention, but their discussion should not be off limits.

Furthermore, we ought to revisit the historical origins of these concepts – in Germany and elsewhere. The Holocaust, Porajmos, the Holodomor, or Germany’s ethnic cleansing of the Slavic people were undoubtedly incommensurable crimes. As were the European colonial projects, the racial segregation regimes in the United States, or Apartheid in South Africa. History does not repeat itself – at least, not in exactly the same shape. But their idiosyncratic uniqueness of these and other violent episodes must not prevent scholars from exploring continuities to contemporary forms of displacement, discrimination, and devastation. As Jürgen Zimmerer has argued, rather than asking ourselves whether past crimes were unique, the question should be which of their aspects were,[33] and which ones can give us a better understanding of violent dynamics in the present. Comprehension of the atrocities of October 7 and the victimization of Gaza’s civilian population requires a thorough reconstruction of their enabling conditions and anticipated consequences. Some of these parameters may indeed have historic counterparts.

Germany, with its commitment to a value-driven and feminist foreign policy has a special responsibility to tolerate such critical projects. We ought to embrace them as opportunities to question ourselves and ask whether our heritage, rather than giving us a better awareness, might not actually make us blind to some of the most abhorrent forms of oppression of our times. German universities, with their legacy of facilitating past genocides and their post-war commitment to independent and critical inquiry, in turn, have a responsibility to provide and protect the spaces where such reflections can take place. The must enable scholars to compare and contextualize, and to intervene into public discourses, free from accusations and repercussions. Both are currently not living up to their responsibilities.

 

 

[1] Agnès Callamard, “Gaza and the End of the Rules-Based Order,” Foreign Affairs, February 15, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/gaza-and-end-rules-based-order?utm_medium=social&utm_source=bluesky_posts&utm_campaign=blue_soc.

[2] Rima Majed, “Living Revolution, Financial Collapse and Pandemic in Beirut: Notes on Temporality, Spatiality, and ‘Double Liminality,’” Middle East Law and Governance 12, no. 3 (December 17, 2020): 310, https://doi.org/10.1163/18763375-12030003.

[3] The Journal of Genocide research has published a discussion of the central arguments made by these scholars in its forum “Israel-Palestine: Atrocity Crimes and the Crisis of Holocaust and Genocide Studies,” https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/cjgr20/0/0.

[4] Amir Tibon, “Why Israel Is Attacking Germany’s Top Middle East Expert,” Haaretz, July 10, 2023, sec. Israel News, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-07-10/ty-article/.highlight/why-israel-is-attacking-germanys-top-middle-east-expert/00000189-3e8f-d145-a1e9-3fff6a260000.

[5] Azmi Bishara, “The War on Gaza Politics, Ethics, and International Law,” Public Lecture (Doha: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, November 28, 2023), 8, https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/azmi-bishara-lecture-the-war-on-gaza-politics-ethics-and-international-law-en.pdf.

[6] See “German Academics Publish ‘Archive of Silence’ Listing Instances of Censorship on Palestine,” BRICUP, accessed March 8, 2024, https://bricup.org.uk/article/german-academics-publish-archive-of-silence-listing-instances-of-censorship-on-palestine/; Nora Ragab, “No Country for Palestinians: A Chronicle of Suppression and Resistance in Germany,” Untold, February 16, 2024, https://untoldmag.org/no-country-for-palestinians-a-chronicle-of-suppression-and-resistance-in-germany/; “University Repression since October 7, 2023” (2024), https://www.zippyshare.day/skoiO7UXzup79A3/preview.

[7] Eva Murašov, “Uni-Präsidenten Befürchten Willkürjustiz,” Tagesspiegel, March 11, 2024, https://archive.is/NI3uc; Landesastenkonferenz – LAK, “Gegen Die Wiedereinführung Des Ordnungsrecht Über Die Studierenden in Berlin! – 17. BerlHG Novelle Verhindern,” Referent_innenRat der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, March 12, 2024, https://www.refrat.de.

[8] See Jannis Grimm and Stephan Roll, “Human Rights Dialogue with Arab States: Argumentation Patterns of Authoritarian Regimes as a Challenge for a Values-Based Foreign Policy,” 2023, https://doi.org/10.18449/2023C41.

[9] Ernesto Laclau, Emancipation(s) (London, UK: Verso, 1996), 36–46; Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London, UK; New York, NY: Verso, 2005), 129 ff.

[10] Raz Segal, “A Textbook Case of Genocide,” Jewish Currents, March 9, 2024, https://jewishcurrents.org/a-textbook-case-of-genocide.

[11] Laclau, On Populist Reason, 74.

[12] Martyn Frampton, “The Moral Parameters of Violence: The Case of the Provisional IRA,” Journal of British Studies 61, no. 1 (January 2022): 138–61, https://doi.org/10.1017/jbr.2021.122.

[13] Regine Schwab, Werner Krause, and Samer Massoud, “The Bombing of Hospitals and Local Violence Dynamics in Civil Wars: Evidence from Syria,” HiCN Working Paper Series, November 28, 2023, https://hicn.org/working-paper/403/.

[14] Rebekka Friedman and Hanna Ketola, “Violations of the Heart: Parental Harm in War and Oppression,” Review of International Studies 50, no. 2 (March 2024): 393–412, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210523000499.

[15] Ora Szekely, Syria Divided: Patterns of Violence in a Complex Civil War (Columbia University Press, 2023).

[16] Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, “Arab Public Opinion about the Israeli War on Gaza” (Doha: Doha Institute, January 10, 2024), https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/arab-opinion-war-on-gaza-full-report-en.pdf.

[17] Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies.

[18] Wendy Pearlman, “Putting Palestinian Agency First,” Middle East Law and Governance 14, no. 3 (October 14, 2022): 294, https://doi.org/10.1163/18763375-14030003.

[19] Dana El Kurd, “Support for Violent Versus Non-Violent Strategies in the Palestinian Territories,” Middle East Law and Governance 14, no. 3 (October 14, 2022): 331–65, https://doi.org/10.1163/18763375-14030005.

[20] Meron Mendel, “Retraumatisierung einer ganzen Gesellschaft,” tagesschau.de, January 14, 2024, https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/asien/israel-hamas-terror-angriff-100.html.

[21] Felix Klein, “Akademischer Antisemitismus: Hierarchien des Hasses; Felix Klein,” FAZ.NET, February 20, 2024, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/karriere-hochschule/akademischer-antisemitismus-hierarchien-des-hasses-felix-klein-19531381.html.

[22] Wendy Pearlman, “The Erasure of Palestinian Society,” New Lines Magazine (blog), February 20, 2024, https://newlinesmag.com/argument/the-erasure-of-palestinian-society/.

[23] RND, “ARD-Deutschlandtrend: Der Hälfte der Deutschen geht Israels Vorgehen in Gaza zu weit,” Redaktionsnetzwerk Deutschland, March 7, 2024, https://www.rnd.de/politik/ard-deutschlandtrend-der-haelfte-der-deutschen-geht-israels-vorgehen-in-gaza-zu-weit-NBGRU2K5VJNHVL2WLMDTFQK64I.html.

[24] Michel Friedman, “Michel Friedman zum Hass auf der Berlinale: Danke für nichts,” Süddeutsche.de, February 27, 2024, https://www.sueddeutsche.de/kultur/michel-friedman-zum-hass-auf-der-berlinale-danke-fuer-nichts-1.6401863.

[25] Klaus Holz and Jens Bisky, “In Der Sisyphos-Situation,” Soziopolis, February 27, 2024, https://www.soziopolis.de/in-der-sisyphos-situation.html.

[26] Michael Rothberg, “Lived Multidirectionality: ‘Historikerstreit 2.0’ and the Politics of Holocaust Memory,” Memory Studies 15, no. 6 (December 1, 2022): 1316–29, https://doi.org/10.1177/17506980221133511.

[27] Omar Sabbour and Students for Palestine, “German Guiltwashing in Times of Genocide,” Al Jazeera, February 27, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/2/27/german-guiltwashing-in-times-of-genocide.

[28] Frank Trentmann, Out of the Darkness: The Germans, 1942-2022 (London: Allen Lane, an imprint of Penguin Books, 2023).

[29] Samuli Schielke, “Der Skandal um Ghassan Hage,” Zenith, February 23, 2024, https://magazin.zenith.me/de/gesellschaft/forschung-deutschland-und-der-gaza-krieg.

[30] Ghassan Hage, “Gaza and the Coming Age of the ‘Warrior,’” 2023, https://allegralaboratory.net/gaza-and-the-coming-age-of-the-warrior/.

[31] Amjad Iraqi, “How the News Cycle Misses the Predominant Violence in Israel-Palestine,” +972 Magazine, February 2, 2024, https://www.972mag.com/structural-violence-media-israel-palestine/.

[32] Martin Shaw, “Inescapably Genocidal,” Journal of Genocide Research 0, no. 0 (2024): 1–5, https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2023.2300555.

[33] Jürgen Zimmerer, “Decent People Must Take a Stand!,” Qantara, February 5, 2024, https://qantara.de/en/article/gaza-war-challenges-germanys-culture-remembrance-decent-people-must-take-stand.