Sarah Bassisseh, Ronja Herrschner, Chonlawit Sirikupt, and Marcia Ponzlet – Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen
“Justice should serve all victims in Syria, regardless of the perpetrators, and justice should not be biased. Otherwise, it will not be full justice and will not lead to civil peace that will build the future of Syria.” (The Syria Campaign, 2025b)
Early Steps Toward Justice
The collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024 brought about a political rupture long hoped for but scarcely believed possible, yielding a contingent opening for transition. Since this historic moment, many Syrians have sought to prioritize accountability and transnational justice on the interim government’s agenda. Just two months after the Constitutional Declaration in March 2025, the transitional authorities announced presidential decrees no 19 and 20, establishing the National Commission for the Missing (NCM) and the National Commission for Transitional Justice (NCTJ). The latter promised to “uncover the truth about grave violations caused by the defunct regime” (SJAC, 2025). Many international actors welcomed this as an essential step towards reconciliation and accountability for the vast violations committed over the last decades (EEAS, 2025). Others, however, were more apprehensive about the narrow scope of the NCTJ’s mandate, which focuses only on the atrocities of the Assad regime, excluding crimes committed by other actors (OHCHR, 2025).
As Syrians entered the transitional period, various local and international observers have started to cast the country’s transitional justice process within the paradigms of ‘post-conflict’ or ‘post-authoritarian’ transition. However, it can be argued that such characterizations are premature, given the ongoing human rights violations and persisting territorial divisions (e.g., in the coastal region, Suweida, the Kurdish-controlled territories, and Israel-occupied territories), as well as the absence of a clear new political order. So, how do the highly complex networks of conflicts and grievances shape our understanding of transitional justice in post-Assad Syria? Drawing on official reports by human rights organizations, government statements, and first-hand accounts by Syrian activists and civil society actors, we delineate three core dimensions that help disentangle the complexities inherent to the transitional period in post-Assad Syria and map out their effects on TJ: (1) Temporality, (2) Spatiality, and (3) Agency. Our framework contributes to the literature on transitional justice ‘during transition’ by foregrounding a granular understanding of the dynamics and challenges of transitional justice amid incomplete and contested transitions.
Understanding Transitional Justice amid Syria’s Interregnal Period
In its early stages, the term transitional justice (TJ) was used to refer to responses to the legacies of massive and systematic human rights violations in the context of major political transformations. It described “a distinctive conception of justice associated with periods of radical political change following past oppressive rule” (Teitel, 2008, p.1). TJ scholarship traces back to the aftermath of World War II, with the Nuremberg Trials and de-Nazification mechanisms as its first prominent embodiment. Its discourse gained momentum in the post-Cold-War context and the parallel emergence of the third wave of democratization, with the new democracies of Latin America and East and Central Europe seeking redress for the atrocities committed under previous authoritarian or totalitarian regimes (Arthur, 2009). The third-wave TJ scholarship assumed a “radically discontinuous” paradigm of change, between a distinctly “bad past” and a “good liberal democratic future” (Dyzenhaus, 2012, p. 182).
Recent TJ scholarship, however, has become more critical of the early circumscribed interpretations of TJ, deeming them misleading in accounting for the complexity of transition contexts (Hansen, 2014). Research on TJ has since expanded beyond post-authoritarian and post-conflict to include non-transition contexts, whether in conflicted societies or even consolidated democracies where TJ deals with reconciliation and reparations with past systematic colonial injustices (Balint et al., 2014). This expansion severed TJ’s connection to that ‘moment’ in time that initially defined the field and emphasized the inescapable dimensionality and contextual complexity of TJ processes (Hansen, 2023).
Dwelling in a transitional period where conflict is still ongoing and a political transition has not materialized; post-Assad Syria is neither post-authoritarian nor post-conflict. While the overthrow of Assad marked the beginning of a regime transition, a defined end to this transition – a coherent, consolidated regime form— has not been reached yet. Syria is now in an interregnum, in Gramscian terms – a suspended space in which the old order is dying, and the new one has not yet been born – characterized by simultaneous opportunities and challenges (Hoare & Nowell, 1971), ranging from the restoration of foreign diplomatic relations to fragile political institutions and reignited violence. We use Gramsci’s concept of interregnum because it captures the ambiguity and flux inherent to the transitional period in Syria, allowing us to venture beyond a fixed and simplistic time-space-actor continuum when discussing TJ. By anchoring our analysis in said intricacies, this article offers a three-dimensional framework to unpack them: temporality, spatiality, and agency.
Temporality
Inherent to TJ is the notion of temporality, which is detrimental to shaping the narratives of injustices and the scope of TJ redress and accountability (Aboueldahab, 2021). However, it has proven challenging to incorporate a clear theorization of time into the actual processes of TJ. With the TJ scholarship becoming less confined to the linear and fixed ruptures in time, the temporal structures and assumptions come under constant interrogation (Hansen, 2014, 2023). Starting with scrutinizing time, this article unravels the temporal intricacies of Syria’s transitional period and their implications for the TJ process through two angles: non-linearity and time politicization.
In Syria’s political interregnum, the past, present, and future are not ‘distinct periods’ but rather fluid and interconnected amid ruptures and continuities. Reckoning with past injustices committed by the Assad regime and all the other perpetrators is essential to TJ. However, it should not be disconnected from the unfolding present injustices during the transitional period. The recent violence and human rights violations committed by many actors, including the interim government, created new victims of injustices and new grievances that also seek redress. The ultimate intertwinement of present grievances with the past ones is unavoidable since the transitional present in Syria—with its structures (weak institutions, corruption), discourses (sectarian and nationalist), and complex network of actors and perpetrators—is inherited from the pre-transition period. This makes it more difficult, if not impossible, to assert a disconnect between the past, present, and future in TJ theory and practice. This temporal “complex web of perpetration, inflicted harms, and grievances” (Aboueldahab, 2021, p. 811) becomes an inescapable reality for TJ processes.
Furthermore, time is not only a defining element in TJ; it is also a political tool of inclusion and exclusion in the narratives of injustice. Expanding the temporal parameters of TJ to account for the past, present, and future means implicating more perpetrators and widening the accountability scope against more actors (domestic and transnational). Therefore, time becomes politicized, and defining the temporal parameters of injustices becomes a tool for evading accountability and marginalizing specific time periods and their related injustices. Although many members of the interim government—former Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), and other militias—were/are complicit in atrocities against Syrians, they attempt to sever the linkages between past and present in that context, zooming in on a past with an Assad-dominated discourse while zooming out of the present. Through selectively addressing the complex web of perpetration, inflicted harm, and grievances by mainly highlighting the past atrocities of the Assad regime, the interim government avoids a meaningful reckoning with its past and present involvement in crimes against Syrians. The same can be said about other complicit actors like the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who leave out of their discourse any time periods that incriminate them.
Spatiality
The initial TJ scholarship predominantly focused on the state as the primary spatial unit when discussing TJ process and mechanisms, arguing that a strong successor state is a precursor to the institutions necessary for implementing and overseeing the rule of law (Teitel, 2003, pp. 75-78). Ever since the 2011 revolution, however, the Syrian territory has been held by different factions (domestic and international) at different times. Alongside this divided territorial control, space-connected narratives of justice have been created, offering multiple, interconnected, and sometimes contradictory discourses of victimhood and perpetration. Currently, the interim government still does not hold full control over the entirety of what is commonly considered Syria, with Israel having repeatedly transgressed into Daraa and Quneitra provinces while still occupying the Golan Heights since 1967, and Türkiye occupying parts of northern Syria. Moreover, Suweida province is still run independently from the central government, and the Kurdish forces still control large parts of north and northeastern Syria have yet to fully realize the agreement of March 2025. The interregnal period has been characterized by new spatial grievances as well as renewed ones, adding to the complexity of justice narratives. Therefore, we argue that understanding TJ prospects in post-Assad Syria necessitates a move away from the state-centered approach towards two space-induced levels: local and cross-border.
Along the shifting lines of territorial control, a complex map of past injustices was created, with each locality incriminating different local perpetrators. The Assad regime and its affiliated militias were the main perpetrators in Syria’s heavy legacy of atrocities, producing spatial grievances that spread all over the Syrian territory. While having thrived on stamping out any political opposition throughout the entirety of its rule, the regime’s repressive legacy culminated in the infamous Hama massacre in 1982, killing tens of thousands of people. Furthermore, the last 14 years under Bashar al-Assad witnessed the highest scale of crimes against humanity: more than 236,000 people killed (15,000 of whom were killed under torture in detention centers), 160,000 people forcibly disappeared, and more than 13 million displaced (SNHR, 2024). The criminal regime also launched multiple chemical attacks, including the infamous Ghouta attack in 2013, and committed tens of massacres, such as al-Houla in 2012 and Tadamon in 2013. However, other actors were also involved in serious crimes against the Syrian people, which should not be disregarded. This includes, among others, crimes enacted by HTS in the Idlib governorate, parts of Aleppo’s western countryside, Latakia’s countryside, and northwest of Hama; SNA in northern Aleppo, Raqqa, and Hasaka; Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Homs, Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor; and the SDF in most of Hasaka, half of Raqqa, and portions of Deir Ez-Zor and Aleppo (EUAA, 2024, pp. 24-26).
The present clashes between the interim government forces and other local actors are contributing further to the spatiality of grievances. The ongoing conflict with the Kurdish-controlled territories is reproducing the old injustices that incriminate both parties as perpetrators. Similarly, the massacres in the largely Alawite-populated coastal region in March 2025, the mass atrocities in the predominantly Druze-inhabited Suweida in July 2025, and the ongoing targeted sectarian and gendered violence (Amnesty International, 2025a; Salhani, 2025) have produced new grievances and victims. While multiple perpetrators, like so-called Assad-regime remnants, Druze militant groups, and even ISIS, were called out by state officials and pro-government media, armed groups affiliated with the interim government were also largely incriminated for their documented systematic violations of human rights (Michael, 2025; Amnesty International, 2025b). This labyrinth of space-connected injustices deems many actors as perpetrators, which triggers accountability considerations. This results in politicizing spaces and controlling the parameters of space-connected justice narratives to avoid accountability and marginalize other injustices, thereby impeding territorial unity.
A considerable part of the space-connected injustices in Syria is also of a transnational nature, as the regional dimensions of the conflict have created cross-border perpetration. However, conventional TJ mechanisms “have generally not been designed or utilized to address transboundary or regionalized abuses” and “often address only the crimes committed on the territory of, or by the nationals of, one state” (Ross & Sriram, 2013, pp. 3-5). During the war, for instance, Türkiye has occupied parts of northern Syria in violation of international law. Abductions, arbitrary detentions, torture, sexual violence, expropriation, and expulsion have occurred there at the hands of various actors, including members of the Turkish Armed Forces and Turkish intelligence services (HRW, 2024). However, considered the godfather of the interim government, Türkiye’s crimes in Syrian territories remain unaddressed. The involvement of Russia, Iran, Hezbollah, and Israel has also aggravated the spatial complexity of injustices. While the interim government clearly denounced the Iranian role in the killings of Syrians and supporting a criminal regime (Myre & Rizkallah, 2025), it took a more pragmatic position with Russia and Hezbollah (Al-Jazeera, 2025; Enab Baladi, 2025). While these official positions may be for strategic reasons, many Syrian activists and NGOs see this as a screaming disregard for the atrocities committed by both Hezbollah and Russia since 2011 (Youssef, 2025; SNHR, 2025). Similar concerns were raised about what the recent attempts at diplomatic talks with Israel would mean for accountability questions for its crimes and territorial aggression in Syria (Al-Asheq, 2025). Additionally, more questions of trans-border accountability arose in the context of the foreign fighters’ involvement in the recent massacres and violence, especially after they were incorporated in the state security apparatus (Strategiecs, 2025).
Agency
Within the fractured landscape of the interregnal period, the distinction between perpetrators and actors of TJ becomes blurred, consciously infused, and even erased. The procedural architecture of the TJ process is mired in conceptual tension as well as confusion over whose interests it serves, and whose version of justice is being legitimized. Being part of the multifaceted network of perpetrators, the interim government’s legitimacy as the main upholder of TJ is questioned. At the same time, other actors, such as local communities, the families of the victims, and local and international NGOs, navigate their agency and voice amid the challenges and opportunities of the transitional period.
The interim government not only claims the role of the main upholder of TJ but also controls most of the discourse around it, especially given the crippled judicial system. The NCTJ‘s exclusive focus on crimes perpetrated by the Assad regime has caused civil society actors to voice concerns about the inclusivity and credibility of the process, as well as the potential risk of selectivity. Additionally, the establishment of both the NCTJ and the NCM reportedly occurred without formal consultation with victims, survivors, or civil society representatives (Bridges of Truth, 2025, p. 2), which highlights the limited agency they have in these processes. Pertaining to the lack of transparency over who is deemed guilty and who is not, some high-ranking former officers have been arrested and imprisoned, while others haven’t. At the same time, many former informants and lower-level personnel appear to continue to walk the streets (The Syrian Observer, 2025; Zamanalwsl, 2025).
The large waves of violence that have unfolded since December 2024 cast doubt on the interim government’s ability to implement accountability among the patchwork of militias currently controlling parts of the country. They also risk reproducing the logic of the ‘victor’s justice’, especially by ambiguating the perpetrators when they are traced back to the government. For example, the report of the fact-finding committee—appointed by Sharaa—on the coastal region massacres denied any involvement of high government commanders in the violations (Reuters, 2025). This came in stark contrast to the findings of the previously published report by Reuters, which uncovered a chain of command leading to Damascus (Michael, 2025). Moreover, in his speech following the Suweida clashes, Sharaa portrayed the Druze militants as committing “human rights violations” and with “separatist aspirations.” However, he used the word “nafeer” (mobilisation) to describe the actions of Bedouin tribes and later thanked them for their “heroic stance” (CNN Arabic, 2025). This contradicted the narratives of some prominent Druze spiritual leaders, like Hikmat al-Hijri, who incriminated the interim government and thanked Israel (Al-Hadath, 2025). Although Sharaa promised to hold “all parties” accountable, there was no direct and clear admission of the crimes committed by the government forces (CNN Arabic, 2025). More recently, the government had to deal with multiple international reports on the systematic kidnapping of Alawite women (Amnesty International, 2025a) by setting up a government-led investigative committee. However, the committee’s November report debunked 41 out of 42 investigated abduction cases and denied any systematic sectarian-gendered violence (SANA, 2025). Importantly, the imposed internet blackouts and the big wave of misinformation in many of these waves of violence have contributed to further blurring the truth over who is a perpetrator and who is a legitimate actor.
Despite the interim government dominating TJ narratives, some civil society actors have been trying to produce more participatory and inclusive TJ mechanisms. Besides the efforts of the White Helmets and the Syrian Emergency Task Force in identifying remains of unidentified persons (Sinjab, 2024), a coalition of 48 civil society organizations (CSOs), the victims, and their families held the first TJ conference in February 2025 to make recommendations for Syrian and international partners regarding advancing TJ and accountability efforts (The Syria Campaign, 2025a). Some of these CSOs, such as Badael and The Day After, worked with the ICTJ to hold seven intensive community dialogues in April 2025. They included testimonies of past and ongoing violence, displacement, political retribution, and details of extrajudicial killings perpetrated by the Assad regime and other actors (Bridges of Truth, 2025). Moreover, there have been many protests calling for a real and inclusive TJ process that is based on “the experiences, the demands and the voices of the families that their loved ones have been disappeared by different parties of the conflict, by different actors in Syria, and justice should be served for everyone” (The Syria Campaign, 2025b). Nevertheless, the genuine inclusion of the victims and their families remain limited as the presidential decrees 19 and 20 fail to specify whether or how victims will be genuinely involved in shaping or participating in the commissions’ work. Having comprehensive justice means establishing independent bodies and inclusive truth commissions, centralizing their agency not only through recognition but also active and meaningful participation “at the design or implementation stages” (Al-Mashan, 2025).
Conclusion: A Path to Justice Through Complexity
This article posits rethinking TJ through the lens of Syria’s interregnal transitional period with its temporal, spatial, and agency complexities. Our three-dimensional analytical framework disentangles the overlapping layers of injustices and grievances connected to past and ongoing violence as well as contested territories, and the competing claims to agency and legitimacy (top-down and bottom-up). This contribution therefore underscores the importance not only of acknowledging but also embracing complexity as a starting point in designing and implementing TJ mechanisms. Disregarding this in post-Assad Syria could hinder inclusive and comprehensive reconciliation and accountability measures and risk further societal divisions over unresolved grievances.
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