Ahmed Haj Assad, Geo Expertise
Water scarcity represents a central challenge to Syria’s reconstruction, resulting from decades of overexploitation, weak governance, and war-related destruction—now compounded by climate change. With more than 85% of its water consumed by agriculture and a heavy dependence on transboundary rivers such as the Euphrates and the Orontes, Syria’s water security is deeply intertwined with regional dynamics.
Under the Assad regime, water management was subordinated to political authority and security imperatives, leading to severe groundwater depletion, river desiccation, and inequitable or non-binding agreements with neighboring countries. These policies reinforced dependency and mistrust rather than sustainability.
The recent political transition offers a critical opportunity to redefine water governance as a cornerstone of national reconstruction and regional cooperation. This study proposes two complementary pathways for water sharing with neighboring countries: Technical–economic collaboration, such as linking Syrian plains with Türkiye’s Harran irrigation networks in the Euphrates River Basin; and Institutional–legal cooperation, including enhanced regulatory frameworks for the Orontes Basin shared with Lebanon.
Together, these approaches illustrate how shared water basins can evolve from sources of tension into platforms for regional integration. By embedding cooperation within both infrastructure and governance frameworks, Syria and its neighbors can strengthen agricultural productivity, ensure water and food security, and promote regional stability.
Ultimately, water governance must become a foundation of Syria’s reconstruction strategy. Beyond addressing urgent domestic scarcity, equitable transboundary cooperation can transform water from a source of vulnerability into a driver of peace, integration, and sustainable development across the MENA region.
Introduction
Securing sufficient water for Syria’s population and economic activities constitutes a major priority for achieving sustainable reconstruction in the post-Assad era. During Assad’s rule, the country’s water resources deteriorated severely as a result of overexploitation, the degradation of water infrastructure, and weak local governance. These structural weaknesses have been further aggravated by the protracted conflict and its devastating consequences. Climate change has added yet another layer of complexity—altering the quantity and timing of precipitation, increasing temperatures, and intensifying drought frequency—all of which have disrupted the hydrological balance and, in turn, heightened the instability of agricultural production and broader socio-economic conditions.
These domestic challenges are compounded by the geopolitical dimension of water resources and their distribution across borders. Syria is heavily dependent on transboundary surface waters, particularly the Euphrates and the Orontes rivers. While bilateral agreements and non-binding understandings exist with neighbouring states (Türkiye, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan), the mechanisms for sharing these resources remain opaque and lack a robust institutional framework capable of ensuring transparent and sustainable governance. In practice, such arrangements have often been driven more by short-term geopolitical interests than by a shared commitment to the equitable and sustainable management of common resources.
In this context, there is an urgent need to reconceptualise of shared water management and sharing as a central pillar of Syria’s reconstruction strategy, while acknowledging the inherently regional nature of the issue. A fundamental question arises: to what extent will Syria’s post-Assad governance structures be prepared and able to develop a new approach to regional water governance? Is it possible to design an economic model rooted in regional cooperation—one that transcends immediate political and military considerations and fosters relations with neighbouring states based on economic justice, sustainability, and mutual benefit?
This study examines both the opportunities and the constraints of rebuilding transboundary water-sharing relations between Syria and its neighbours in the framework of post-conflict reconstruction. It further explores the potential for developing an economic model about transboundary water sharing that would serve not as a source of conflict or dependency, but rather as a catalyst for regional cooperation and integration.
Since March 2011, Syria has undergone profound political transformations. What began with popular uprisings against a regime that had monopolised power for decades culminated on 8 December 2024 with the fall of the Assad regime following the entry of opposition forces into Damascus. The collapse of the former regime has produced a new political reality, centred on an administration tasked with reconstruction in a highly complex context shaped by overlapping political, economic, and social challenges. Unlike its predecessor, this administration appears inclined to establish relations based on economic and security cooperation with neighbouring states. Within this framework, it is crucial to emphasize cooperation in the governance and equitable sharing of water resources, as such cooperation is inevitable to address the declining quantity and quality of water resulting from the combined effects of war, mismanagement, and climate changes. Water must be ensured not only as a fundamental resource for life, but also as a central driver of socio-economic development. Such cooperation is essential for advancing reconstruction and development, with the ultimate aim of strengthening water security, food security, and regional peace.
Water Distribution: A Climatic–Geographical Perspective
National planning under Hafez al-Assad, particularly concerning the geographical allocation of economic investments and the administrative–military distribution of power, appears to have deliberately encouraged rural exodus toward urban centers as a means of consolidating political control—without regard for the natural distribution of water resources. This strategy generated profound spatial imbalances and contributed to the intensification of water shortages in major cities such as Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and Hama. The effects of this disparity are especially pronounced within Syria’s highly variable climatic context, where annual rainfall ranges from over 1500 mm in the northwestern regions to less than 200 mm in
the southeastern areas (Figure 1).
The management of water resources has been central to Syrian societies for millennia. From the second half of the twentieth century onward, water development policies accelerated with the aim of expanding irrigated agriculture and meeting rising domestic demand. These efforts included the drainage of the al-Ghab swamps and the construction of approximately 160 dams of varying capacities and functions (MAAR 2010). Since the mid-1980s, groundwater extraction has intensified under policies designed to achieve food self-sufficiency, resulting in the drilling of more than 160,000 wells (MAAR 2010). Agriculture today accounts for more than 85% of total water consumption (FAO 2021), with irrigated land representing roughly 30% of all farmland—about 60% of which depends on groundwater (Figure 2; MAAR 2010).
Under Assad’s rule, water management in Syria became deeply politicized. Decision-making was dominated by political calculations aimed at preserving regime stability and consolidating its rural support base. Political authority consistently overrode scientific evidence and technical expertise (Haj Asaad, 2024). Rather than relying on data and analyses produced by specialized institutions such as the Ministry of Water Resources (formerly the Ministry of Irrigation), successive governments instrumentalized water allocation as a mechanism to reinforce political legitimacy and project state credibility. In this process, environmental considerations concerning both the quantity and quality of water were largely ignored (Haj Asaad, 2024).
This politicized approach led to the widespread depletion of Syria’s water resources. In the 2007 hydrological year alone, the country recorded a water deficit of approximately three billion cubic meters (Haj Asaad, 2024). Many springs—such as those of Ras al-Ain—dried up completely (Zwahlen et al. 2014). Entire rivers and tributaries, including the Khabur, disappeared, while pollution levels in both surface and groundwater increased dramatically, deepening Syria’s environmental and hydrological crisis.
In response to river contamination, the drying of key springs, and rapid urban expansion, authorities increasingly resorted to transferring water from supply-rich regions—often connected to transboundary rivers—to meet urban demand. For instance, Aleppo became dependent on Euphrates water conveyed through large-scale infrastructure (Figure 3). Climate change has further exacerbated water insecurity by amplifying precipitation variability and intensifying the frequency and duration of droughts, thereby compounding the challenge of managing already overstressed hydrological systems. Collectively, these measures and evolving conditions have increased Syria’s dependence on transboundary water resources.
Regional Interference and the Neglect of Transboundary Water Governance and water sharing
During the presidency of Assad, Syria has systematically sought to consolidate its regional influence vis-à-vis neighbouring states through both direct and indirect military and political interventions. This strategic orientation has profoundly shaped its relations with Lebanon and Türkiye, relegating the question of water-sharing of Orontes and Euphrates to a secondary priority.
In Türkiye, concern with the inflow of the Orontes is relatively limited, given the abundance of local water resources from springs and rivers, as well as apprehensions regarding the risk of flooding and the inundation of agricultural lands. By contrast, in Syria and Lebanon, the Orontes constitutes a strategic and vital water resource. Although a bilateral water-sharing agreement was signed in 1994—supplemented by additional protocols in 1997 and 2002—Syrian political and military interference in Lebanon during the regimes of Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad undermined the effectiveness of joint water governance. Policies of lax border control contributed to the overexploitation of groundwater on both sides, particularly in Syria (Figure 4), thereby rendering the river’s springs and flow increasingly vulnerable to depletion and drought.
The agreement was concluded in 1994, at a time when Syria exercised near-total control over Lebanese institutions and decision-making mechanisms through its military and intelligence presence. According to Lebanese politicians and scholars, the agreement—which allocated Lebanon only 80 million cubic metres of water per year—was widely regarded as inequitable (Zwahlen et al. 2014). This outcome was made possible largely by Syria’s dominance over Lebanese political life during that period. In 1997, the agreement was revised through an attached protocol that increased Lebanon’s quota to 96 million cubic metres per year by excluding closed-basin waters, such as those of Yammouneh, …, amounting to roughly 16 million cubic metres (Peterson 2022). A further amendment in 2002 granted Lebanon the right to construct a pumping station and a dam in Hermel to irrigate approximately 7,000 hectares. This provision was consistent with the principles of the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses.
These favourable changes in the agreements for Lebanon coincided with the parallel rise of Hezbollah as a decisive actor in Lebanese politics. The evolution of the Orontes agreements thus underscores how shifts in regional hegemony, rather than hydrological considerations or international legal norms, shaped the terms of water governance. The changing balance of power between Syria and Lebanon illustrates the extent to which water-sharing arrangements were contingent upon political dominance rather than principles of equity. The Orontes agreements of 1994–2002 exemplify this dynamic particularly clearly. Initially, the 1994 accord strongly reflected Syria’s dominance over Lebanese political institutions, but subsequent revisions, culminating in the 2002 agreement, revealed Lebanon’s growing capacity to negotiate more favourable terms.
The Euphrates River Basin case between Türkiye and Syria, by contrast, illustrates two dynamics: first, how water issues have been systematically overshadowed by security concerns; and second, how water has been instrumentalised to facilitate political rapprochement. Syria’s support for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), although not directly related to water negotiations, relegated discussions on water to a marginal level, confined to a Tripartite Technical Committee that yielded no tangible results. On April 1992, Turkish Interior Minister began addressing the PKK issue directly with the Syrian political authorities and his counterpart (Beschorner 1992). Water negotiations, in this context, were reduced to the margins. The tripartite meetings between Türkiye, Syria, and Iraq produced no binding agreements, only Türkiye’s non-binding “moral pledge” to release 500 cubic metres per second of Euphrates flow, of which Iraq’s share was to be 58% (UNESCWA & BGR 2013). Türkiye dependent on water absolute sovereignty principal (Bazin & De Tapia 2015). This weak commitment highlights how the Syrian strategy of leveraging security alliances failed to translate into enforceable hydro political gains.
The Syrian government never recognised Hatay (Liwa Iskenderun) as part of Turkish territory. Nevertheless, in 2011, Syria signed an agreement with Türkiye to construct the ‘Friendship Dam’ on the Syrian–Turkish border, precisely in an area over which it did not recognise Turkish sovereignty. The dam’s approval was widely interpreted as a diplomatic gesture aimed at easing Syria’s regional isolation following the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005 an operation for which the Syrian regime was accused of responsibility. Economically, the project offered limited benefits for Syria while posing risks to the Ain al-Zarqa spring, potentially depriving Idlib and the al-Ruj plain of essential drinking and irrigation water. Despite technical experts’ insistence on relocating the dam, the foreign ministry prioritised political expediency over hydrological concerns. This contrast underscores how water governance was subordinated to short-term strategies of political survival.
Taken together, these cases demonstrate the structural shortcomings of Syria’s regional water sharing strategy during the Assad regime. By privileging hegemonic control, support for non-state armed groups, and the instrumentalization of water policy for political legitimacy, Syria not only failed to secure durable water-sharing agreements but also entrenched mistrust and hostility with neighbouring states. This outcome underscores a broader pattern: rather than enhancing water security, Syria’s reliance on coercive and security-driven strategies produced dependency, vulnerability, and long-term hydropolitical fragility.
Possibilities for Regional Cooperation
The new administration must reassess the regional relationships inherited from the Assad regime and replace them with policies that prioritize equitable water sharing. Such a shift is essential to securing a fair allocation of transboundary water resources and addressing the dual challenges of water scarcity and climate change within the broader framework of national reconstruction.
This objective can be achieved through cooperative approaches grounded in shared interests, aimed at promoting sustainable development and strengthening water security. In particular, creating bilateral cooperation projects—such as joint initiatives in the Euphrates Basin between Türkiye and Syria and the coordinated management of the Orontes Basin between Lebanon and Syria—could reduce tensions over water allocation and protection. These projects have the potential to transform water from a source of competition into a catalyst for regional integration and peace.
In this context, the strategic importance of water for all three countries underscores both the risks of unilateral policies and the opportunities offered by cooperative solutions. The convergence of economic needs, ecological vulnerabilities, and security imperatives highlights the urgency of developing cross-border projects based on mutual benefit. Regional cooperation in water governance could not only mitigate environmental degradation but also generate shared economic gains, reinforce food and water security, and contribute to broader regional stability.
In the case of the Euphrates River, cooperation could involve expanding irrigated areas by connecting Syrian plains to Türkiye’s irrigation networks in the Harran Plain (Figure 5), which are currently supplied from the Atatürk Dam through two tunnels. Together, these tunnels convey an average flow of 328 m³/s, enabling the irrigation of approximately 463,105 hectares in the Şanlıurfa and Mardin Plains through gravity irrigation (Tosun 2007). The adoption of modern irrigation technologies would make it possible to allocate sufficient water for Syria, thereby facilitating the irrigation of the Tal Abyad region. Through bilateral economic and environmental cooperation, Syria could leverage this advanced hydraulic infrastructure to implement joint agricultural and irrigation projects that capitalize on the geographical and demographic linkages between Tell Abyad and the Harran region (HAJ Asaad 2025)—transforming shared water resources into a foundation for regional peace (Figure 6).
Figure 5: Harran plain, photo Ahmed Haj Asaad, 30.06.2023
In the Orontes Basin, cooperation would primarily take an institutional and legal form. This would entail strengthening regulatory frameworks in both Lebanon and Syria and advancing the completion of the Hermel Dam project, designed to irrigate approximately 7,000 hectares while securing water supplies and preventing farmers from drilling wells around the Ain al-Zarqa and Dafash springs. Enhanced legal monitoring mechanisms would also improve the protection of these springs from overexploitation and depletion.
Taken together, the cases of the Euphrates and Orontes illustrate two complementary pathways for managing shared water basins between Syria and its neighbors: a technical–economic pathway, focused on leveraging existing hydraulic infrastructure for joint productive projects—as in the Tell Abyad–Harran example—and an institutional–legal pathway, centered on establishing regulatory frameworks to control overexploitation and safeguard shared resources, as exemplified by the Orontes Basin. Moving from a logic of conflict to one of cooperation thus requires a multidimensional approach that integrates economic development, environmental protection, and political trust-building, ensuring water security while strengthening long-term regional stability.
The current political transformations present a timely opportunity to develop an integrated economic–social–environmental model grounded in mutual benefit, cross-border solidarity, and environmental sustainability. Such a model would mark a qualitative shift in regional water governance—moving beyond narrow questions of sovereignty while respecting existing political boundaries. It could transform border regions, long characterized by militia activity, illicit agriculture, and smuggling under Assad’s rule, into spaces of cooperative engagement built around the equitable sharing of water resources. This approach would enhance agricultural productivity, reinforce economic stability, foster local peace, and contribute to regional resilience through a shared governance framework capable of confronting the challenges of climate change.
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وزارة الزراعة والإصلاح الزراعي (MAAR)المجموعة السنوية الإحصائية الزراعية (2010)،