Ameni Mehrez, William and Mary
Following the 2011 Uprisings, Tunisia stood out as the Arab Spring’s most promising democratic success story. Unlike neighboring countries where revolutionary fervor descended into civil war, prolonged instability, or swift authoritarian restoration, Tunisia appeared to chart a different course – one characterized by competitive elections, constitutional consensus-building, and peaceful transfers of power. Central to this transition was the Islamist Ennahda Party. The party emerged from decades of repression under both Habib Bourguiba and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to become a dominant political actor. After long years in which its leaders endured imprisonment, torture, and forced exile, Ennahda participated in successive free and fair elections (2011, 2014, 2019), led coalition governments, and navigated the highly polarized post-revolutionary political landscape in Tunisia. Yet by 2021, this democratic experiment collapsed when President Kais Saied suspended parliament and dismantled the political party system, ushering in a return to authoritarian rule while sending many of Ennahda’s leaders back into prison or exile. Ennahda’s trajectory during this decade, from underground, exiled movement to a governing party and then back to political marginalization again, raises several questions about its evolution and strategic choices. How did a party so central to Tunisia’s democratic path end up excluded again despite all of its efforts to avoid just such a fate? What explains the failure of a highly organized party such as Ennahda to stand up to the authoritarian turn? And crucially, could the party have avoided being excluded from power again if it had taken different political positions?
This essay traces the trajectory of Ennahda Party over the 10 years when it rose to power and took part in the transition to democracy. I identify three key internal transformations that have shaped the party’s trajectory and help to explain its decline as a major political player: ideological rebranding, power sharing, and the party’s internal divisions. Several analysts and international observers have praised Ennahda Party for its flexibility and pragmatism during crucial turbulent moments, such as voluntarily ceding power, prioritizing stability and dialogue, as well as negotiating national consensus. However, others have warned about such transformations and their tremendous effect on the party’s internal organization and its base of support.[1] I argue in this essay that in fact these very transformations, while praised as pragmatic, are what ultimately weakened Ennahda and led to its decline.
Ideological Rebranding
The first transformation that Ennahda Party underwent was an ideological one. In May 2016, more than a thousand members gathered for the party’s 10th Congress. Among the most significant outcome of that meeting, was an announced decision that made domestic and international headlines: the party is abandoning “political Islam” and adopting “Muslim democracy.” In an interview, the leader of the party Rached Ghannouchi declared: “We want religious activity to be completely independent of political activity. This is good for politicians because they will not be accused in the future of using religion for political purposes. It is also good for religion so that it is not held hostage by politics and used by politicians.”[2]
Since that announcement, the party faced several internal struggles and suffered the weakening of their partisan base. People who supported and voted for Ennahda because of its endorsement of Islamic values and principles no longer viewed Ennahda as a party that represented those views. Abandoning its core ideology left voters alienated and opened the floor for a new Islamist party, Dignity Coalition, that took part in the 2019 elections and made it the 4th party in parliament. While this ideological dilution might bring electoral gains, it was not the case for Ennahda Party. In 2011, the party received around 37% of the votes, in 2014, it was around 27%, and by 2019, that dropped below 20%. Meanwhile, the rebranding failed to convince non-Islamist voters.
Survey data shows that this ideological rebranding affected the public perception of the party. According to the Comparative Study of Election Surveys[3] (CSES), people provide very inconsistent answers as to where Ennahda Party should be placed on a secular-Islamist dimension. Figure 1 depicts how Tunisian respondents from the CSES evaluated the party on the secular-Islamist scale. The results show that there are roughly the same number of people who place Ennahda as a secular party (0) as those who place it as an Islamist (10). This inconsistency reflects the blurring of the lines of where the party stands in its ideological views.
Figure 1: Ennahda Party placement on the secular-Islamist scale.
There are several reasons that might explain the ideological shift within the party other than electoral calculations. The first one has to do with the rise of radical jihadist groups. Following a series of attacks in Tunisia that destabilized the country and killed tourists as well as Tunisians, several people associated Ennahda with these terrorist groups. Ennahda and its leader, legalized some Salafist groups and attended their meetings in the early years of the transition period (Merone and Cavatorta 2012). As terrorist attacks escalated and militant groups proliferated, the party sought to distance itself from radical Islamist movements by denouncing political Islam and embracing secular democracy. The announcement of this decision was likely intended to signal to voters their firm stand against radical Islamism and extremism.
Another factor that may explain the party’s ideological shift is external international pressure. Ennahda had been at the forefront of media coverage following the Arab Uprisings. Everyone was waiting to see what would happen to the Tunisian experiment with democracy. Considerable pressure was placed on Ennahda as the single largest party and leading player during the Troika government, and this pressure intensified following the first free and fair 2014 parliamentary elections. The stakes grew even higher when a military coup removed Egypt’s democratically elected government of Mohamed Morsi and his Freedom and Justice Party (the Muslim Brotherhood). Tunisia was seen as the last remaining hope to achieve democracy and the goals of the Arab Spring. Denouncing political Islam may have been Ennahda’s strategy to signal to the international community their commitment to democracy and a peaceful political agenda.
A further explanation for the decision to ideologically moderate lies in the structural pressures of incumbency. Ennahda’s coherent ideological package was a powerful asset as an opposition party, where a clear identity-based platform mobilizes a loyal base against the status quo. Once in government, however, the logic of incumbency fundamentally alters a party’s incentives, as governance requires coalition-building, policy compromise, and administrative pragmatism that gradually erode ideological distinctiveness — a phenomenon often referred to as “incumbency fatigue” (Panebianco 1988; Przeworski and Sprague 1977; Hamid 2014). In this sense, Ennahda’s ideological rebranding was not solely a voluntary strategic choice, but also a structurally induced response to the pressures that inevitably accompany the transition from opposition movement to governing party (Wolf 2017).
Power Sharing and Reconciliation
The second major shift the party underwent was their pragmatic approach to coalition-building and power-sharing. The party engaged on multiple occasions in cross-ideological coalition formation. First, after winning a plurality of votes for the Constituent National Assembly, Ennahda decided to enter into a coalition (also called the Troika) with two secular parties: Ettakatol[4] and the Congress for the Republic. This coalition lasted from 2011 until 2013 and stepped down amid social unrest, two political assassinations, and high tensions between MPs over the role of Islam in the new constitution. Ennahda stepped down, allowing a technocratic nonpartisan government to lead the transition, finish the constitutional draft, and announce a long-overdue new election. This new transition was led by four leading national NGOs – later called the National Dialogue Quartet: the General Labor Union (UGTT), the Union of Industry, Commerce, and Crafts (UTICA), the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH), and the Tunisian Order of Lawyers (ONAT). These four organizations were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize[5] in 2015 for their mediation role in paving the way for Tunisia’s democratic transition.
The second major agreement that Ennahda engaged in was the 2014 Grand Coalition with the secular party, Nidaa Tounes. This political reconciliation[6] started in Paris in 2013 during a meeting between Rached Ghannouchi and Beji Caid Essebsi, an ancient régime member and the leader of the newly formed secular party, Nidaa Tounes. The two leaders decided before the election results were even announced that they would work together in the next phase. In 2014, no party won an outright majority in the Assembly of the Representatives of the People. Nidaa Tounes came in first with 86 out of 217 seats, and Ennahda came second with 69 seats. Though Nidaa Tounes could have formed a coalition with other smaller left-wing secular parties, it chose to govern with Ennahda. This power-sharing agreement, also known as the Carthage Agreement, was praised by observers as a positive move to foster democracy. While other Islamist-leaning parties existed in Tunisia, most notably Tayar al-Mahaba (Current of Love, formerly Al-Aridha al-Sha’biya), coalition with them was not a viable alternative for Ennahda. Tayar al-Mahaba operated primarily as a populist movement, with an agenda that diverged significantly from Ennahda’s Islamist-democratic platform, making political cooperation unlikely. Ennahda’s decision to partner with the secular Nidaa Tounes thus reflected not an absence of ideological alternatives, but a deliberate strategic choice driven by pragmatic governance considerations.
By 2018, Ennahda-Nidaa coalition had fractured, which led to new discussions about Carthage Agreement II. The second attempt to share power and lead a national unity government under Youssef Chahed did not go smoothly. Major disputes over economic and social reforms arose, and the agreement was suspended by President Beji Caid Essebsi in late May 2018. This 2018 crisis resulted in a rift between Ennahda and Nidaa and a weakening of the ruling coalition ahead of the 2019 elections.
Internal Divisions
Internal divisions have also contributed to the weakening of Ennahda. The fissures within Ennahda Party have been widening since 2012, revealing fundamental tensions about the party’s identity, strategy, and leadership. What started as a highly organized party evolved into a fragmented group, with prominent figures walking away and others being forcibly silenced. The disagreements within the party resolved around several issues such as internal party rules, leadership position, economic reforms, and most importantly political alliances.
The early warning signs appeared during the contentious negotiations over coalition governments. Several members of Ennahda resigned in protest of the grand coalition decision, particularly following the negotiations over Carthage Agreement II in 2018. The party found itself deeply divided: should it accept a complete government reshuffle to maintain its position, or risk breaking with President Beji Caid Essebsi? Different factions had fundamentally different views about that question.
The exodus of senior leaders tells its own story. In March 2019, Abdelhamid Jelassi – one of Ennahda’s most respected figures – resigned, following closely behind Zied Ladhari, who had stepped down as secretary-general. These members were central to the party’s structure and credibility. Their departures signaled a widening leadership split that Rached Ghannouchi could no longer paper over. But they were not the first to leave. Hamadi Jebali, who had served as Tunisia’s prime minister, resigned in March 2014 after his proposals for a technocratic government were rejected – a clear signal of his frustration with Ennahda’s political maneuvering. Riyad al-Shuaibi left in November 2013, and Zubair al-Shahoudi departed in September 2019. Each resignation further discredited Ennahda’s image of unity and organization.
The breaking point came in 2020 when Rached Ghannouchi unilaterally dissolved the executive bureau and replaced it with what he called a “caretaker bureau.” On the surface, this was framed as an administrative reorganization. In reality, it was a power grab. Ghannouchi was consolidating control, eliminating potential rivals, and ensuring that no alternative power center could challenge his authority. The move was particularly controversial because it emerged against the backdrop of succession planning. Ennahda’s internal regulations explicitly prohibit a third consecutive term for the party president, in other words Rached Ghannouchi should have been preparing to step aside after two terms. Instead, he was entrenching himself. The dissolution of the executive bureau eliminated the very body that might have forced the succession question or selected his replacement.
Even the July 2021 constitutional coup by President Kais Saied – which should have unified Ennahda against an external threat – instead exposed and deepened internal fractures. Instead, of forcing solidarity between the party members, it revealed how divided the party had become over strategy, leadership, and accountability. Two months after Saied’s power grab, Rached Ghannouchi suspended Imad Hammami, a former party spokesperson and member of the executive bureau for criticizing him and calling for internal reforms within the party. The suspension was not just punitive – it was symbolic and clear message to anyone else considering criticizing the way the party functioned. Many viewed Hammami’s suspension as proof that Ennahda, a party that had long defended democratic values, was becoming increasingly authoritarian in its internal governance. This approach has severely damaged Rached Ghannouchi’s reputation, both within the party and beyond.
Data from expert surveys confirm these patterns of internal fragmentation. The Varieties of Party Democracy (V-Party) dataset (Lindberg et al. 2022), part of the V-Dem project, includes measures of internal party cohesion[7] based on expert assessments of elite disagreement over core strategic decisions. Figure 2 presents Ennahda’s scores on the internal cohesion scale[8] from 2011 to 2019, revealing a dramatic decline in party unity during this critical period. The trajectory is striking. In 2011, at the height of post-revolutionary optimism and Ennahda’s electoral triumph, internal cohesion registered was above 2.5, indicating that while some visible disagreement existed, it remained manageable and did not trigger elite defections. By 2019, however, the score had dropped to approximately 1.5, signaling a high level of visible disagreement accompanied by actual departures from the party.
Figure 2: Varieties of Party Democracy – Internal cohesion scores for Ennahda Party from 2011 to 2019.
Concluding Remarks
Understanding Ennahda’s trajectory during this decade in power is essential for explaining both Tunisia’s initial democratic promise and its eventual breakdown. Three interconnected transformations, ideological rebranding, relentless power-sharing, and deepening internal divisions, combined to weaken and eventually destroy what was once Tunisia’s most organized political force.
Ennahda’s ideological rebranding from principled Islamist movement to pragmatic “Muslim democrat” party alienated its core supporters. Voters who had backed Ennahda because it stood for social justice and freedom – principles they deeply endorsed – felt betrayed when the party abandoned those commitments for the sake of political expediency (Mehrez 2023). Relentless power-sharing agreements compounded this confusion. Rather than clarifying Ennahda’s vision or advancing democratic consolidation, the party’s willingness to partner with anyone – from secular leftists to ancient regime establishment figures – left Tunisians bewildered and disillusioned. What should have been healthy coalition-building became unprincipled dealmaking. People stopped understanding what Ennahda believed in and what the party stood for. Finally, internal divisions fragmented the party even further. Despite Ennahda’s rhetorical commitment to democratic norms, the party failed to build the robust organizational structures and internal accountability mechanisms that could have maintained strong linkages between leaders and supporters. Instead, Rached Ghannouchi’s authoritarian management style further deepened the political deadlock. Perhaps most damaging, these internal battles made Ennahda increasingly ineffective as an opposition force against Kais Saied’s authoritarian drift. A party consumed by succession crises and leadership purges cannot mount coherent resistance to external threats. And that’s precisely where Ennahda found itself in 2021.
These transformations carry two broad implications that extend well beyond Ennahda’s fate. The first concerns democratic consolidation: Ennahda’s fragmentation and ideological dilution occurred precisely during the critical period when Tunisian citizens were forming political identities and partisan attachments, leaving an institutional vacuum that Kais Saied would eventually fill with authoritarian populism rather than democratic leadership. The second concerns the moderation-inclusion thesis, which holds that ideological moderation increases Islamist parties’ chances of political inclusion (Schwedler 2006; Browers 2009; Wickham 2004). Ennahda’s trajectory complicates this argument. When it moderated, it alienated its base and opened the door to radical competitors like the Dignity Coalition who accused it of abandoning Islam, yet radical Islamist movements equally face repression and marginalization. This creates a paradox that raises serious questions about whether the moderation-inclusion thesis is the best strategy for Islamists parties.
References
Browers, Michaelle. 2009. Political Ideology in the Arab World : Accommodation and Transformation. With Internet Archive. Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press. http://archive.org/details/politicalideolog0000brow.
Hamid, Shadi. 2014. Temptations of Power: Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East. Oxford University Press.
Lindberg, Staffan I., Dupont Nils, Higashijima Masaaki, Baker Kavasoglu Yaman, L. Marquardt Kyle, and Bernhard Michael. 2022. “Varieties of Party Identity and Organization (V-Party) Dataset V2. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.” https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.23696/vpartydsv2.
Mehrez, Ameni. 2023. “When Right Is Left: Values and Voting Behavior in Tunisia.” Political Behavior, ahead of print, June 29. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-023-09879-6.
Mehrez, Ameni, Levente Littvay, Youssef Meddeb, Bojan Todosijevic, and Carsten Schneider. 2023. “Introducing the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems in Tunisia: Populist Attitudes, Political Preferences, and Voting Behavior.” Mediterranean Politics 0 (0): 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2023.2252155.
Merone, Fabio, and Francesco Cavatorta. 2012. “The Emergence of Salafism in Tunisia.” Jadaliyya – جدلية. https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/26907.
Panebianco, Angelo. 1988. Political Parties: Organization and Power. CUP Archive.
Przeworski, Adam, and John Sprague. 1977. “A History of Western European Socialism.” Paper presented at Paper Presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. https://doi.org/10.1177/003232927700700401.
Schwedler, Jillian. 2006. Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen. Cambridge University Press.
Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky. 2004. “The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt’s Wasat Party.” Comparative Politics 36 (2): 205–28. https://doi.org/10.2307/4150143.
Wolf, Anne. 2017. Political Islam in Tunisia: The History of Ennahda. Oxford University Press.
Endnotes
[1] See full article https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2019/03/politicians-or-preachers-what-ennahdas-transformation-means-for-tunisia
[2] See full interview article Le Monde: https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/05/19/rached-ghannouchi-il-n-y-a-plus-de-justification-a-l-islam-politique-en-tunisie_4921910_3212.html
[3] The CSES survey provides electoral data on Tunisia post the 2019 elections. The data collection was part of wave V. Wave 5 of the CSES has been conducted in more than 50 countries including Tunisia and it has specifically focused on the study of populist attitudes (Mehrez et al. 2023).
[4] Also known as the Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties.
[5] https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2015/tndq/facts/
[6] See full piece https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/17/world/africa/a-political-deal-in-a-deeply-divided-tunisia-as-islamists-agree-to-yield-power.html
[7] Scores range from 0 (near-complete elite disagreement with significant departures) to 4 (virtually no visible disagreement).
[8] The scale measures the extent to which party elites display disagreement over fundamental strategic choices—including election campaign strategy, policy positions, allocation of financial resources, coalition formation decisions, and the selection of candidates and party leadership.