Brahim El Guabli, Johns Hopkins University
Since the independence of Tamazghan (broader North African) nation states from France in the mind-1950s and the early 1960s, Imazighen (sing. Amazigh), the Indigenous people of Tamazgha, have been treated as a minoritized group within their own ancestral homeland. This minoritization, exacerbated by their othering, translated into Imazighen’s decades-long political, linguistic, and cultural marginalization. Although they are the Indigenous people of the land, their opinions could not matter less in defining the identities of their postcolonial states, which self-defined as solely Arab-Islamic without any recognition of the Amazigh matrix on which they are founded. The constitutions of Morocco and Algeria, the two countries with the largest Amazigh populations, erased their Amazigh dimension completely. The Preamble to Morocco’s first Constitution in 1962 stated that “Morocco is a fully sovereign Muslim state whose official language is Arabic” while Article 5 of Algeria’s 1963 Constitution stipulates that “Arabic is the national and official language of the state,” following Article 4, which established Islam as “the religion of the state.”[i] Even though Imazighen represented a large percentage of the two countries’ populations, their constitutions simply overlooked their existence. These two constitutions are an exemplum of a politics of minoritization in which these societies’ anthropological and demographic reality was denied by a slight of constitutional hand.
Imazighen’s minoritization left multilayered impacts on many levels. Official education, media, and culture were harnessed to make them internalize their minoritized status. Because of the indoctrinating role of state institutions, a large portion of Imazighen gave up their Amazighity, even developing a complex of inferiority vis-à-vis Arabness. Scholarship also entrenched Imazighen’s minoritization, and the scholarly literature is replete with references to Imazighen as a minority. Mirroring the states’ positions vis-à-vis their Indigenous population, scholarship participated inadvertently in the minoritizing process that unfolded in Tamazgha.[ii] Culturally and linguistically alienated Imazighen perceived of themselves as a powerless minority that was doomed to disappear and resigned themselves to accepting the primacy of Arabism, which was strategically confounded with Islam. When the Amazigh historian Ali Sadqi Azaykou attempted to make a clear distinction between Arabness and Islam, his work elicited the ire of the state and he was sentenced to a year in jail.[iii]
Despite this repression and aggressive Arabization, a successful Amazigh Cultural Movement (ACM) emerged throughout Tamazgha and its diaspora, spurring transformations that very few thought were possible in the first decade of independence. I argue that the period between 1990 and 1993 was a crucial moment for Amazigh indigeneity, as ACM activists framed their struggle against cultural and linguistic erasure through an indigenous lens that superseded the minoritizing framework that had prevailed since independence. Consequently, Imazighen, particularly members of the Moroccan Amazigh Cultural Movement (MACM), went from advocating for recognition locally to integrating with the larger networks of the Global Indigeneity Movement (GIM). As I demonstrate in this article, Imazighen have since the mid-1990s rejected the degrading minority status imposed on them in favor of recovering a more globally translatable and legible indigenous status.
Nationalist Minoritization and the Amazigh Consciousness
Imazighen across Tamazgha gained consciousness of their marginalization as soon as their states achieved independence from France. The systematic erasure of Tamazight and Amazigh culture after independence created the perception of Imazighen as remains of a primitive self that stood in the way of Arab-nationalist modernity. The result was the Arabization of education, media, culture, and the public sphere in order to de-Amazighize and Arab-modernize this indigenous self. Even toponymies were changed to entrench Arabization. In Algeria and Morocco, this situation was compounded by the dissolution of the institutional and academic structures that French colonialism put in place to support the use of Tamazight for its own administrative and military purposes.[iv] As a result of widespread alienation created by this system policy of de-Amazighization, educated Imazighen were forced to gain awareness of their oppressive condition before they could work to redress it. This emergent awareness was instrumental to the invention of the Amazigh civil society that quickly embodied the postcolonial Amazigh consciousness.[v] Both local and diasporic, the Amazigh civil society combined cultural activism with social movement strategies to effectuate slow (but efficient) change by resorting to both overt and covert action that helped it negotiate the imbalance of power against more powerful Arab-Islamic states.[vi]
This regained Amazigh consciousness was manifested in the proliferation of Amazigh associations that advocated the termination of all manifestations of Imazighen’s official minoritization. The formation of the Académie Berbère in Paris in 1966 by a group of prominent Kabyle expatriates and the establishment of al-Jam‘iyya al-maghribiyya li-al-baḥt wa-al-tabādul al-thaqāfi (the Moroccan Association for Research and Cultural Exchange, AMREC) in Rabat in 1967 by a coterie of Amazigh teachers and students marked the beginning of a new stage in a proactive Amazigh consciousness that aimed to conscientize the masses against the ongoing, intensive de-Amazighization of their societies and create spaces for the expression and sustenance of Amazigh language and culture. The al-Jam‘iyya al-jadīda li-al-thaqāfa wa-al-funūn (the New Association for Culture and Art, later Tamaynut in 1990) in Rabat in 1978, Ilmas Association in Nador, and Ghriss Association (later Tilili) in Guelmina were born successively. In Algeria, where Amazigh activism was taxed of “Berberism,” Abderrahmane Ben Hamida, the country’s Minister of Education in 1962, had no qualms about declaring that “Berbers are an invention of the White Fathers.”[vii] The Algerian state’s repression of Amazigh action led to the outbreak of the Amazigh Spring of 1980, which spurred a significant change in the articulation of Amazigh issues of which the Seminar of Yakourn highlighted the historically indigenous nature.[viii] The process involved in the ACM’S civic engagement deepened Imazighen’s consciousness of their disempowerment and further confirmed the importance of struggle for the achievement of their rights.
The ACM’s rise and growth was not easy. Amazigh activists had to surmount obstacles and brave oppression to achieve their goals. While the Académie operated in France, it was subjected to constant pressure from the Algerian state until it was dissolved in 1978.[ix] Morocco’s repressive Years of Lead (1956-1999) forced the MACM to keep a low profile until the early 1990s. The AMREC particularly focused its work on reviving Amazigh literature, documenting heritage, and revitalizing artistic practices that gave pride to Amazigh youth. In this regard, the association published a journal called Arratn (Written Sources), organized study groups in the homes of its members, worked to standardize Tamazight using the Arabic alphabet, and even established a musical band named Usman (Lightening). Likewise, the Agadir Summer School’s gatherings brought together figures who would later play a significant role in the history of the MACM. Ranging from literature to legal thinking and from translation to linguistics, the seminars of the Agadir Summer School demonstrate their seminal role in putting the train of Amazigh renaissance on its tracks. However, the fate of the ACM would take a fascinating route in the 1990s when its members opened up their activism to international collaborations.
The Era of Human Rights and Indigeneity
Various factors coalesced to make the 1990s a transformative turning point in the history of Amazigh activism. The Berlin Wall fell in 1989, and two years later the Soviet Union collapsed. Until this point in time, the ACM activists only focused on their hyperlocal issues within national borders but planetary geopolitical transformations would thrust them into a fast-globalizing world in which human rights acquired greater moral and diplomatic significance. Like their other Indigenous peers, Amazigh activists discovered human rights as a framework to globalize their cause and pressure their states to make concessions.[x] It is within this context that they discovered indigeneity as a powerful concept that encompasses rights to land and resources, surpassing in its potential the mere focus on linguistic and cultural rights.
The “years 1992 and 1993 were a watershed for the Indigenous Peoples’ movement,” according to Elsa Stamatopoulou, the former Chief of the Secretariat of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.[xi] While 1992 was the fifth-hundred anniversary of Columbus’s disastrous arrival in America, the UN adopted the “UNDRIP [United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples], to establish a permanent forum on Indigenous issues, and to have a Decade of the World’s Indigenous People” at the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in 1993.[xii] The Vienna Conference, as it came to be known in MACM literature, was a key moment for Amazigh activists’ encounter with and deployment of indigeneity. After decades of keeping a low profile in their domestic struggle against their minoritizing state, the six signatory organizations of the Agadir Charter for Amazigh linguistic and cultural rights decided to internationalize their identity-related demands as a human rights issue.[xiii] As Stamatopoulou asserts, “Human rights bring out a political edge that not only makes states take notice but provokes states’ annoyance or sensitivity because of the critique that is made of their practices.”[xiv] Lawyers Hassan Id Balkassam and Ahmed Dgherni were designated as MACM’s representatives to the Vienna Conference. Already accomplished political, cultural, and human rights figures, Id Balkassam and Dgherni’s trip to Vienna allowed them to find out about the efficiency of human rights as a framework for the issues faced by Imazighen. Their return from Vienna would also be a good time to historicize a split of the MACM into, on the one hand, a traditionalist wing that chose to focus on ethnolinguistic rights under AMREC’s helm and, on the other hand, a human-rights-oriented counterpart that adopted indigeneity as a path toward achieving parity for Imazighen.
Translation played a major role in the shift of a section of MACM from minoritization to adopting indigeneity as a framework. When they went to Vienna, Id Balkassam and Dgherni brought with them a document entitled “A Memorandum on Linguistic and Cultural Rights,” which they intended to distribute at the conference on the behalf of the organizations they represented.[xv] Initially written in Arabic by the associations and translated into French by Ahmed Boukous, the current Dean of the Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture (IRCAM), the French translation conveyed that “historically, Imazighen have constituted the autochthonous people of North Africa.”[xvi] The Arabic phrase “sha‘b aṣlī” became “peuple autochtone,” which, in turn, became “Indigenous people” in English. Through these various acts of translation, Id Balkassam and Dgherni made the unexpected discovery that the definition of Indigenous people applied to Imazighen. Not only did they choose to join the work of the subcommittee on indigeneity instead of the usual ones on minorities, but also adopted the concept as an instrumental tool for the battle against Imazighen’s erasure when they returned from the conference.[xvii]
The accidental nature of the shift from their self-perception as a minoritized group to an Indigenous people did not stop there. In fact, Id Balkassam and Dgherni foresaw the merits of joining the GIM’s decades-old struggle to better benefit Imazighen. The GIM dates all the way back to 1923, the year Cayuga Chief Deskaheh (aka Levi General) requested the League of Nations’ recognition of the sovereignty of the six Canadian tribes that he represented. Despite the ebb and flow that characterized its history, the GIM would gain more traction in the 1980s and the 1990s, culminating in the participation of the Zapatista in the anti-globalization movement in the mid-1990s and the adoption of the UNDRIP in 2007. Amazigh representatives who attended international fora learned about the intersectionality of human rights, anti-globalization, and indigeneity for Indigenous decolonization. They also internalized rituals, activist practices, and discourses that broadened their horizons and pushed them to harness the opportunities they offered. More concretely, however, Id Balkassam geared the action of Tamaynut toward indigeneity as a conceptual and actionable framework to deepen the ties with the UN and the GIM.
Indigeneity is a slippery concept that stirs controversy even among Indigenous people themselves. Both a concept and a status, indigeneity can only be defined by taking into account how every individual relates to their indigenous roots in their own specific context.[xviii] It is a relational condition that reflects the situation of people who are native to a place or a region but whose existence changed as a result of domination, genocide, and settler colonialism. José R. Martinez Cobo, the former Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, broadly defined Indigenous people as:
Those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop, and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.[xix]
Cobo’s definition links temporality, territory, and culture together with a sense of disempowerment, minoritization, and a threatened futurity. Although Indigenous people have temporal precedence in their ancestral territories, they live under the control of settlers colonials and are subjected to the hegemony of the descendants of invaders. Most Indigenous people have not been allowed to achieve their socio-economic and cultural potential as a result of their subjugation.[xx] Hence, Indigenous people have suffered from myriad forms of expropriation and dispossession in addition to the disregard of their culture and languages.[xxi]
Despite its conceptual and historical richness, Amazigh indigeneity has been left undertheorized. While Amazigh cultural production, discourses, and activist praxis convey a deep engagement with indigeneity, the concept remains underexamined regardless of the three-decade involvement of Imazighen in the GIM since the Vienna Conference. This lack of theoretical enthusiasm for indigeneity in Tamazgha can be explained by several factors. The first factor is French colonialism’s misuse and abuse of the adjective “indigène” whose legacy elicits the ire of Francophone scholars and Amazigh activists.[xxii] Indigène, in this context, refers to the “non-European inhabitants of the colony.”[xxiii] The second factor is the Sénatus-Consulte of 14 July 1865, which, in the words of historian Michael Brett, “defined the native Algerian Muslim as a French subject but not a French citizen unless he renounced his rights and duties under Muslim law.”[xxiv] Codified into a larger assembly of rules and regulation, this Sénatus-Consulte became the infamous Code de l‘indigénat,[xxv] which severely restricted Algerian and, later, other colonized people’s freedoms starting in 1881.[xxvi]The other factor is linguistic and has to do with the fact that indégénat, for the reasons explained above, has acquired a negative meaning that is deeply embedded in colonialism. Only recently has the neologism “indigénéité,” which probably emerged in Canada, been used in French to distinguish between the liberation-oriented,[xxvii] decolonial Anglophone indigeneity and the racializing, colonial indigénat.
Beyond colonial history, there are also local reasons that explain academic reluctance to use indigeneity in Morocco and Tamazgha in general. The country’s own internal political struggle created a situation in which Tamazight and Amazigh issues were a bargaining chip between Hassan II and his Arab-Islamic nationalist opponents. Political overbidding required these nationalist parties to advance Arabization agenda forcefully, creating a consensus to sacrifice Imazighen. Except for Mahjoubi Aherdan, who was protected by his past in the resistance against the French, no politician could oppose this sacrificial strategy without risking the total destruction of his political career. Additionally, the semantics of indigeneity in Arabic are fraught. Aṣlāniyya, the Arabic equivalent of indigeneity, is derived from aṣl (origins), which both scares and infuriates Arab nationalists.[xxviii] Aṣl in Arabic is a very loaded word, and its usage in this specific context stirs up issues of political legitimacy. Aṣl confers both prestige and rights on whoever has it. Self-defined Moroccan Arabs, including the Alawite monarchy, take a great deal of pride in their Andalusian and Arabian origins, which logically put them outside the framework indigeneity. To prevent any further elaboration of ⵜⴰⵎⵚⵍⵉⵢⵜ (tamṣliyt/indigeneity), Arab-Islamic nationalists accuse Amazigh activists using it of fitna (discord/disunity), even as self-declared Arabs brandish their genealogical trees that place their origins outside Tamazgha without any criticism. The strive to control how Imazighen describe themselves is, however, reminiscent of settler colonizers’ tendency to control the self-narratives of the Indigenous people they dominate.[xxix]
From Guests to Leaders
MACM’s coincidental encounter with the GIM in 1993 ushered in a new era in Amazigh post-coloniality. Postcolonialism for Imazighen did not mean the end of their subjugation because the departure of French colonialism only meant a transition from foreign domination to an internal one. Imazighen’s minoritization across Tamazgha reproduced the colonial playbook to disempower and disenfranchise the Indigenous people of the land. Nation states in Tamazgha treated their Imazighen as internally colonized people after independence for decades. Not only were they deprived of seeing their language and culture as part of the national mainstream, but their lands and resources were also exploited without their consent. Only their encounter with the GIM would allow Amazigh activists to understand this reality in these terms, which enabled them to benefit from the momentum that Indigenous issues were gaining in order to assert their various rights.
The aftermath of the Vienna Conference was a deeper Amazigh involvement in the GIM. As a result of their integration of global networks, some Amazigh activists became leaders, fully immersed in the indigenous literature and its worldviews. While at the Vienna conference, Amazigh activists cooperated with other African delegates to found the Indigenous Peoples of Africa Co-ordinating Committee (IPACC) of which Id Balkassam was elected president. IPACC is currently chaired by Moroccan Amazigh historian Mohamed Handaine. The latter is also the founder of the Francophone Autochthonous Coordination (FAC).[xxx] Additionally, dozens of Amazigh delegates from the different parts of Tamazgha attend the UN meetings and participated in the process that resulted in the UNDRIP. Diasporic Imazighen have also participated in building and disseminating this Indigenous consciousness. In addition to the traditional Amazigh diaspora in Europe, Imazighen living in the United States and Canada have brought a deeper and more critical awareness to Amazigh indigeneity. Finally, a major outcome of this indigenous approach was the establishment of the Amazigh World Congress in 1994. A supranational organization that aims to unite Imazighen’s struggles and aspirations across Tamazgha, the idea for AWC was also born in Vienna in 1993. In 2013, the Amazigh World Assembly (AMA), which seceded from the AWC, released “ⵜⴰⵢⵙⴰ ⵏ ⵜⵎⴰⵣⵖⴰ” (Taysa n Tmazgha/The Tamazgha Manifesto), which is a significant document that reiterated the primacy of international human and Indigenous rights conventions for this supranational organization, strengthening the indigeneity-oriented and human-rights-focused tendency within the ACM.[xxxi]
While the need for Amazigh linguistic and cultural rights had already been normalized, the shift to the indigenous framework that happened after 1993 could be noticed in land- and resource-based claims that emerged later. In 2003, Tamaynut organized a four-day conference entitled “Human Rights and the Rights of Indigenous People in Light of the C169 of the WLO” in partnership with World Labor Organization (WLO) in Rabat. C169 was a precursor to the universal recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights. One of the participant highlighted that the participation of Amazigh civil society and Moroccan political parties in these meetings indicated that issues related to indigeneity “have gained more ground” and that Tamaynut succeeded in “lift[ing] the embargo that has surrounded Amazigh people’s indigeneity.”[xxxii] The maturity of Amazigh embrace of the GIM discourse has been further reflected in the establishment of Akal Coordination whose activism combines land claims with climate change and food security.[xxxiii] Speaking at the UNESCO in 2019, Id Balkassam reflected these important shifts in saying that:
Many African and world countries only remember Indigenous people in order to displace them, expropriate their lands, and take control over their forests and resources so as to facilitate their exploitation by multinational companies and implementing big projects without their prior, free, and informed consent.[xxxiv]
Id Balkassam’s words would not have been possible before 1993. Here, he articulated the condition of most Indigenous people across the globe who have been disempowered, disenfranchised, dominated, and despoiled of their riches and resources. His speech reflected the maturity MACM’s struggle for their rights within the globalized Indigenous framework. Instead of speaking for Morocco alone, Id Balkassam’s speech mirrors the evolution of the Amazigh discourse as a result of its contact with the GIB in the last thirty years.
Conclusion
The imbrication of French indigénat’s racializing and hierarchizing history with Arab-Islamic resistance to the notions of origins built into it has prevented indigeneity from reaching its liberatory, decolonial, conceptual, and methodological potential in Tamazgha. Even Brahim Akhiate, AMREC’s founder and president, distanced his organization from the concept in the midst of the backlash that ensued after Id Balkassam and Dgherni’s return from Vienna in 1993. For Akhiate, indigeneity was solely applicable to “Native Americans, Australian Aboriginals, and some people in Latin America.”[xxxv] Beyond the fact that he may have gleaned his reductive image of Native Americans from Hollywood movies, Akhiate’s position is reflective of the tricky nature of the concept of indigeneity, which requires a bifurcation in temporality in order to distinguish between the inhabitants of a place based on who preceded the other in time.[xxxvi]However, the proponents of Amazigh indigeneity have extended its benefits to all Tamazgha’s inhabitants whether they recognize their Amazighity or not. Instead of a polarizing binary that pits the Indigenous Imazighen against a supposed class of settler colonials, as it may be reflected in other contexts, Amazigh activists, like Dgherni, propose that everyone who lives on the land of Tamazgha is Indigenous.[xxxvii] Amazigh indigeneity is fluid and all-inclusive, and its articulation takes into account the indigenization of the erstwhile invaders’ blood through centuries of miscegenation. Consequently, and unlike in other indigenous contexts, where blood quotas and tribal affiliation are codified in treaties to serve as fundamental pillars of exclusion from, granting of, and claiming indigenous status, Amazigh indigeneity extends to all those who perceives themselves as Amazigh independently of whether they speak the language or not.
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[i]“Dustūr al-mamlaka al-maghribiyya (1962),” Tafra.ma, http://old.tafra.ma/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/constit_1962_ar.pdf; “Dustūr 1963,” cour-constitutionnelle.dz, https://courconstitutionnelle.dz/ar/2021/03/07/%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1-1963/?print=pdf.
[ii] For the significance of Tamazgha, see Brahim El Guabli, “The Idea of Tamazgha: Current Articulations and Scholarly Potential,” Tamazgha Studies Journal 1:1(2023): 7-22.
[iii]Ali Sadqi Azaykou. “Fī sabīl mafhūm ḥaqīqī li-thaqāfatina al-waṭaniyya.” Ma‘ārik fikriya ḥawla al-amāzīghiyya. Ed. Markaz Ṭāriq ibn Ziyyād, 35-43. (Rabat: Markaz Ṭāriq ibn Ziyyād, 2002).
[iv] See Salem Chaker, “L’Algérie 1962–1974: Le refoulement des études berbères.” Le temps de la coopération: Sciences sociales et décolonisation au Maghreb. Eds. Jean-Robert Henry et Jean-Claude Vatin, 109-118 (Paris: Karthala-IREMAM, 2012).
[v] Brahim El Guabli. “Amazigh Indigenous Post-Coloniality and Maghreb/North African Studies.” The Journal of North African Studies 30:2 (2025): 163–75.
[vi] Brahim El Guabli, Amazighitude: Living Amazigh Indigeneity in the World (forthcoming).
[vii] Bernad Lugan, “Algérie: berbérisme contre arabisme,” fr.le360.ma, accessed 27 April 2026, https://fr.le360.ma/politique/algerie-berberisme-contre-arabisme_SRPZ44K2JJF7NJ23CTMBILCGLA/.
[viii] Préparation du dossier cultural : Séminaire de Yakouren (du 1er au 31 aout 1980) (Paris: Imedyazen-Ateliers Berberes de Production et de Diffusion, 1981).
[ix] For this history, see Mohand-Aarab Bessaoud. Heureux sont les martyrs qui n’ont rien vu: La vérité sur la mort du colonel Amrouche et de Abbane Ramdane (Algiers: Imprimerie l’Artisan, n.d.).
[x] Elsa Stamatopoulou, Indigenous Peoples in the International Arena: The Global Movement for Self-Determination(New York: Routledge, 2025), 13.
[xi] Ibid., 148.
[xii] Ibid.
[xiii] These associations are AMREC, the Agadir Summer School Association, Ghriss Association for Culture, The New Association for Culture and Popular Art, Ilmas Association for Culture, and Souss Association for Culture.
[xiv] Stamatopoulou, Indigenous Peoples, 11.
[xv] Zoom Interview with Id Balkassam, March 24, 2023.
[xvi] Id Balkassam shared a copy of this document with me, but it doesn’t have any elements that could help reference it.
[xvii] Zoom Interview with Id Balkassam, March 24, 2023.
[xviii] See Julia Bello-Bravo’s problematization of the concept in her article “When is Indigeneity: Closing a Legal and Sociocultural Gap in a Contested Domestic/International Term,” AlterNative 15:2 (2019), 111-112.
[xix]José R. Martínez Cobo. Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations. Volume 5, Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations. Digitallibrary.un.org, 1987, accessed 6 March 2026, digitallibrary.un.org/record/133666?ln=en&v=pdf, para. 379.
[xx]United Nations. “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” www.un.org, 2007, accessed 4 March 2026, www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/wp-content/uploads/sites/19/2018/11/UNDRIP_E_web.pdf.
[xxi] For instance, see the example of Native Americans in Justin Farrell et al., “Effects of Land Dispossession and Forced Migration on Indigenous Peoples in North America,” Science 374, eabe4943(2021):1-8.
[xxii] Brahim El Guabli, “Widening the Scope: Conceptualizing the Indigenous Media in the Amazigh YouTube.” In Amazigh Cinema: An Introduction to North African Indigenous Film, edited by Lucy R. McNair and Yahya Laayouni, 151–76 (Regina, CA: University of Regina Press, 2025), 154-155.
[xxiii] Ibid., 154.
[xxiv] Michael Brett, “Legislating for Inequality in Algeria: The Senatus-Consulte of 14 July 1865,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 51:3 (1988), 441.
[xxv]See Vincent Bollenot, “1887. Le code de l’indigénat algérien est généralisé à toutes les colonies françaises,”Encyclopédie d’histoire numérique de l’Europe, accessed 12 August 2024, https://tinyurl.com/yzr2w4md .
[xxvi] Erell Mourouga, “The Code de l’Indigénat and Colonial Management in Algeria (1865-1944): Hierarchy, Ethnic Division, and Politicisation of Identity,” The Beacon Journal (2023), 3.
[xxvii] El Guabli, “Widening the Scope,” 154.
[xxviii] Brahim El Guabli, “Musicalizing Indigeneity: Tazenzart as a Locus for Amazigh Indigenous Consciousness,” Tamazgha Studies Journal 1:2(2024a), 27.
[xxix] Ibid., 26-45.
[xxx] Brahim El Guabli, “Amazigh Indigeneity and the Remaking of Tamazgha,” Current History 123:857(2024b): 347–353.
[xxxi]Amazigh World Assembly. “Manifest of Tamazgha for a Democratic, Social and Cross-border Confederation, Based on the Right to Autonomy of the Regions,” amamazigh.org, accessed 15 February 2026, https://amamazigh.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/AMA_MANIFESTE-DE-TAMAZGHA_5-langues.pdf.
[xxxii] Abdallah, Hitous, “ L’association Tamaynut et l’Organisation Internationale du Travail: Séminaire Sur La Convention 169 de L’O.I.T,” tawiza.byethost10.com, 2003, accessed 6 March 2026, tawiza.byethost10.com/Tawiza80/Tamaynut.htm?i=1.
[xxxiii]Akal’s 2018 statement after the March of Casablanca can be found here: Amadal Amazigh. “Des centaines de milliers de personnes ont défilé lors de la marche “Akal” contre la spoliation des terres dans la région du Souss.” Le Monde Amazigh, 3 December 2018, accessed 6 March 2026, amadalamazigh.press.ma/fr/des-centaines-de-milliers-de-personnes-ont-defile-lors-de-la-marche-akal-contre-la-spoliation-des-terres-dans-la-region-du-souss/.
[xxxiv] Muntaṣir Itriī, “al-Muḥāmī ḥasan idbalqasām: al-‘ālam lā yatadhakkaru al-shu‘ūb al-aṣliyya illā min ajli tahjīrihā wa-naz‘i arāḍīhā wa-al-sayṭara ‘alā ghābātihā wa-mawāridiha,” Amadal Amazigh, 4 February 2019, accessed 19 February 2026, https://tinyurl.com/y4vbkzb4.
[xxxv] Brahim Akhiate. al-Nahḍa al-amāzīghiyya kamā‘ishtu mīylādahā wa-taṭawwurahā (Rabat: Manshūrāt al-jam‘iyya al-Maghribiyya li-al-Baḥt wa-al-Tabādul al-Thaqāfī, 2012), 210.
[xxxvi] Mary Louise Pratt. Planetary Longings (Durham: Duke University Press, 2022), 17-18.
[xxxvii] Ahmed Dgherni. al-Amāzīghiyya wa-al-ta‘dīlāt al-dustūriyya (Rabat: Maṭba‘at al-Takattul al-Waṭanī, 1996), 44-45.