Md Maniruzzaman Mamun, University of Florida
Mark Beissinger argues that urban civic revolutions often unite diverse participants through shared anger at corruption, economic hardship, and abusive rule rather than a common ideological commitment to democracy, drawing on survey evidence from the Orange Revolution, the Tunisian Revolution, the Egyptian Revolution, and Euromaidan (Beissinger 2022). Yet empirical evidence shows that mobilization around pro-democratic aims remain widespread and has grown globally in recent years (Hellmeier and Bernhard 2022; Pemstein et al. 2018). This pattern is especially pronounced in North Africa and the Sahel, where levels of democratic mobilization are, on average, higher than in other regions. The Arab Spring marks a critical temporal juncture in this pattern: prior to 2012, pro-democratic mobilization in the region was comparatively limited and episodic, whereas the post–Arab Spring period has witnessed both a rise in mobilization and greater variation in its intensity. What explains the persistence and evolution of democratic mobilization in North Africa and the Sahel across these pre- and post-Arab Spring contexts?
Existing theories of collective action emphasize three broad explanations for protest: grievance-based accounts, political-process perspectives emphasizing mobilization capacity, and integrative approaches that highlight the interaction between the two. This paper evaluates these competing explanations by examining patterns of pro-democratic mobilization in North Africa and the Sahel before and after the Arab Spring. By distinguishing between the pre-2012 and post-2012 periods, the analysis assesses whether the uprisings transformed the underlying drivers of mobilization or instead altered the political context in which established mechanisms operate.
By drawing on large-N data and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, the results show that pro-democratic mobilization is shaped by conditional dynamics between societal grievance and opposition capacity. Higher grievance is generally associated with greater mobilization, but this effect depends on the size of opposition groups. Before 2012, grievance increases mobilization across levels of opposition capacity. After 2012, however, grievance increases mobilization mainly when opposition capacity is low. At moderate levels of capacity, the relationship is mostly flat, while at high levels of capacity, grievance is associated with lower mobilization. This suggests that in the post–Arab Spring period, large and capable opposition groups may face stronger repression, shift toward institutional politics, or redirect discontent into non-protest forms. The findings also point to threshold effects, where the relationship between grievance, capacity, and mobilization changes once opposition capacity becomes sufficiently high. Overall, the analysis shows that grievances remain important, but their mobilizing effect is conditional on opposition capacity and the broader post-2012 political environment.
Pro-Democratic Mobilization
Research on pro-democratic collective action in North Africa and the Sahel is broadly organized around three theoretical traditions: grievance-based explanations, political-process explanations, and integrative approaches that combine grievance and political process. The Arab Spring constitutes a critical turning point for evaluating these perspectives, as it altered both the level of societal grievance and the political and organizational conditions under which collective action occurs.
Grievance-based theories argue that protest emerges from popular discontent rooted in social, psychological, and material conditions, including economic inequality, political exclusion, and ethnic or regional marginalization (Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2014; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Davies 1962; Gurr 1970; Wimmer 2002). In this view, higher levels of grievance generate stronger incentives for collective action and increases in grievance are expected to translate linearly into higher levels of pro-democratic mobilization. Prior to the Arab Spring, many countries in North Africa and the Sahel exhibited high levels of grievance without sustained mass protest, as repression constrained mobilization. The economic and political impact of the Arab Spring intensified those accumulated grievances (Bellin 2012; Josua and Edel 2021). Accordingly, grievance-based theories predict that higher grievance should be associated with increased mobilization both before and after 2011, with post–Arab Spring protest reflecting heightened or newly activated discontent.
Political-process theories, by contrast, contend that grievance is widespread and therefore insufficient to explain variation in collective action. Instead, these theories emphasize political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and organizational resources as the key determinants of protest (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003; Skocpol 1979; Tarrow 2022; Tilly 1978). Applied to the Arab Spring, political-process approaches highlight how elite divisions, regime vulnerability, transnational diffusion, and shifts in repression altered the opportunity structure for pro-democratic mobilization (Bellin 2012; Josua and Edel 2021; Weyland 2012). From this perspective, collective action depends less on the intensity of grievance and more on whether opposition actors possess the organizational capacity and political openings necessary to mobilize. Mobilization after the Arab Spring should therefore be driven primarily by changes in opposition capacity and political opportunity rather than changes in grievance levels.
However, the persistence of mobilization among resource-poor or weakly organized groups suggests that motivation can precede and, at times, substitute for organizational capacity (Siroky et al. 2020). A third line of research integrates these perspectives by emphasizing the interaction between grievance and mobilization capacity. Integrative approaches argue that grievance provides the motivation for collective action, while organizational resources and political opportunities determine whether that motivation can be translated into sustained collective action (Shadmehr 2014; Siroky et al. 2020). Groups with mobilization capacity but low grievance lack incentives to act, whereas highly aggrieved groups without organizational capacity face substantial barriers to collective action. In this framework, actors weigh the costs and benefits of action based on the resources and opportunities available to them (Shadmehr 2014).
This paper evaluates these competing theoretical traditions by examining patterns of pro-democratic mobilization in North Africa and the Sahel before and after the Arab Spring. If grievance-based theories are correct, higher levels of grievance should be associated with increased mobilization across both periods. If political-process theories are correct, the presence of organized opposition and mobilization capacity should predict protest regardless of grievance levels, particularly after 2011. Finally, if integrative theories are correct, democratic mobilization should be most likely where societal grievance and organizational capacity jointly reinforce one another, with the Arab Spring altering the political context in which grievance is converted into collective action.
Data and Variables
This study draws on data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al. 2025a; Pemstein et al. 2025), covering the period from 1991 to 2023. The analysis focuses on 13 countries in North Africa and the Sahel, with temporal coverage varying by country depending on data availability (see Table 2). The final dataset contains 415 country–year observations, ranging from 21 to 33 observations per country. The dependent variable is pro-democratic mobilization, measured using V-Dem’s indicator of mass mobilization for democracy. The key independent variables capture mobilization capacity and grievance. Mobilization capacity is measured using the size of regime opposition groups, and grievance is operationalized using the equal distribution of resources index.
The measure “opposition capacity” captures the share of the domestic adult population that constitutes noteworthy opposition actors to the incumbent political regime. Substantively, the variable reflects the size and organizational presence of opposition groups capable of mobilizing against the regime (Coppedge et al. 2025b, p. 151). The observed values range from −1.883 to 2.127. Lower values correspond to contexts in which opposition groups are substantially smaller than the sample average, typically representing only a very small share of the population (roughly 1–5 percent or less). Values around zero indicate average opposition group size, often corresponding to groups representing approximately 5–30 percent of the population. Higher values, particularly those above one, indicate very large opposition constituencies that may represent more than 30 percent of the population.
Table 2: Temporal Coverage of Country-Level Data
| Country | First Year | Last Year | Coverage Span |
| Algeria | 1991 | 2023 | 33 |
| Burkina Faso | 1991 | 2023 | 33 |
| Chad | 1991 | 2023 | 33 |
| Egypt | 1991 | 2023 | 33 |
| Libya | 1991 | 2011 | 21 |
| Mali | 1991 | 2023 | 33 |
| Mauritania | 1991 | 2023 | 33 |
| Morocco | 1991 | 2023 | 33 |
| Niger | 1991 | 2023 | 33 |
| Nigeria | 1991 | 2023 | 33 |
| Senegal | 1991 | 2023 | 33 |
| Sudan | 1991 | 2023 | 33 |
| Tunisia | 1991 | 2023 | 33 |
Notes: The table reports the first and last years of available. data for each country in the sample. Coverage span is calculated as (Last Year−First Year+1). Libya’s coverage ends in 2011 due to data availability.
“Grievance” captures the extent of structural political and socioeconomic grievances within society. The measure is derived from the distribution of resources component of the V-Dem dataset, which assesses how equally material and non-material resources are distributed across social groups (Coppedge et al. 2025b, p. 385). The original measure ranges from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate more equal distributions of resources. In this study the measure is inverted so that higher values correspond to greater levels of societal grievance. The observed values range from −0.500 to 0.214, indicating relatively modest variation around the sample mean. Lower values represent comparatively low levels of grievances relative to the dataset average, while positive values indicate cases in which grievances are above the sample mean.
“Mass mobilization for democracy” measures citizen participation in mass events organized with explicit democratic aims, including demonstrations, strikes, and sit-ins. Substantively, the variable captures collective action intended to advance or protect democratic institutions and civil liberties (Coppedge et al. 2025b, p. 237). The observed values range from −2.903 to 3.589. Lower values correspond to countries or years with virtually no mobilization events. Observations near zero indicate moderate levels of mobilization, typically involving several or many small-scale events. Higher values represent intense mobilization environments characterized by frequent protests and the presence of both large and small mobilization events.
Descriptive Evidence
Table 1 presents yearly averages of mass mobilization, opposition capacity, and grievance across the countries in the sample. The first row reports the average values for the pre-2009 period (1991–2008), while subsequent rows display annual averages. Before discussing the temporal patterns, it is useful to clarify the substantive meaning and empirical range of the key variables. The descriptive patterns in Table 1 reveal several notable trends. First, mass mobilization increases sharply during the period surrounding the Arab Spring. The average level of mobilization rises from 0.26 in the pre-2009 period to 0.46 in 2009, 0.71 in 2010, and peaks at 1.60 in 2011. Although mobilization declines after 2012, it remains elevated relative to the pre-2009 baseline for much of the following decade, with a secondary increase observed in 2019. Second, opposition capacity increases during the years immediately preceding the Arab Spring. The average level of opposition capacity rises from 0.78 in the pre-2009 period to 1.27 in 2010 and remains relatively high in 2011 and 2012 before gradually stabilizing at somewhat lower levels in later years.
This pattern suggests that stronger opposition structures were present during the period in which mobilization peaked. By contrast, grievance levels remain relatively stable across the entire period. Average grievance values fluctuate within a narrow range between approximately 0.62 and 0.67, indicating that structural grievances change far less over time than the more dynamic patterns observed for mobilization and opposition capacity. Taken together, these descriptive patterns suggest that the surge in mass mobilization around 2011 coincides with increases in opposition capacity rather than dramatic shifts in grievance levels. This preliminary evidence provides descriptive support for the theoretical expectation that organizational capacity may shape the extent to which underlying societal grievances translate into large-scale mobilization.
Table 1: Average Levels of Mass Mobilization, Opposition Capacity, and Grievance
| Period | Mass Mobilization | Opposition Capacity | Grievance |
| 1991–2008 | 0.26 | 0.78 | 0.65 |
| 2009 | 0.46 | 0.80 | 0.63 |
| 2010 | 0.71 | 1.27 | 0.63 |
| 2011 | 1.60 | 1.19 | 0.63 |
| 2012 | 1.24 | 1.05 | 0.62 |
| 2013 | 1.02 | 1.01 | 0.66 |
| 2014 | 1.06 | 0.94 | 0.67 |
| 2015 | 0.87 | 0.97 | 0.66 |
| 2016 | 0.77 | 0.94 | 0.66 |
| 2017 | 0.76 | 0.97 | 0.67 |
| 2018 | 0.85 | 1.06 | 0.65 |
| 2019 | 1.12 | 1.01 | 0.65 |
| 2020 | 0.80 | 1.04 | 0.64 |
| 2021 | 0.84 | 0.80 | 0.65 |
| 2022 | 0.49 | 0.73 | 0.66 |
| 2023 | 0.27 | 0.76 | 0.65 |
| 2024 | 0.04 | — | 0.66 |
Note: Values represent yearly averages across countries; Opposition capacity data for 2024 are unavailable.
Results
Table 3 presents three OLS models estimating the relationship between opposition capacity, grievance, and mass mobilization in democratic contexts. It distinguishes between two periods: the pre–Arab Spring era (1991–2011) and the post–Arab Spring era (2012–2023) to examine whether these relationships changed following the Arab Spring. Model 1 reports the baseline specification including opposition capacity, grievance, and the post-2012 indicator. Model 2 introduces the interaction between opposition capacity and grievance, and Model 3 adds temporal interactions to evaluate whether these relationships differ after 2012.
In the baseline model, grievance is positively associated with mass mobilization and approaches conventional levels of statistical significance (β = 0.555, p < 0.10), while the coefficient for opposition capacity is negative but not statistically significant. The post-2012 indicator is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that mass mobilization in democracies is more likely in the post-2012 period. Model 2 demonstrates that the interaction between opposition capacity and grievance is negative and statistically significant (β = −1.393, p < 0.01). This suggests that the mobilizing effect of grievance diminishes as opposition capacity increases and vice versa.
Table 3: OLS Models of Mobilization for Democracy
| Model 1 (Base) | Model 2 (Interaction) | Model 3 (Temporal) | |
| Intercept | 0.411***
(0.072) |
0.450***
(0.073) |
0.516***
(0.075) |
| Opposition Capacity | -0.097
(0.065) |
-0.148*
(0.067) |
-0.174*
(0.083) |
| Grievance | 0.555+
(0.297) |
1.396**
(0.433) |
2.200***
(0.559) |
| Post-2012 | 0.438***
(0.116) |
0.446***
(0.115) |
0.270*
(0.129) |
| Opposition Capacity × Grievance | -1.393**
(0.526) |
-1.424*
(0.701) |
|
| Opposition Capacity × Post-2012 | 0.109
(0.140) |
||
| Grievance × Post-2012 | -2.208*
(0.876) |
||
| Opposition Capacity × Grievance × Post-2012 | 0.221
(1.047) |
||
| Num. Obs. | 415 | 415 | 415 |
| R2 | 0.047 | 0.063 | 0.091 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.040 | 0.054 | 0.075 |
Notes: Entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.1, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Model 3 extends this specification by allowing these relationships to vary after 2012. This temporal distinction allows for a direct comparison of the determinants of pro-democratic mobilization before and after the Arab Spring. The interaction between opposition capacity and grievance remains negative and statistically significant (β = −1.424, p < 0.05), reinforcing the conclusion that stronger opposition structures reduce the marginal impact of grievances on mobilization.
The temporal interaction between grievance and the post-2012 period is negative and statistically significant (β = −2.208, p < 0.05), indicating that the effect of grievance on mobilization is weaker after 2012. By contrast, the interaction between opposition capacity and the post-2012 period is not statistically significant, suggesting that the relationship between opposition capacity and mobilization remains relatively stable across time. The three-way interaction among opposition capacity, grievance, and the post-2012 period is also statistically insignificant.
Model fit improves across specifications, with the R2 increasing from 0.047 in the baseline model to 0.091 in the full temporal interaction model, indicating that the inclusion of interaction terms and temporal dynamics provides a better explanation of variation in democratic mass mobilization. Diagnostic tests indicate no major violations of the OLS assumptions. Residual diagnostics show no strong departures from linearity or normality, no influential observations, and only mild heteroskedasticity, which is very common in social science research.
Figures 1 and 2 visualize the interaction effects estimated in Model 3, which incorporates both the grievance-opposition interaction and its temporal conditioning after 2012. These figures present predicted levels of mass mobilization across varying levels of grievance and opposition capacity, separately for the periods before and after 2012.
Figure 1: Grievance × Opposition Capacity Interaction Before and After 2012
Figure 1 demonstrates prior to 2012 (left panel), the relationship between grievance and mass mobilization is strongly conditioned by the level of opposition capacity. As grievance increases, predicted mobilization rises most sharply when opposition capacity is low. In contrast, when opposition capacity is high, the relationship between grievance and mobilization becomes substantially weaker and may even decline slightly. The post-2012 period shows a different dynamic (right panel). Grievance is positively associated with mobilization when capacity is low. On the other hand, grievance decreases the predicted mobilization levels at average to high level of capacity.
Figure 2 presents the same relationship from the complementary perspective of opposition capacity. Both before and after 2012, increases in opposition capacity tend to reduce mobilization when grievances are high to average, but increase mobilization when grievances are low. This crossover pattern again reflects the negative grievance–opposition interaction estimated in the regression model. After 2012, however, the relationship becomes flatter and less differentiated across grievance levels, suggesting that the interaction between these structural factors weakens in the later period.
Figure 2: Opposition Capacity × Grievance Interaction Before and After 2012
Importantly, the three-way interaction term (opp × griev × post2012) is not statistically significant in Model 3, indicating that although the baseline effect of grievance changes after 2012, the fundamental conditional relationship between grievance and opposition capacity remains broadly similar across periods. Overall, the figures reinforce the regression results: grievance strongly predicts mass mobilization at levels of opposition capacity and vice versa.
Discussion and Conclusion
This analysis assessed how societal grievance and opposition capacity shape pro-democratic mobilization before and after the Arab Spring in North Africa and the Sahel. Three findings stand out. First, both grievance and opposition capacity matter for democratic mobilization. Although they are not significant in the base models, they become significant in the interaction and temporal models. This supports integrative theoretical approaches, which argue that grievances provide motivation for collective action, while organizational capacity determines whether that motivation can be translated into mobilization (Shadmehr 2014; Siroky et al. 2020).
Second, the findings show a negative conditional relationship between grievance and opposition capacity. The mobilizing effect of grievance weakens as opposition capacity increases, and the effect of capacity also depends on the level of grievance. However, the predicted probability plots show that this relationship changes before and after 2012. Before 2012, grievance is positively associated with pro-democratic mobilization across levels of opposition capacity. After 2012, grievance increases mobilization only when opposition capacity is low, around 1–5% of the population. At moderate levels of capacity, around 5–30%, the relationship is mostly flat. At high levels of capacity, above 30%, grievance is associated with lower mobilization.
Figure 2 shows a complementary pattern. Opposition capacity increases mobilization when grievance is low, has little effect at moderate levels of grievance, and decreases mobilization when grievance is high. This pattern is broadly similar before and after 2012, but Figure 1 shows the clearer temporal shift. After the Arab Spring, grievance no longer translates into mobilization in the same way, especially when opposition groups are already large. This post-2012 dynamic may reflect a more constrained political environment. In high-grievance and high-capacity settings, states may respond with greater repression, or opposition groups may shift toward institutional politics instead of open protest. This suggests that grievances remain important, but the post–Arab Spring environment changed how grievances translate into collective action. Regime adaptation, institutional reforms, and changing patterns of repression may have reshaped the opportunity structure for pro-democratic mobilization.
Third, the findings suggest threshold effects. The relationship between grievance, capacity, and mobilization is not linear across all values. Instead, the effect changes after certain levels of grievance or capacity. In Figure 1, grievance increases mobilization up to a point, but its effect changes once opposition capacity becomes high. In Figure 2, capacity increases mobilization at low grievance, remains flat at moderate grievance, and decreases mobilization at high grievance. The threshold appears to differ before and after 2012, suggesting that the post–Arab Spring period altered the conditions under which grievance and capacity support mobilization.
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