Salma Daoudi, University of Oxford
Introduction
The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 constituted a critical historical juncture in Syria’s contemporary political trajectory, marking both a rupture with entrenched authoritarian structures and the onset of an uncertain transitional moment that needs to reckon with the death and destruction wrought by years of violence. Among the most tangible and tragic of these legacies is the vast population of Syrians with war-related disabilities, tens of thousands of men, women, and children who survived bombings, chemical attacks, torture, sieges, and battles, but were left with permanent injuries and disabilities. These survivors carry the physical and psychological scars of a decade-long conflict that is estimated by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (2025) to have caused the direct deaths of close to 657,000 people, while displacing and dispossessing millions. By 2015, at least 1.5 million Syrians had acquired war-related disabilities (Human Rights Watch, 2022), a number that has only grown with continued fighting and compounded injuries. As of 2021, approximately 28% of the Syrian population lived with a disability, a rate substantially higher than the global average of 15% (International Center for Transitional Justice, 2023).
They embody and document records of grave human rights violations, as their bodies remain inscribed with both the violence endured and the aspirations of dignity and freedom that fueled resistance. Yet, as Syria tentatively transitions to a post-Assad era that has yet to fully materialize into a post-conflict order, war-disabled Syrians remain largely marginalized in debates on justice, reconstruction, and national belonging. This paper argues that addressing the rights and needs of Syria’s war-disabled is not a peripheral humanitarian issue, but a core political question for a just transition. Reparations in post-conflict Syria must be conceptualized not merely as mechanisms of financial compensation or technical instruments of transitional justice, but as integral to the unfinished project of liberation inaugurated by the popular uprising of 2011. Any framework of redress must remain anchored in these emancipatory claims to honor the sacrifice of multi-scalar and multi-leveled losses, and must extend beyond individualized restitution to encompass collective recognition, memorialization, and the structural transformation of the political order that enabled mass violence, which also requires affirming the agency of those whose bodies were most irrevocably marked by conflict.
Grounded in political sociology, critical disability studies, and transitional justice theory, this analysis critically examines how Syria’s war-disabled expose the limitations of dominant post-conflict frameworks. The discussion begins by situating war-inflicted disability as a product of intersecting violence, displacement, and infrastructural collapse, building on overarching themes identified through interviews with war-disabled Syrians, caregivers, and community organizers. It notes that post-conflict institutions often fail to include people with disabilities, reflecting deeper tensions over whose suffering counts in the new political order. The potential social marginalization and political invisibility of disabled Syrians, underscores the shortcomings of technocratic reconstruction plans and selective recognition of victimhood, itself a highly contentious and porous concept.
At the same time, war-disabled Syrians are not merely passive victims; they are emerging as political actors. Through grassroots organizing, mutual aid networks, and advocacy campaigns, they are insisting on accessibility, inclusion, and accountability as foundational principles for Syria’s future. In doing so, they challenge binary narratives that cast them only as heroes or victims, asserting instead their right to shape the society they helped bring into being.
Ultimately, the paper calls for a reconceptualization of “reparation” for Syrians with war-acquired disabilities beyond token compensation, toward inclusive institutional design, structural accessibility, and new civic imaginaries that embrace embodied histories of loss and resistance. If karama (dignity) was a central slogan of the 2011 Syrian uprising, then a truly dignified post-authoritarian transition must heed the voices and fulfill the rights of those whose dignity and bodies have been deeply tested by the war. Anything less risks reproducing the patterns of exclusion and injustice that defined both the conflict and the old regime.
War-inflicted disabilities as embodied legacies of violence in Syria
More than a decade of asymmetric warfare and collective punishment mechanisms have left Syria with one of the highest disability rates in the world. Tens of thousands of people have been left with permanent markers of the violence unleashed, whether because of lost limbs from bombing, disfiguration from torture, or crippling disabilities after lack of adequate healthcare. While estimating how many people exactly have been indelibly physically affected by the conflict, whether directly or indirectly, proves to be a delicate endeavor, recent assessments underscore the staggering human cost of the Syrian conflict in terms of disability.
The plurality of the causes of impairment reflects the scale of creative technologies of violence in Syria, that were not merely repetitive brutality, but inventive, adaptive, and constantly recalibrated to break bodies, communities, and morale. This relates to a broader political project of the engineering of death and suffering (Ismail, 2018), a systematic, bureaucratically coordinated, and technologically innovative architecture of killing, harnessing creativity for the optimization of injury and the scaling of death.
There is a scalar continuity from collective and spectacular violence to individualized and routinized harm, wherein the infrastructural production of disability mirrors its carceral miniaturization. Decades of authoritarian rule under both Hafez and Bashar al-Assad institutionalized detention, torture, and enforced disappearance as a means of disciplining dissent and producing fear across society. Prisons like Tadmor and Sednaya, described by al-Haj Saleh (2025) as “factories of power,” functioned as laboratories of authoritarian control, where detainees were subjected to hunger, torture, and prolonged isolation, transforming incarceration into both a material and symbolic practice of erasure. Survivors of such spaces not only endured physical violence, but also sustained deep psychological injuries, ranging from post-traumatic stress disorder and depression to long-term difficulties with trust, belonging, and reintegration into social and family life.
Maiming in Syria should be conceptualized not as accidental collateral but as a purposive technique of rule, calibrated to reconfigure the capacities of bodies and the rhythms of social life (Scarry, 1985). Rather than solely indexing sovereign power to mortality, the repertoire of harm in Syria has produced debilitation a governable outcome that multiplies dependency and contracts political agency, thus operating within a necropolitical order that dictates who may live and who must die and organizes conditions of living that approximate death. These can be termed “death-worlds,” spaces of exposure, enclosure, and attrition in which survival itself becomes precarious and administratively contingent (Mbembe, 2019). The production of injury is sustained by an apparatus that renders harm legible, allocable, and routine. Through disciplinary and biopolitical practices, bodies are sorted into categories of treatability and worth (Foucault, 2003). The result is an infrastructural politics in which spectacular demonstrations of mass violence are superimposed on the quotidian governance of the normalization of injury through its administrative mismanagement due to the lack of adequate healthcare, inclusive infrastructure, and humane living conditions (Weizman, 2011). Crucially, the temporality of maiming exceeds the event of the strike, as injury accrues as slow violence over time (Nixon, 2011). In this sense, inflicted injury functions as an administrative rationality, where survivorship in diminished form becomes instrumentally valuable to domination (Puar, 2017).
On a large scale, the experiences of mass violence and collective punishment led for instance to lost limbs or eyesight from artillery shells, airstrikes, and landmines, spinal injuries from gunshot and shrapnel, neurological damage from chemical attacks, and other debilitating or paralyzing aftereffects[1]. Explosive weapons represent the primary cause of injury in Syria, with an estimated 89% of injured suffering from permanent or temporary impairments fueling high psychological distress and loss of functionality (Handicap International, 2016). Nerve agents, most notably sarin, were used not only to kill, but also to terrorize and disperse communities, emptying cities from perceived enemy demographics. Eyewitness accounts from Eastern Ghouta in 2013 and Khan Shaykhun in 2017 described rapid collapse, choking, foaming at the mouth, and visual pain within minutes, which were found to be symptoms consistent with sarin exposure (OPCW Fact-Finding Mission, 2017).
Beyond immediate fatalities, the harm often extends well beyond the day of attack. Longitudinal studies of sarin survivors document persistent difficulties with attention, memory, mood, sleep, and, for a subset, recurrent seizures and cognitive impairments that constrain schooling, work, and independent living (Hoffman et al., 2007). In Syria’s degraded care ecology, marked by attacks on hospitals, staff flight, and disrupted supply chains, these acute crises were more likely to harden into long-term disability, with limited, if not impossible, access to rehabilitation. The lack of immediate, urgent, and specialized adequate care following violent incidents explains the significant proportion of preventable amputations, nerve damages, and long-term complications that ultimately lead to loss of function (Handicap International, 2016), while protracted sieges, the weaponization of starvation, and the strategic destruction of healthcare in conditions of widespread poverty and insalubrity, favored stunted growth amongst children, war-induced malnutrition, and the spreading of preventable diseases and aggravation of pre-existing conditions that resulted in lifelong disabilities. A such, war-related disability in Syria is not merely the outcome of singular violent incidents, but of intersecting and compounding violences that have turned treatable injuries into permanent impairments.
The Syrian conflict transformed recoverable illness and injury into long-term disability by collapsing the conditions of repair. The destruction of facilities and flight of personnel curtailed even basic trauma and infection care, converting treatable wounds into amputations and chronic complications, while assistive technologies such as wheelchairs and prosthetics that make impairment livable were scarce or unaffordable (Human Rights Watch, 2022). In besieged and repeatedly bombarded areas, antibiotics, anesthesia, and post-operative care were intermittently absent, which caused preventable limb loss and avoidable deterioration (Save the Children, 2014). This produced a care economy reordered around permanent improvisation, where the absence of devices and rehabilitation locked families into cycles of physical diminishment, financial dependency, and foregone schooling and work. In the words of an injured young man who has lost the use of his legs, the hardest part is not simply to access an assistive device and learn how to walk again, but to learn where to go.[2] His remark collapses the physical and the political, for it situates recovery as part of a broader restoration of agency and right to inhabit the moral and material landscape of the country.
Additionally, these injuries were not randomly distributed. Often, the most intense violence fell upon communities that resisted the regime or found themselves on frontline fault lines, meaning certain regions such as Homs, Aleppo, Eastern Ghouta, and Idlib, produced disproportionate numbers of war-disabled survivors. Disability in Syria thus maps onto the geography of conflict and resistance.
Mass displacement intensified these dynamics. More than 13 million Syrians have been uprooted across borders or within Syria (UNHCR, 2025), and many people with disabilities have ended up in informal sites or inaccessible shelters where mobility, hygiene, and follow-up care were structurally constrained, leaving many to feel trapped in conditions of improvised impermanence and limitation.[3] Poverty and displacement became both causes and consequences of disability. Households with more than one member with a disability were already less able to meet basic needs in 2020, and that gap widened as the economy deteriorated by 2022, with many unable to procure or replace broken assistive devices and hence forced to live without rehabilitative support (Human Rights Watch, 2022). These lived experiences underscore that disability in Syria is not just a medical condition, but a social condition produced by violence, displacement, and neglect.
People with disabilities face higher risks of abuse, facing exploitation and even abandonment. Children and adults with disabilities in Syria were disproportionately vulnerable to violence during attacks, unable to flee without help and sometimes even left behind by desperate families (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Extreme coping practices emerged of families resorting to shackling children with intellectual disabilities at home due to social stigma and lack of support, reinforcing a broader pattern of social exclusion prompted by worsening living conditions.[4] These same dynamics extend into the politics of memory and redress, as disabled Syrians were routinely omitted from documentation and community programs, leaving their testimonies underrepresented in public reckoning with the war (Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, 2023).
These intertwined micro- and macro-deployments of violence against the body demonstrated that disability is not a contingent medical by-product of war, but rather a technology of governance maintaining governed lives structurally diminished. As Syria transitions, acknowledging and addressing the genealogy of violence requires moving beyond mortality as the only measure of the political economy of harm, to include other forms of the afterlives of injury.
Reimagining reparations as political subjectivity and infrastructural justice
The dominant vocabulary through which disability in conflict is understood remains primarily humanitarian, casting people with disabilities as a vulnerable group in need of aid and as recipients of care instead of rights-holders whose claims are equally constitutive of the political landscape. Existing scholarship and policy discourse tend to treat disability as an individualized condition to be rehabilitated rather than as a social and political relation (Kett & van Ommeren, 2009). Yet the Syrian experience exposes the limits of this approach. The mutilation of bodies and the corrosion of social trust are not separate processes but entwined effects of the same architecture of violence, meaning the destruction of hospitals, the criminalization of care, and the long attrition of welfare and infrastructure. As scholars such as Fassin (2012) and Das (2007) remind us, the afterlives of violence reside as much in institutions and environments as in the body itself.
That is why this paper draws on humanitarian and biomedical readings to approach disability as a political condition that reveals how justice, care, and sovereignty are negotiated in recovery. In this view, reparation is not merely a form of compensation but an entry point into the reorganization of power and infrastructure. Urgent humanitarian assistance has been and remains indispensable, but reducing the issue to charity or medical relief obscures its fundamentally political dimensions. I contend that justice and reparation for Syria’s war-disabled must be reframed as a core political question in the post-authoritarian transition, not relegated to the margins as a special-needs or humanitarian sidebar.
Transitional justice theory provides a lens for this reframing. Traditionally, transitional justice refers to the judicial and non-judicial measures implemented by societies emerging from conflict or authoritarianism to address past human rights violations, anchored normatively in acknowledgment of violations and the restoration of rights (De Greiff, 2006). Strikingly, however, people with disabilities remain at the margins of this field in Syria and beyond, a gap that recent scholarship identifies as both conceptual and operational. Despite growing commitments to participation and inclusion, disability is rarely centered in the design of truth processes, consultations, or reparations architectures (Clark, 2023), as if resulting losses and suffering were private tragedies rather than a matter of public justice. This echoes broader critiques of transitional justice as overly juridical and inattentive to social repair (Lambourne, 2009; Madlingozi, 2010) yet extends them by foregrounding the infrastructural conditions through which justice is materialized.
Critical disability studies problematize this marginalization, by relocating disability as product of the environments, institutions, and norms that govern life. It introduces a key distinction between impairment, meaning a person’s physical or mental condition, and disability, meaning the social disadvantages and exclusions that result from an impairment because socio-political environments fail to accommodate these impairments (Oliver, 2004). To illustrate, children that have lost their legs to bombing, for instance, are impaired, but what disables them is an environment that lacks prosthetic services, has buildings with no ramps, and encourages their social exclusion and economic marginalization. Thus, disability is a relational and political condition: it reflects how power structures create barriers or enable participation. Syrians were disabled by the violence exercised against them and by the state’s failure, and unwillingness, to protect and care for them. Their continued exclusion in the transition would represent a political choice to perpetuate inequity. The mother[5] of an amputated child reported watching her daughter living in constant war with life itself, struggling to achieve the most mundane of tasks. She feared this war would never end, regardless of the evolution of the Syrian conflictual dynamics, since the battle she fought was relegated to the personal instead of the public realm. A 30-year-old double amputee[6] who was forcibly displaced echoed these sentiments, arguing that the losses he has incurred financially, emotionally, and physically were sacrifices he made for national liberation, but that he was painfully aware his own liberation from a reduced form of life would never come.
These testimonies anchor the need for recognizing war-inflicted disability as a legitimate harm for which accountability and reparation are due, to include those who were maimed or psychologically traumatized in transitional justice efforts and in the country’s subsequent inclusive reconstruction. A transition that does not account for this significant victim group risks entrenching a two-tiered society and leaving wounds of the war to fester.
The infrastructures of care that sustained life through more than a decade of war have persisted into the transition, but in forms that expose underlying asymmetries of the Syrian polity. The concentration of institutional revival of state resources in the center opposes the prolonged humanitarization of care in the periphery. In the political center, transitional administrations inherited remaining health infrastructure and programs while developing new models of social services, but the material provision of assistive care continues to depend on UN and INGO partnerships. In the northern and eastern peripheries, humanitarian and local NGO networks function as de facto welfare regimes, delivering prosthetics, physiotherapy, and psychosocial support through project-based initiatives, operating under conditions of chronic shortage and discontinuity (Handicap International, 2016; UNOCHA, 2025).
If under the former Assad regime disability in Syria has been administered through the coupling of spectacular harm with the mundane (mis)governance of injury, then the object of redress needs to encompass the apparatus of structural violence that renders injury so crippling. Reparations can be broadened to also include infrastructural justice, meaning paying attention to the social and material arrangements through which rights are either made operable or withheld. In this register, the “right to a remedy” is not exhausted by individualized awards, but rather indexed to the redesign of health, mobility, and decision-making systems such that the conditions that previously converted treatable wounds into permanent impairments are no longer reproduced.
Reframed this way, truth and reparation are less concerned with tallying discrete violations than with making disabling harms legible as public wrongs and with situating their afterlives within the evidentiary record. Such an epistemic shift is not merely curatorial. It anchors recognition, redistribution, and representation as mutually constitutive dimensions of justice rather than parallel tracks, an alignment long argued in critical theory but seldom operationalized in post-conflict design (Fraser, 1995). It also resonates with the human-rights model of disability, which treats accessibility, reasonable accommodation, and participation not as dispensations but as enforceable obligations that persist in “situations of risk and humanitarian emergencies” (Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2006, art. 11).
A young activist from Aleppo suffering from irreversible injury reframed justice as visibility rather than nostalgia or mere remembrance, asking for the right to inhabit the city as citizens, not as residuals of conflict.[7] Her demands centred around the inclusive (re)planning of the city in ways that facilitate mobility and improve accessibility, as opposed to the rubbles and ruins that constrain movement in most of the city. This articulates justice as spatial participation, meaning the ability to co-produce the rebuilt environment and, through it, to reconstitute belonging, through an act of inclusion that is not symbolic but sovereign, an insistence that justice must be built, not merely promised.
This analytic does not prescribe a technocratic blueprint. It suggests, rather, a shift in scale and temporality, to move beyond remedy as punctual event to remedy as durable capacity, centering rights-holders, and cementing inclusion and co-participation as institutional norms. In a post-Assad Syria, one of the measures of a just transition will be whether the polity’s infrastructures allow for the materialization of equity and shared dignity. That is the sense in which reparations, understood as infrastructural justice, belong at the center of transitional politics rather than at its charitable margins.
Conclusion
This article has argued that disability in post-Assad Syria is neither a peripheral humanitarian concern nor a purely clinical aftermath, but a constitutive terrain upon which the transition can be made or unmade. Read across scales, maiming appears not as collateral but as a technique of rule whose afterlives are administered through infrastructures of repair and refusal. In this register, the war-disabled do not simply index the conflict’s destructiveness, they disclose the grammar of governance that converted treatable wounds into permanent impairments and diminished forms of life. To address disability as such is therefore to confront the political economy of harm that outlives the regime change, including the institutions that decide who is rendered legible as a victim, which injuries count as public wrongs, and how rights are made operable, or withheld.
Against dominant post-conflict frameworks that confine disability to the domains of aid delivery and medical relief, the analysis has recentered justice and reparation as questions of membership, recognition, and co-decision. The proposal to construe reparations as infrastructural justice follows directly from the Syrian evidence: if injury has been produced and reproduced by the coupling of spectacular violence with administrative scarcity, then redress must be judged by whether it reconfigures the arrangements through which bodies move, are treated, and can speak. In practice, this includes reductions in waiting for rehabilitation services, the accessibility of rebuilt spaces, the durability of prosthetics and rehabilitation supply chains, and the presence of disabled Syrians in the institutions that design and govern repair. Such a shift is not technocratic; it is constitutional in the deepest sense, because it concerns how the polity understands equality and whose capacities count in the reconstruction of the social.
The contribution is thus twofold. Conceptually, it widens transitional justice beyond adjudication and symbolic recognition to the redesign of infrastructures through which rights are materialized, aligning justice with the social and human-rights models of disability without dissolving accountability into policy incrementalism. Empirically, it situates Syrian disability within a scalar continuity of violence and governance that explains why humanitarian aftercare, however necessary, will remain insufficient if the architectures that administer debility persist. The implication is not a blueprint but a criterion: a transition is just to the extent that it ceases to govern through injury and begins to institutionalize equal membership as lived practice.
Ultimately, if karama has oriented Syrian claims since 2011, its evaluation in the transition belongs less to proclamations of inclusion than to the organization of the ordinary. The relevant tests are institutional. They encompass non-discriminatory access to care, the navigability of public space, including schools and the workplace, and the incorporation of previously excluded testimonies into public archives on equal terms. To center the war-disabled does not constrict the ambit of transition, it clarifies its constitutional content. A polity that can acknowledge the injuries it produced and reconstruct infrastructures so that impaired bodies may act, move, and speak as equal members is one in which dignity is not merely asserted but materially realized.
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[1] From several interviews conducted with Syrian doctors and nurses in October 2024, identifying common physical trauma amongst the population.
[2] From an anonymized interview conducted in October 2024.
[3] Based on several anonymized interviews conducted with displaced Syrians on October 2024.
[4] Based on several anonymized interviews conducted with displaced Syrians on October 2024.
[5] From an anonymized interview conducted in October 2024.
[6] From an anonymized interview conducted in October 2024.
[7] From an anonymized interview conducted in October 2024.