Tyler B. Parker, Mercer University
The Sultanate of Oman ensures its survival through an independent foreign policy that is neither formally allied, functionally dependent, nor factually neutral. By avoiding entanglements in others’ disputes, facilitating dialogue, and promoting peace, Oman embodies a vital diplomatic lynchpin whose Musandam Peninsula sits strategically at the juncture between the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman. Sultan Haitham bin Tariq Al Said, who succeeded Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said in 2020 after the latter’s near fifty-year reign, has retained Oman’s independent ethos. Oman’s experience shows in part how “weakness” does not alone dictate foreign policy choices, and that considerable agency remains for such states to determine how they respond to security challenges.
While Oman has maintained this stance for a remarkably long time, the “turbulence” (as described by Waleed Hazbun) of the Middle East’s political dynamics and security developments poses a challenge to Oman’s independence.[1] The latest iteration of turbulence began on February 28, 2026 when the United States (US) and Israel launched attacks on Iran, which has subsequently targeted—to varying degrees—the six monarchies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The GCC states’ sense of betrayal stems from their supposed security guarantor, the US, neglecting to consult them leading up to its strikes, and then failing to defend their infrastructure and protect their interests during the ensuing conflict.[2] Oman responded uniquely by actively mediating US-Iranian talks, while expressing significant discontent at American behavior during the negotiations.
The challenges confronting Oman shifted as 2026 progressed. Before the Iran war began, Oman faced tensions on the Arabian Peninsula as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) escalated their rivalry in and beyond Yemen.[3] By late January, Oman observed the deadly public protests in Iran. Throughout February, Omani diplomats sought to secure a renewed nuclear deal between the US and Iran. Oman’s facilitative mediation was unable to prevent the launch of Operation Epic Fury. As US strikes commenced, Omani Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr Albusaidi posted on X: “I am dismayed. Active and serious negotiations have yet again been undermined… I urge the United States not to get sucked in further. This is not your war.”[4] Frustration among Omani decision makers was evident, especially given Albusaidi’s assertion on February 27, 2026 that a “peace deal is within our reach.”[5] The sequence of events in late February suggests that the US utilized Omani-mediated negotiations as a cover to prepare for “a reckless and unnecessary war of choice” which neglected the “diplomatic off-ramps that Omani diplomats worked hard to make available.”[6] This was emblematic of further insistence by Albusaidi that the US stop attacking Iran.[7]
Oman’s situation is similar to, yet distinct from, other small Arab monarchies that Courtney Freer and Curtis Ryan analyze in this volume. Like in Kuwait and Jordan, US actions against Iran have resulted in Iranian reactions that have imperiled Arab sovereignty and security. Unlike neighboring states, Iranian strikes on Oman—which hosts relatively less US equipment and fewer American personnel—have been few and far between. These similarities and differences situate Oman as a central case study for understanding how smaller states operate in an environment where, as Sean Yom assesses in this volume, “the key advantage of hierarchy—certainty—[has] decline[d] due to vacillating foreign policy interests within the dominant power.” Oman offers a window into what happens when a great power’s military actions are the animating source of security threats for its smaller partners, and how relatively weaker states ensure equilibrium in a region veering toward polarization. Oman’s unique skillset and choices allow it to survive threats, seize opportunities, and sustain adaptation in a precarious regional system.
Oman’s fundamental advantage is its magnanimous, multilateral, and measured diplomacy. Brokering detainee releases, mediating the cessation of hostilities, and facilitating talks between parties lends Oman a reliable reputation as a credible third-party. Oman eschews an expeditionary military and maintains a political economy distinct from its GCC neighbors. Oman’s approach is diplomatic pragmatism. But it also confronts the reality of limited leverage within a hierarchical regional order. The paper proceeds as follows. First, I explain the source and substance of Oman’s foreign policy. Then, I overview the challenges it confronts. Next, I analyze the opportunities Oman has for third-party diplomacy. I conclude with the implications of my findings for other regional states.
Intrinsically Independent
Not every relatively small or weak state can exercise independence. As the International Relations literature demonstrates, many must balance through alliance membership, bandwagon through dependence, or bolster official neutrality.[8] Since the 1970s, Oman as retained its independence by aligning with every significant actor in the Gulf regional security complex, avoiding participation in military coalitions, basing its security on Anglo-American ties, and forging Indo-Pacific commercial connections. Though these actions, Oman has avoided what Michael Handel cautioned as “the conditions most dangerous to security and independence of the weak states,” which include “isolation from the international system, or inclusion within the sphere of influence of one of the great powers.”[9] Oman’s independence has yielded successes, including facilitation that culminated in the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. Many works locate the cause of Oman’s independent foreign policy in its geographic location, domestic cultural, and/or former Sultan Qaboos’s personal qualities.[10] These three factors are essential. However, just as important for Oman’s post-1970 foreign policy is the series of counterinsurgency partnerships that Oman formed and fostered to defeat resistance emanating from Dhofar, in the southwest of the country.[11] It was those external partnerships that Oman leveraged into its foreign policy independence seen today.
Sultan Qaboos established the pillars of Oman’s foreign policy: non-interference in the affairs of other states, engagement with all actors in a pragmatic way, and stability and consistency in decision making.[12] His successor Sultan Haitham has continued this approach. Toward Iran, Oman maintains sound relations with the Islamic Republic, which toppled the Iranian regime that deployed to Dhofar. Toward the US, Oman coordinates strategically, but it has been able to ensure its autonomy. Toward its GCC neighbors, Oman is integral to the bloc, but it rejects subordination to Saudi or Emirati primacy.
A trio of dilemmas surround Oman: peninsular politics, Iran’s social and security situation, and US diplomatic initiatives and military actions. Prior to the outbreak of war in the Gulf this February, Oman faced connected crises to its west and north. In Yemen, the coalition intended to confront the Iran-backed Houthis all but crumbled. In 2022, the coalitional Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) was established to paper over the divisions between Yemen’s internationally-recognized government and the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC). That façade faded in December 2025 when STC forces swept across southern Yemeni governorates in a bid for full control over an independent south. Oman seeks a secure and stable Yemen, because a renewed North-South split would exacerbate tensions and could lead to conflict spillover. Oman approaches Yemen as a de jure sovereign state in which there are myriad de facto local actors, including the Houthis, the PLC, and—to some extent—the STC. The dilemma for Oman is this trio are backed by Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, respectively, reflecting conflict regionalization. Thus, Oman aims for “preservation of strategic independence” to prevent any outcomes “imposed through proxies, surrogate actors, or externally driven territorial designs.”[13]
This ambition had confronted heightened Saudi-Emirati competition. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have had differences of strategy in Yemen for over a decade. But by early 2026, operational variations demonstrated deep divisions. Saudi aerial forces targeted STC positions, ultimately contributing to the group’s contraction, loss of control, and reports of its dissolution on January 9.[14] On January 26, the Saudi foreign minister stated that a full withdrawal of Emirati forces from Yemen (where some remained after a reduction in 2019) would be foundational to continuing Saudi Arabia’s strong relationship with the UAE.[15] Management of Saudi-UAE tactical tensions and strategic strains will be vital for Oman.
Across the Gulf, Oman witnessed an Iran facing widespread social protests. The Iranian regime turned to force to quell these, with death toll figures placed between 3,000 and tens of thousands by January 2026.[16] Amid these protests and ongoing international sanctions, the Iranian regime must also navigate the future of its nuclear program. There was Omani facilitation of nuclear negotiations between the US and Iran in 2025 that stalled with the start of Israeli—and then American—strikes on Iran in June 2025. The threat of material danger to Omani transit and trade, stemming from renewed combat between the trio, came to pass by late February 2026.
This brings us to the US. Oman has pragmatically coordinated with its American partner. For example, the duo undertook their Third Strategic Dialogue in January 2026 and focused on deepening their economic exchange. But Oman has not joined the US-led and Trump-chaired “Board of Peace” (BOP). BOP is an intergovernmental organization tasked with post-conflict governance, reconstruction, and security in the Gaza Strip. Oman also eschewed membership in another US-brokered bloc, the Abraham Accords normalizations between Israel and a few Arab states. Oman has hosted Israeli prime ministers, but it is adamant that recognition of Israel is predicated on an independent State of Palestine. Thus, any threat arising from the US would entail pressure on Oman to join its political blocs. As quoted by Asim Al-Shaidi in Oman Daily on March 11, 2026, Albusaidi observed that “the actual objective of the war is weakening Iran, reshaping the region, and advancing the normalization agenda” before declaring that Oman “will not join this [BOP] council and will not normalize with Israel.”[17] Oman is retaining its core foreign policy principles despite US insistence on its Arab partners joining polarized blocs.
Oman’s Opportunities
How can a relatively small and weak state like Oman address these challenges? As argued above, Oman has opted to meet its challenges by deftly deploying third-party diplomacy and maintaining its foreign policy independence. In Yemen, Oman has the comparative advantage of being the sole GCC state with working relations with the Houthis. This has resulted in de-escalations with magnanimous aspects, including ceasefire agreements and detainee releases between 2023-2025. These are successes that could position Oman well to facilitate intra-Yemeni peace talks in the future. Oman has handled the rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in an independent way. In March 2015, it was the sole GCC state to not join the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. But, amid Emirati expansion around the Gulf of Aden, Oman shifted to Saudi Arabia to counterbalance the UAE. Oman remains cautious in not publicly siding with either state, retains its multilateral approach, and would be well-positioned to mediate between Saudi Arabia and the UAE should their tensions resurface.
Between Iran and the US, Oman took a measured position in their early 2026 negotiations. Throughout February, Oman hosted US-Iranian talks in Muscat and facilitated two rounds of indirect talks in Switzerland. Throughout the month, the threat of American war on Iran loomed, resulting in an urgency for Oman which led to more active mediation. As Alex Vatanka argued at the time: “If Muscat wants its mediation to remain credible and its region intact, it must use its good offices in Tehran not just to relay messages but also to influence Iranian choices in ways it has rarely attempted before.”[18] As addressed in the next section, the clear shift from its long-held, covert facilitation to overt mediation was unable to prevent the outbreak of war.
The reliable reputation that Oman has cultivated is an asset—but it is not a panacea. Indeed, the Sultanate faces two primary hinderances to its diplomacy. First, there is the reality of limited leverage. Oman’s facilitative form of third-party diplomacy, marked by its discreetness and quietness, gives Oman comparative advantage on sensitive issues. But its precludes an ability to exert pressure or offer inducements. In Yemen, Oman has a working relationship with the Houthis, but cannot prevent its armed actions. Furthermore, its tireless diplomacy in early 2026 was unable to stop the US and Israeli strikes against Iran that precipitated this year’s Gulf conflict.
There are indications that new material threats and diplomatic dynamics are pushing Oman toward more formulative third-party diplomacy: mediation directly among disputants.[19] In Yemen, this has entailed direct involvement between the Houthis, Yemen’s government, and Saudi Arabia. On Iran and the US, this was demonstrated by the more active and publicized role of Omani diplomats in Rome and Geneva. Oman’s mediative push between the US and Iran in 2025-2026 may have stemmed from expectations of the Trump administration for publicized results from talks.[20] But Oman must remain prudent in augmenting its traditionally-discreet facilitation with the kind of active and overt mediation that brings with it more responsibilities of results. As shown by Turkey’s mediation between Israel and Syria in 2007, and Qatar’s mediation between the US and the Taliban in 2020 and between Israel and Hamas in 2023, overt mediation places greater onus on the mediator.
Second, there is the issue of trust building that the US and Oman must foster. As noted, the US launched Operation Epic Fury despite Omani insistence that a negotiated deal was within reach. As of mid-May 2026, uncertainties over the status of Iran’s nuclear program and uranium enrichment, the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, and the sustainability of an early April ceasefire abound. It is notable that Oman’s transport minister affirmed on April 8: “We have signed all maritime transport agreements that stipulate no fees on passage through the Strait of Hormuz.”[21] Omani frustration with American actions in late February has been apparent. But Albusaidi quickly affirmed Oman’s diplomatic role following the ceasefire announcement: “For now the world has stepped back from disaster. But there’s no room for complacency. Serious negotiations [are] now required for lasting peace. Oman will support this work for the vital and urgent purpose of strong and enduring regional security.”[22] Oman’s direct communications with Tehran, its sovereignty within the Strait of Hormuz, and its strategic partnership with the US demonstrate its centrality for Gulf stability.
What are the takeaways of the Omani case for understanding the actions and options of similarly small Middle Eastern states in a regional order poised for polarization? First, Oman has shown that survival does not just arise from relative military power, but also from relational mediatory power. As Bobby Ghosh noted in his exploration of Sultan Haitham’s economic management approach to governance: “In a region torn by rivalries, being everyone’s friend makes you indispensable.”[23] Oman’s independence lends it credibility and contributes to its safety. Analogously small regional states, like Kuwait or Jordan, could thereby enhance their third-party mediation to offset the material dangers they respectively confront. Second, Oman has approached adaptation gradually by augmenting its facilitative diplomacy with more formative mediation. The Omani lesson for other states is that they must remain flexible in their alignments and statecraft, and—as regional examples like Qatar demonstrate—realistic about the liabilities and limitations of mediation. Third, given that it has successfully seized opportunities to get belligerents like Saudi Arabia and the Houthis—as well as the US and Iran—to negotiate with one another, Oman will be key for securing sustained stability on the Arabian Peninsula and in the Persian Gulf.
[1] Waleed Hazbun, “In America’s Wake: Turbulence and Insecurity in the Middle East,” POMEPS Studies 34: shifting Global Politics and the Middle East, March 2019, https://pomeps.org/in-americas-wake-turbulence-and-insecurity-in-the-middle-east.
[2] Marc Lynch, “The United States Could Lose the Gulf,” Foreign Policy, March 5, 2026, https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/05/iran-israel-united-states-war-gulf-countries-alliances/.
[3] Marc Lynch, “The Saudi Arabia-UAE Dispute Is About More Than Just Yemen,” Foreign Policy, January 8, 2026, https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/01/08/saudi-arabia-uae-dispute-yemen-sudan/.
[4] Badr Albusaidi, X post, February 28, 2026, https://x.com/badralbusaidi/status/2027716606223388847?s=20.
[5] “Full Transcript: Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi tells ‘Face the Nation’ a U.S.-Iran deal is ‘within our reach,’” CBS News, February 27, 2026, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/full-transcript-omani-foreign-minister-badr-albusaidi/.
[6] Giorgio Cafiero, “Iran War Tests Oman’s Foreign Policy,” Arab Gulf States Institute, March 13, 2026, https://agsi.org/analysis/iran-war-tests-omans-foreign-policy/.
[7] Badr Albusaidi, “America’s friends must help extricate it from an unlawful war,” The Economist, March 18, 2026, https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2026/03/18/americas-friends-must-help-extricate-it-from-an-unlawful-war.
[8] Glenn H. Snyder, “Review: Alliances, Balance, and Stability,” International Organization 45,
- 1 (Winter 1991): 128
[9] Michael I. Handel, Weak States in the International System (London: Frank Cass, 1990), 257-258.
[10] See Joseph A. Kechichian, Oman and the World: The Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995); Jeremy Jones and Nicholas Ridout, Oman, Culture and Diplomacy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012); and Linda Pappas Funsch, Oman Reborn: Balancing Tradition and Modernization (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015).
[11] Tyler B. Parker, “The Power of Partnerships: Explaining Oman’s Independent Foreign Policy,” The Middle East Journal 78, no. 1 (2024): 53-73.
[12] Author interviews in Oman, December 2025.
[13] Giorgio Cafiero, “Oman’s Calculus Amid the STC’s Southern Gains,” Gulf International Forum, December 31, 2025, https://gulfif.org/omans-calculus-amid-the-stcs-southern-gains/.
[14] “Southern Yemen separatist group says it will dissolve after its head fled to the UAE,” NPR, January 9, 2026, https://www.npr.org/2026/01/09/nx-s1-5672397/yemen-southern-transitional-council-dissolution-leader-uae.
[15] “Ties with UAE important for regional stability, Saudi Arabia’s top diplomat says,” Al Arabiya English, January 26, 2026, https://english.alarabiya.net/News/saudi-arabia/2026/01/26/ties-with-uae-important-for-regional-stability-saudi-arabia-s-top-diplomat-says.
[16] Kaveh Rostamkhani, “Appropriating the death count: Manufacturing consent for an attack on Iran,” Al Jazeera, January 31, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/1/31/appropriating-the-death-count-manufacturing-consent-for-an-attack-on-iran.
[17] Asim Al-Shaidi, “Sayyid Badr: Oman refuses to support a war lacking legitimacy and we adhere to diplomacy,” [translation my own] Oman Daily, March 11, 2026, https://www.omandaily.om/%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85/na/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6-%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%83-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A8%D9%84%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9.
[18] Alex Vatanka, “In the US-Iran Standoff, Oman’s Mediation Matters More Than Ever,” The National Interest, February 4, 2026, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/us-iran-standoff-oman-mediation-more-than-ever.
[19] On the distinctions between “facilitative” and “formulative” mediation, see Kyle C. Beardsley, David M. Quinn, Bidisha Biswas, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, “Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 1 (2006): 62–4.
[20] Author interviews in Oman, December 2025.
[21] AJABreaking, X post, April 8, 2026, https://x.com/ajabreaking/status/2041795191141453840?s=51.
[22] Badr Albusaidi, X post, April 8, 2026, https://x.com/badralbusaidi/status/2041772635642802271?s=51.
[23] Bobby Ghosh, “The Manager-Monarch Who Saved Oman,” Foreign Policy, January 12, 2026, https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/01/12/haitham-bin-tariq-oman-gulf-oil-diplomacy/.